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This thesis stages an encounter between theories of World Literature and the 
philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, using the concept of the line of flight as philosophical 
motif and methodological refrain. Initially, this will take the form of a critique of 
representational and metaphorical modes of reading in the work of two prominent 
world-literary theorists, Franco Moretti and Pascale Casanova. In contrast, the 
second chapter develops a materialist semiotics of world literature referred to as a 
geoliterature, utilising the concepts developed by Deleuze in collaboration with 
Félix Guattari and with special focus on Francophone Algerian literature as its 
practical elaboration. The third chapter extends this theorisation to present an 
alternative philosophy of postcolonial difference to dialectical models, reading 
Deleuze’s early work on Henri Bergson and his critique of Hegelian dialectics 
alongside the fiction of Zimbabwean novelist Dambudzo Marechera. The fourth 
chapter argues that this postcolonial Bergsonism makes Deleuze’s philosophy of 
time, as presented in Difference and Repetition, already a postcolonial alternative 
to theories of the subject belonging to European modernity. This argument is made 
by reading Deleuze’s ‘three syntheses of time’ through three contemporary world-
literary works by J.M. Coetzee, Amitav Ghosh and Alexis Wright respectively. In 
each chapter the line of flight returns as a conceptual motif (whether as the scream 
in Assia Djebar’s work, the rejection of recognition in Dambudzo Marechera’s Black 
Sunlight, or the disjunctive synthesis of the future embodied by Alexis Wright’s The 
Swan Book). The Coda draws these readings together, arguing for a speculative 
cartography which thinks the becoming of world literature via the aesthetic figure 
of the line of flight and an ethics of fabulation rather than representation, taking 
the study of world-literary theory beyond the paradigms of nationalism and 





Introduction: “Capitalism is Profoundly Illiterate”1 
 
"Like Deleuze. I believe in the world and want to be in it. I want to be in it all the 
way to the end of it because I believe in another world in the world and I want to be 
in that".2 
 
The world is not what it used to be. In fact, as soon as the world became an 
object for the human sciences towards the end of the twentieth century (via the 
economic and social effects of globalisation) its end was also on the horizon via 
global warming and ecological disaster. As Foucault understood, that which is 
visible and sayable (an episteme) only begins to be knowable as it is in the process 
of mutating into something else. In the humanities and literary studies in particular, 
the effects of globalisation were inscribed at an institutional level via the formation 
of a new theoretical paradigm: World Literature.3 But already this formation is 
beginning to seem untenable. The world of world literary theory, articulated best 
by the endless plasticity and adaptability of the novel form in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, no longer seems to offer us much purchase on a global 
capitalism which has long preferred the instantaneous communication and digital 
coding of financial transactions over the messy and comparatively slow antics of the 
written word. "Capitalism is Profoundly Illiterate" argued Deleuze and Guattari, as 
far back as 1972.4 
By positing the world of capital as its objective reality, theories of World 
Literature have tended to affirm rather than critique the conditions in which 
literature is produced. The novel, the poem or the book itself are secondary to the 
reality making codes and forces of the economy. An unbridgeable gap exists 
between the world and the literary. Despite trying to return literary studies to a 
                                                          
1 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, 
Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane, (London: Continuum 2004; Paris: Les Éditions De Minuit 1972), p.260. 
2 Fred Moten and Stefano Harney, The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, (New 
York: Minor Compositions 2013), p.118. Original emphasis. 
3 Although use the term extends as far back as Goethe, I refer here to its re-inscription as a specific 
paradigm for thinking about the effects of globalisation on literary studies. 
4 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus p.260. 
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more materialistic and scientific praxis against the discursive excesses of new 
criticism, structuralism or deconstruction, World Literature as it is theorised by 
Franco Moretti, Pascale Casanova, David Damrosch and others is fundamentally 
anti-materialistic in its consideration of the book as matter. The matter of the book 
is significant only insofar as its content can be mined for clues leading to the 
machinations of capital pulling the strings. If we accept the premise that the literary 
space is determined by political economy (as Moretti, Casanova and Damrosch all 
do at various points) then reading them will only reveal that determining logic at 
work. In fact, it is the matter of reading that matters. Reading (whether close or 
distant) is never simply a discursive or symbolic event. By dispensing with the body 
of the text in favour of data-analytic models Moretti, for instance, reinforces the 
idea that the book-as-object, the text that I hold in my hand or see on the screen, 
does not matter. There still remains in world literary theory a hard binary between 
the former and the latter term that more recent theorists have attempted to elide 
via a hyphen (World-Literature) that would aim to jump the void between text and 
world that Moretti's work originally enacted.5 
Here I distance myself from those theories of World Literature (and World-
Literature) carried out first by Casanova and Moretti at the turn of the 21st century 
and renewed recently by the Warwick Research Collective (WReC), which describe 
themselves as materialist but only in specific senses. These materialisms might be 
classified thus: in Casanova it takes the form of Bourdieuian sociology, in Moretti 
the anti-dialectical strain of Italian Marxism pursued by Galvano Della Volpe and 
Lucio Coletti, and in the Warwick Research Collective by a commitment to the 
theory of combined and uneven development put forth by Trotsky.6 My aim is not 
to suggest these paradigms are wrong, or to return to a strictly a-historical 
formalism, but to put forward a different tradition of philosophical materialism 
which includes Lucretius, Spinoza, Marx, Bergson and Deleuze and which has thus 
far been overlooked when it comes to the philosophy of literature, in spite of its 
                                                          
5 Warwick Research Collective, Combined and Uneven Development: Towards a New Theory of World 
Literature, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 2016). 
6 Both Moretti and the WReC are of course indebted to the Marxist analyses of Lukács, Gramsci and 
Jameson as well. 
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having significant influence over the field of contemporary continental philosophy. 
This “minor” materialism which includes Marx but does not originate in him, takes 
the reality of material processes seriously, instead of relegating them in favour of 
questions over discursive or symbolic representation associated with the so-called 
linguistic turn, but neither does it reduce the matter of the text to its historical 
conditioning in a certain mode of production; the interpretation of which is the 
horizon of all reading.7 
This argument, that we need to pay attention to the “stuff” of the world 
independently of what that stuff means for us, is where Deleuze’s philosophy has 
had the most impact in the humanities and social sciences in ushering in a wave of 
renewed materialist thought since the late 1980s and early 1990s. I include in this 
return to materialism the work of Rosi Braidotti, Claire Colebrook, Camilla Griggers 
and Bruno Latour. This new materialism is also a feminist materialism in calling for a 
“situated” political philosophy, which attends to the material and corporeal 
processes by which certain bodies, communities or groups are caught up in modes 
of subjection and are not simply subject to discursive or symbolic exclusion from 
some ontologically prior real.8 In postcolonial studies, for instance, the work of 
Reda Bensmaia, Lorna Burns and Simone Bignall constitute a minor Deleuzian line 
which belongs neither to the Derridean-dominated field of discourse analysts such 
as Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha, but neither to the neo-Marxist “second wave” 
of postcolonial theory represented by Neil Lazarus and Benita Parry. Whether in 
Francophone-African literatures (Bensmaia), the Caribbean (Burns) or Australia 
(Bignall) the influence of Deleuze on postcolonial studies is at once situated and 
                                                          
7 For instance, the WReC’s favoured term when it comes to describing what literature actually does 
is “register”—which to me implies an understanding of the text as a recording surface for the forces 
of social and historical systems, rather than considering the text as certain kind of material itself, in 
relation to other material and discursive flows. See Combined and Uneven Development: Toward a 
New Theory of World Literature, p.16. The Gramscian overtones of this configuration I contrast to 
the “geoliterature” I pursue in Chapter 2. 
8 Rosi Braidotti: “Feminists have been openly critical of the universalistic orientation of most political 
theory, Marxism included. We stress instead the need for a change of scale, to unveil power 
relations where they are most effective and invisible: in the specific locations of one’s own carnal, 
psychic and social existence, in our immanent intellectual and social practices. One has to start from 
micro-instances of embodied and embedded self and the complex web of social relations which 
compose the self. A situated practice.” Rosi Braidotti, Punk Women and Riot Grrls (2015) 
<http://www.performancephilosophy.org/journal/article/view/32/63> [Accessed 20 January 2018]. 
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specific to local conditions without subjecting those situations to singular or 
totalising symbolic structures of cultural difference in abstraction. This mobile or 
tactical thinking-in-movement which Deleuze demands of his readers, Bensmaia has 
described as akin to becoming “a stalker in philosophy” in the manner of 
Tarkovsky’s cinematic style.9 
In the following work I will show how Deleuze's philosophy offers us a rich 
and productive way of thinking not just about the materiality of texts, but how 
writing and reading (in the broadest sense of practices of inscription on surfaces 
and the interactions those inscriptions partake in as part of a social field) can in fact 
go beyond their material manifestation as inscriptions and produce 
transformations, passages and becomings in the world. This is why I have taken 
Deleuze’s concept of the line of flight as a conceptual refrain and philosophical 
motif throughout, for the way it allows us to think of the literary as a worldly 
encounter that produces passages of escape, lines of deterritorialisation, from the 
reality of things (the “subjectivity and objectivity of what happens”).10 
The line of flight occurs in several of Deleuze’s texts written both under his 
own name and in collaboration, but always seems to mark a threshold moment in 
his arguments, wherein it assumes a piloting role in taking Deleuze’s thought away 
from its predetermined path and into new territories and new encounters with 
those beings outside of philosophy: artists, paintings, writers, texts, films, 
schizophrenics, political activists, anti-psychiatrists and many others. In an 
untranslated text written anonymously for the Groupe d’Information Sur Les 
Prisons, for instance, we find the clearest exposition of the concept of the line of 
flight in Deleuze’s corpus—where Deleuze’s thought happens precisely in the 
encounter with the political aftermath of the death of the activist, prisoner and 
Black Panther George Jackson: 
Il y a quelque chose en nous qui nous fait croire souvent que les 
interventions du pouvoir, si elles ne sont pas justes, sont du moins 
                                                          
9 Reda Bensmaia, “Preface: Gilles Deleuze and How to Become a ‘Stalker’ in Philosophy”, in Gilles 
Deleuze, Postcolonial Theory and the Philosophy of Limit, (London: Bloomsbury 2017), pp.x-xiv. 
10 Gilles Deleuze, “Immanence: A Life”, in Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life, trans. Anne Boyman 
(New York: Zone Books 2001), p.28. 
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diaboliques et bien calculées. Ce n'est pas vrai; tout échappe au pouvoir, à 
commencer par ce qu'il fait, ce qu'il conspire et ne domine pas. L'assassinat 
de Jackson est de ces choses, une ligne de fuite, comme dirait Jackson, où 
les révolutionnaires s'engagent. 
[There is something in us which often makes us believe that interventions of 
power, if they are not just, are at least evil and well calculated. This is not 
true; everything escapes power, starting with what it conspires to do and 
does not dominate. Jackson’s assassination is of these things, a line of flight, 
as Jackson would say, where the revolutionaries engage.]11 
The line of flight is not the antithesis of power but that which is always in a process 
of leaking from within its matrices; that which, in the course of power’s paranoia, is 
produced as a surplus value or threshold of escape. New techniques of surveillance, 
new workings of capital and new dimensions of control produce their own lines of 
flight, their own modes of resistance that are forged in the very workings of power. 
“As individuals and groups we are made of lines”, Deleuze and Parnet will argue, 
“lines that are very diverse in nature”.12 For Deleuze, society is defined by its lines 
rather than its bodies, institutions or structures (which are themselves traversed by 
lines). There are segmentary lines, which divide, striate and organise us into distinct 
categories:  
Each time, from one segment to another, we are told, “Now you are no 
longer a child”; then at school, “Now you are no longer at home”, then in 
the army, “This isn’t school anymore…” In short, all kinds of well-defined 
segments, going in every direction, which carve us up in every sense, these 
bundles of segmented lines.13 
But at the same time, there are lines which traverse and splinter off from their rigid 
segments, lines which are: 
                                                          
11 Groupe d’Information Sur Les Prisons “Aprés les Assasinastion”, in Intolérable ed. Phillipe Artières, 
(Paris: Editions Gallimard 2013 [1971]), p.209. My translation. 
12 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, “Politics” in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, On The Line, trans. 




[…] much more supple, that are somehow molecular. Not that they are 
more intimate are personal, for they traverse groups and societies as well as 
individuals. They trace out small modifications, cause detours, suggest 
“highs” or periods of depression; yet they are just as well defined, and even 
govern many irreversible processes. Rather than being segmented molar 
lines, these are molecular flows (flux) with thresholds or quanta. A threshold 
is crossed that doesn’t necessarily coincide with a segment of more visible 
lines. Many things happen along this second type of line—becomings, micro-
becomings—that don’t have the same rhythm as our history.14 
Lines are immanent to the social field, which is to say they compose the social field 
as the imminent milieu through which power conducts its paranoid segmentary 
divisions. Yet, at the same time, “there is always something that flows or flees, that 
escapes the binary organizations, the resonance apparatus, and the overcoding 
machine”.15 The line of flight is always “on the run”, leading sometimes to a 
revolutionary new configuration, recording or reterritorialisation (the Black Panther 
Party) or sometimes to a deterritorialisation or flight which is more absolute, which 
draws a plane of consistency across all the segmentary and rigid lines as well as 
their molecular variations: deterritorialisation is absolute when it conforms to the 
first case and brings about the creation of a new earth, in other words, when it 
connects lines of flight, raises them to the power of an abstract vital line, or draws a 
plane of consistency.16 Sometimes the flights are blocked, the escape plan aborted, 
and the line of flight becomes instead a line of abolition or death; “the line of flight 
blasts the two [supple and rigid] segmentary series apart; but it is capable of the 
worst, of bouncing off the wall, falling into a black hole, […] and in its vagaries 
reconstructing the most rigid of segments”.17 
What would a literary history look like from the perspective of the line of 
flight? Grant Hamilton speaks of world literature as the leakage of national 
literatures; of texts which break out of their circulation within a national context 
                                                          
14 Ibid. Original emphasis. 
15 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 





and take up a more global or international audience.18 But this is not quite right, for 
the line of flight is indeed a “leaking” but from within the national space as well as 
without: it is always “in the middle”, neither national or global but carving out its 
own trajectory from within those cartographies. It is speculative not descriptive.19 
Though they exist within societies (or sometimes at their legislative bind spots or 
unofficial zones of control) prisons, schools, hospitals and universities are made of 
borders no less than the geographic borders between countries. Hamilton assumes 
there was something called “national literature” in the first place, but the line of 
flight tells us that identities are always a threshold, a becoming-otherwise, always 
fleeing what they are. “Kafkaesque” is not a German, nor Czech, nor Jewish, nor 
global author-function, but something entirely stranger: a minor literature that 
builds an elaborate architecture in order to escape the segmentary lines by which 
we might try capture it in the form of meaning, representation or allegory. In 
Deleuze and Parnet’s survey of the Anglo-American novel, what is revealed is not a 
voyage—a journey between points—but a flight which can happen even “on the 
spot”; a becoming which maps its own relations, its own molecular variations, its 
own lines and transformations and which does not trace what it already knows: an 
exo-geography. Sure, there is always the risk of returning to the nation, to “our” 
history, to Oedipus (“what is it which tells us that, on a line of flight, we will not 
rediscover everything we were fleeing?”) but nonetheless, to write is always to take 
up a line of flight, without knowing its trajectory: “to write is to trace lines of flight 
which are not imaginary, and which one is indeed forced to follow. Because in 
reality writing involves us there. To write is to become, but has nothing to do with 
becoming a writer”.20 
The following work, therefore, is not a representation or a tracing of 
Deleuze’s own becoming, but an encounter which requires its own constellation, its 
own cartography, in order to follow the lines of flight I have sought in world 
                                                          
18 Grant Hamilton, “On World Literature: When Goethe Met Boltzmann”, Textual Practice, 28.6 
(2014), 1015-1033. 
19 For more on the notion of ‘speculative cartography’ as alternative research methodology to world 
literature, see my conclusion. 
20 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, “On the Superiority of the Anglo-American Novel”, in Dialogues II 
trans. Hugh Tomlinson, Barbara Haberjam and Elliot Ross Albert, (London: Continuum 2002; Paris: 
Flammarion 1977), pp.38-43. 
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literature. The primary concepts I draw from Deleuze (“geoliterature”, 
“unbecoming”, “the caesura” and others) may or may not appear in Deleuze’s work 
themselves, but nonetheless repeat the creative force of Deleuze’s thought in new 
directions. This is the only possible interpretation of an oeuvre that systematically 
resists systemisation. Deleuze constantly reinvented his vocabulary so as to 
emphasise the specificity and difference of his various encounters with art and 
artists (Bacon is not Kafka, Proust is not Ozu) so as to avoid reducing his concepts to 
a set of ready-mades: a guerrilla metaphysics. There are several works which 
reconstruct Deleuze’s literary philosophy (rather than his “philosophy of literature”) 
by showing the historical progression and continuity of his thinking with respect to 
difference. These are often productive and instructive, but they can also run 
counter to Deleuze’s ontological, ethical and aesthetic rejection of representation, 
whereby we can reduce and summarise the labour performed by concepts such as 
the critical and clinical, the apprenticeship in signs, masochism, minor literature, 
visions and auditions, to a set of identities to be applied in different situations. A 
concept is always a constellation. This thesis is not an interpretation or an exegesis 
but an attempt to think Deleuze’s philosophy via an encounter with various world 
literary texts which follows its own lines of flight, its own passages and 
transformations. From repetition: difference.  
My reading of Deleuze instead takes the form of a zig-zag line: beginning 
with an investigation of the Capitalisation and Schizophrenia project (in which I 
include the “missing plateau” of Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature in between the 
first and second volumes) in light of the scholarship on world literary theory. Then 
in chapter 2 I move on to a more focused reconstruction of the ‘Postulates of 
Linguistics’ from A Thousand Plateaus in the service of thinking a properly 
materialist geoliterature. In chapter 3 I go back to Deleuze’s early concepts of 
difference and multiplicity in Bergsonism, his break from the dominant form of 
Hegelian dialectics practiced French philosophy at the time, for the ways this might 
inform a postcolonial politics beyond that of centre, periphery and notions of 
hybridity. Finally, my argument culminates in a reading of the three syntheses of 
time in Difference and Repetition, alongside three contemporary works of world 
literature, where the spatial politics of geoliterature now gives way to a fully 
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temporal politics of a dissolved, mobile, and nomadic form of subjectivity that 
opens the possibility of multiple and differential worlds within “the” world.  
I do not intend to argue that Deleuze’s philosophy can be thought of in 
terms of its relevance and application to postcolonial problematics, therefore, but 
that Deleuze’s philosophy is, virtually if not actually, already a postcolonial one in 
its response to and overturning of the Kantian subject of modernity and its 
Others.21  
Deleuze does not write a philosophy “of” literature but rather a literary-
philosophy that thinks in proximity to the lines of flight literature and aberrant 
movements literature undertakes. This is why Jean-Luc Nancy describes Deleuze’s 
philosophy as “[a] philosophy of passage, and not of ground or of territory. The 
passage: a displacement and an assembling, fleeting or prolonged, but always 
perfect, completed, which does not mean fulfilled.22 Whilst several have noted this 
fact, few works on/with Deleuze take it to its radical conclusions: Deleuze's oeuvre 
is composed almost entirely in indirect discourse.23 Speaking of “Deleuzian 
philosophy” or “Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy”, or even (as some have 
attempted) to isolate a self-sufficient Deleuzian corpus independent of his 
collaborators and interlocuters, is the most profound betrayal—a failure to think 
multiplicity. Even when writing under his own name, “Deleuze” is an encounter, a 
becoming, that follows lines and passages laid out by his fellow travellers (Guattari, 
Claire Parnet, Foucault, Antonio Negri, Carmelo Bene, as well as Proust, Sacher-
Masoch, Kafka, Joyce, Beckett, Lawrence, Melville and innumerable others). “Since 
each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd”.24  
Reading works of world literature with Deleuze is to open oneself to the 
encounter, to be taken up by a line of flight, to abandon the narratives of the self 
                                                          
21 Toni Morrison has argued, for instance, that in their exposure to dislocation, alienation and 
subjective fragmentation, slaves were the first true ‘moderns’. See Toni Morrison qtd. in Paul Gilroy, 
“Living Memory: A Meeting with Toni Morrison”, in Small Acts: Thoughts on the Politics of Black 
Cultures, (London: Serpent’s Tale 1993), p.177. 
22 Jean-Luc Nancy, “The Deleuzian Fold of Thought”, in Deleuze: A Critical Reader, ed. Paul Patton, 
(London: Blackwell 1996), p.112. 
23 See Joe Hughes, Difference and Repetition: A Reader’s Guide, (London: Continuum 2009), for one 
of the only commentaries on Deleuze that acknowledges his use of indirect discourse throughout his 
monographs on other philosophers. 
24 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.3. 
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and the other, to find an escape route which no longer passes through an author 
function but is instead an imminent cartography. What Deleuze, after Henri 
Bergson, calls “fabulation”, or that mode of storytelling which is speculative, which 
gathers together the various bodies, territories, social machines, institutions it 
encounters and in doing so dissolves their historical specificity, their location and 
determination by power and instead partakes in fictioning the real as nothing less 
than the destruction of the world in the service of the worldy: where the lines of 
flight meet an Earth and a people as yet inexistent (“yet to come”) but whose 
apparition we might seek in the cracks along the segmentary lines of persons, 
nations, institutions, prisons, identities and disciplines.25 
                                                          
25 Deleuze: “We ought to take up Bergson’s notion of fabulation and give it political meaning”. Gilles 
Deleuze and Antoni Negri “Control and Becoming”, in Deleuze, Negotiations 1972-1990, p.174 
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1. Reading World Literature with Deleuze 
 
1.1. Maps, trees and metaphors 
 
Now, trees and waves are both metaphors – but except for this, they have 
nothing in common. The tree describes the passage from unity to diversity: 
one tree with many branches: from Indo-European, to dozens of different 
languages […] Trees are what nation-states cling to; waves are what markets 
do.1 
It is odd how the tree has dominated Western reality and all of Western 
thought from botony to biology and anatomy, but also gnosiology, theology, 
ontology, all of philosophy …: the root foundation, grund, racine, 
fondement.2 
The tree as metaphor, as model, or as image of thought itself? How is it that 
this same idea comes to preoccupy the speculative theorization of a world-literary 
system at the turn of the twenty-first century, as continually reoccurs in the 
thought of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari almost three decades earlier? This 
repetition, or reoccurrence, of the arborescent as a conceptual figure has seemingly 
thus far gone unnoticed. Perhaps this is due not so much to the calcification of 
disciplinary barriers in the years since Moretti’s first conjectures on the world-
literary system, but speaks rather to a deeper indifference between world-literary 
studies and poststructuralist philosophy: “In a hundred odd pages [Kafka: Toward a 
Minor Literature] contains a truly impressive amount of nonsense”.3 Despite 
Moretti’s flippancy towards Deleuze and Guattari here, I will argue that this 
indifference actually plays itself out at the level of praxis, of concepts and 
                                                          
1 Franco Moretti, “Conjectures on World Literature”, in Distant Reading, (London: Verso 2013), p.60. 
2 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi, (London: Continuum 
2004; Paris: Les Editions de Minuit 1980), p.20. 
3 Franco Moretti, Modern Epic: The World System from Goethe to Marquez, (London: Verso 1996), 
p.199. Moretti is apparently unaware that Deleuze wrote a whole book on the subject of nonsense, 
The Logic of Sense, which is actually much longer. 
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methodologies, rather than on any superficial or surface level. By exposing world-
systems theory and its aftershocks in literary studies over the last decade to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy, I will attempt to identify a political and 
conceptual blind spot within world literary theory as practiced by two of its 
prominent early figures—Franco Moretti and Pascale Casanova—when it comes to 
thinking the relation between language and power, subjectivity and literary forms, 
and the immanence of text and world. In place of the representational thinking of 
models and metaphors, where the text becomes only a simulacrum or bad copy of a 
more ontologically rich reality, I wish to substitute an immanent cartography of 
lines and transformations where the text is already worldly (it partakes in the 
becoming of the world) and does not need to have the concept of worldliness 
added to it as a theoretical supplement. 
In the first instance the problem concerns the ontology of the model itself. 
As a metaphor, the image of the tree is useful for Moretti across a number of 
different fields - evolutionary biology, macroeconomic history, Marxist critical 
theory: 
Evolutionary trees constitute morphological diagrams, where history is 
systematically correlated with form […] From a single common origin to an 
immense variety of solutions: it is this incessant growing apart of life that 
the branches of the morphological tree capture with such intuitive force […] 
a tree is a way of sketching how far a certain language has moved from 
another one, or from their common point of origin.4 
The logic of this metaphor derives from its capacity to bring aspects of actually 
existing states of affairs (the history of literature, the history of species, the history 
of language) into alignment as discrete fields whose objects of knowledge relate to 
each other in similar ways. That is to say, the metaphor works – it systematically 
correlates the movement of multiple histories into qualitative synthesis as specific 
examples within a totalizing system. The metaphor aims to make thought identical 
                                                          




with actual states of affairs. The positivism of Moretti’s early methodology here 
would seem to support his own description of his experiments as “scientific work” 
rather than either strictly or quasi-philosophical work as in the case of previous 
critical methodologies (e.g deconstruction).5 The abstract models which occupy 
Moretti both in Conjectures and Graphs, Maps, Trees work by making the global 
movement of literary forms available to vision in the form of a totalizing logic: 
“Wallerstein’s tripartition of core, periphery and semi-periphery appealed to me 
because it explained certain empirical findings I had slowly gathered”.6 In this case 
the metaphor of the tree has a double function in Moretti’s early work on world 
literary theory not only as an image of literary production on a planetary scale, but 
as an image of his own critical praxis.7 
 This distinction between the activity of science and the activity of 
philosophy qua philosophy is, I will argue, the reason for Moretti’s indifference to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work on Kafka in the 1970s despite the overlap in much of 
their intellectual material (systems theory, evolutionary biology, complexity 
theory). The metaphor of the tree slides for Moretti between the evolution of 
natural forms (in the case of the Darwinian tree) and of the evolution of language. 
Both, it would seem, work by a logic of bifurcation: 
From a single common origin to an immense variety of solutions: it is this 
incessant growing-apart of life forms that the branches of a morphological 
tree capture with such intuitive force […] a tree is a way of sketching how far 
a certain language has moved from another one, or from their common 
point of origin.8 
                                                          
5 Moretti, “Conjectures on World Literature”, p.45. 
6 Ibid. p.45. 
7 Moretti’s work is certainly not reliant on the image of the tree, nor is it reducible to it. My 
contention lies more with how the relationship between the evolutionary model of the tree and 
Moretti’s method of distant reading, the process of modelisation itself, can be read axiomatically for 
Moretti’s overall literary sociology. That is, the ontology of the model common to Darwin’s tree and 
Moretti’s theory of the world-system interests me for the way in which it is able to turn the Earth 
into an object of knowledge. Moretti’s own use of trees as models for literary and cultural analysis 
extends beyond the evolutionary tree, but the ontology of modelisation and representation remains 
fairly consistent. 
8 Moretti, Graphs, Maps, Trees, p.70. 
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In the language of Deleuze and Guattari, the tree functions as a “plane of 
reference” composed of “a system of coordinates [in which] the bifurcations, 
slowing-downs, and accelerations produce holes, breaks and ruptures that refer 
back to other variables, other relations, and other references”.9 Science, for 
Deleuze and Guattari, operates by an axiomatic logic that responds to instances of 
rupture or chaos by introducing new “functives” (models, ideas, images) to a plane 
of reference.10 From within this plane the problematic behaviour of matter can be 
brought into relation with previous objects of scientific knowledge as a particular 
instance of differentiation within a transcendent conceptual synthesis. Here we 
have an image of thought which corresponds to the image of the tree as a system 
consisting of extensive differences from a unifying logic. Moretti’s emphasis on 
models, tracings and visualisations can therefore be understood as scientific activity 
even in Deleuze and Guattari’s esoteric terminology. Citing Max Weber, Moretti 
shares much of his conceptual vocabulary in Conjectures with Deleuze and Guattari 
in What is Philosophy? In describing the modes of scientific activity: “It is not the 
‘actual’ interconnection of ‘things’, Max Weber wrote, ‘but the conceptual 
interconnection of problems which defines the scope of the various sciences. A new 
‘science’ emerges where a new problem is pursued by a new method”.11 This 
theoretical movement, from stable notions of identity to degrees of difference from 
a norm, is precisely the principle which Deleuze and Guattari attack throughout 
their work not as incorrect per se, but as the dominant image of thought for 
historical capitalist societies and from which their philosophy marks a point of 
escape. Furthermore, this indifference – the fundamental disagreement between 
what it is Moretti and Deleuze and Guattari believe they are doing – will inform my 
explication of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of minor literature and its qualitative 
difference from contemporary approaches to world literary theory, as well as how 
the two may be combined in creative and unforeseen ways. 
                                                          
9 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, Trans. Graham Burchill and Hugh Tomlinson, 
(London: Verso 1994; Paris: Les Editions de Minuit 1991), p.120, p.124.  
10 Ibid. p.127. 
11 Moretti, “Conjectures”, p.46. 
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Moretti’s morphological tracing gives us the extensive difference of 
languages from one another, but not the qualitative differences within languages 
themselves and from which, for Deleuze and Guattari, literature draws its political 
content. If the evolutionary tree in Moretti’s hands expresses the spatio-temporal 
difference of language, this difference between languages rather than within them 
also implies the presence of a linguistic “genetic material” which is universal to all 
languages and through which each individual language can theoretically be traced 
back to its common ancestor. I posit that this “genetic material” correlates to 
theories of universal grammar in scientific linguistics developed by Noam Chomsky 
among others. This view of language, however, is grounded in a conceptual process 
which moves from origins and identity to differentiation and individuation. That is 
to say, Moretti’s evolutionary-linguistic schema is a theory of logos. In other words, 
a conceptual privileging of identity over difference - or what Deleuze refers to as 
“the dogmatic image of thought”.12 
In A Thousand Plateaus this dogmatic image is associated in linguistics with 
Chomsky—who comes under attack in the fourth plateau Postulates of Linguistics: 
“Chomsky’s abstract machine retains an arborescent model and a linear ordering of 
linguistic elements […] It is what allows linguistics to claim a basis in pure 
scientificity, to be nothing but science”.13 This commitment to logos allows scientific 
linguistics to render individual cases of language-use (in the form of dialect or 
syntax) as so many instances of variation or difference derived from a 
transcendental grammar of identities: 
Chomsky asks only that one carve from this aggregate a homogenous or 
standard system as a basis for abstraction or idealization, making possible a 
scientific study of principles. Limiting oneself to standard English is thus not 
the issue, for even a linguist who studies Black English or the English of the 
                                                          
12 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton, (London: Continuum 2004; Paris: 
Presse Universitaires de France 1968), p.185. 
13 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp.101-2. 
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ghettos is obliged to extract a standard system guaranteeing the constancy 
and homogeneity of the object under study.14 
The tendency to extract categories of grammatical identity from the heterogeneity 
of language as it exists in the world is precisely what leads linguistics to separate 
language as a transcendental object of knowledge. The specificity and singularity of 
linguistic difference is downplayed. The dogmatic or representational image of 
thought transforms the figure of the tree as a metaphor for language, into an image 
of metaphor itself—that is to say—metaphor as the form of conceptual 
representation through which thought is made to correlate to a perceived state of 
affairs in the world. Instead of being an impartial tool through which empirical 
inquiry can be furthered, metaphorical structures come to dominate Moretti’s 
conceptual vocabulary to the exclusion of anything else. Interpretation becomes its 
own dogma. 
The problem which theories of World Literature still seek to address, we 
may remember, is a perceived inability in the theoretical apparatus of comparative 
approaches to have any purchase on the life-world of capitalism in its period of 
globalised accumulation. The initial response to this lack was, however, to construct 
a new science wherein the objective reality of the world pre-exists the “law of 
literary evolution” which presumably awaits to be discovered.15 To look at it 
another way, Moretti’s rejection of close reading and the necessary ontological 
baggage which accompanies its history (dialectical materialism, deconstruction) has 
only resulted in a covert ontology returning through the back door as the scientific 
a priori on which Moretti’s system is built. Deleuze and Guattari’s strategy is not 
simply to reject science as a discipline but rather the folding of ontology entirely 
into scientific enquiry. Linguistics has it that language exists in a more or less stable 
state from which universals can be extracted, to the extent that the experiments 
with field recordings and sociolinguistics conducted by William Labov in the 1970s 
were seen as radical. The debate between Chomsky and Labov which forms the 
background to Deleuze and Guattari’s fourth plateau can be understood in terms of 
                                                          
14 Ibid. p.103, original emphasis. 
15 Franco Moretti, “Conjectures”, p.152. 
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a struggle between a transcendental, dogmatic structure and a rhizomatic, 
heterogeneous milieu of variation and difference. Moretti’s theoretical 
indebtedness to Chomsky, rather than Labov, leads him to repeat this systematic 
reduction of difference. That is to say, where language and literature are for 
Moretti similar in respect to their combined and uneven development as world-
system, the totalizing logic of representation ignores what it is literature as 
literature actually does – as a specific kind of language-use.  Everywhere Moretti’s 
abstract models find traction it is at the expense of a discussion of stylistics, of 
action, in favour of semiotics and metaphor. Critical distance from the text may be 
expanded but “reading” remains an essentially interpretative ontological praxis. 
Here I wish to identify a similarity between Moretti’s scientific materialism 
(which he inherits from the anti-dialectical Italian Marxists Galvano Della Volpe and 
Lucio Coletti) and the forms of scientific Marxism practiced by the French 
Communist Party during the mid-twentieth century. A Thousand Plateaus’ emphasis 
on metaphor and representation as oppressive categories is described by Brian 
Massumi as an attack on the variations of “State philosophy” which permeate 
Western metaphysics.16 The state in this understanding is not merely a socio-
economic phenomenon but an ontological framework “grounded in a double 
identity: of the thinking subject, and of the concepts it creates and to which it lends 
its own attributes of sameness and constancy” and through which “the subject, its 
concepts, and the ‘external’ objects to which the concepts are applied have a 
shared, internal essence: the self-resemblance at the basis of identity”.17 This 
description works well as a summation of Moretti’s theoretical concerns in both 
Conjectures and Graphs, Maps, Trees. By emphasising the scientific and empirical 
aspects of his research the more problematic questions of ontology can be passed 
over. In actual fact, when Moretti attempts to move literary studies past its reliance 
on the nation state for its ideological basis, not only does ontology make a return, 
but the still even more insidious State as an ontology as well. 
                                                          
16 Brian Massumi, A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizoprhenia: Deviations from Deleuze and 
Guattari, (Cambridge, Mass: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press 1992), p.2. 
17 Ibid. p.4. 
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Here we can begin to sketch a Deleuze-Guattarian critique of world literary 
theory as a discipline which fails to adequately address the gradual critique and 
overturning of Platonic philosophies of representation undertaken by post-
structuralism in the wake of May 1968, despite claims to the contrary. When 
Deleuze and Guattari invoke the imperative to “make rhizomes, not roots, never 
plant! Don’t be one or multiple, be multiplicities!” they contrast the making of a 
cartography with no centralised territory or point of origin, to the dogmatic work of 
the tree which subordinates all points in its matrix to the self-identity of logos.18 Of 
course Moretti makes both maps and trees, but the implication is that for him they 
constitute two variations on a general principle of representational criticism. Hence 
we can repurpose Deleuze and Guattari’s insistence that “binary logic is the 
spiritual reality of the root-tree. Even a discipline as ‘advanced’ as linguistics retains 
the root-tree as its fundamental image, and thus remains wedded to classical 
reflection” and redirect this attack towards world-systems approaches to literature 
in order to say that: “this system of thought has never reached an understanding of 
multiplicity”.19 
Is it possible to gesture towards an alternative to world literary theory 
where “the world” and “the text” do not work according to a logic by which the 
latter represents the former as a, however mediated, abstraction from the material 
substance of reality? In such an alternative, the two would exist as manifestations 
of the same substance in an immanent ontology of desiring-production whose 
categories are not pre-given. To some extent this would be to go against a tradition 
of materialist or Marxist criticism which seeks to find the abstract signification of 
dominant social relations lying sedimented in the formal properties of the text, in 
favour of an immanent criticism which sees those abstractions as both in the world 
and as part of the world. By drawing upon Deleuze and Guattari’s anti-linguistic 
theories in A Thousand Plateaus and Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature, the 
speculative cartography of texts which results will be contrasted to the more 
orthodox materialism of Moretti and Casanova’s world-systems theories. 
                                                          
18 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.27. 
19 Ibid. p.5. 
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1.2. Language and power 
 
When Moretti states that because “forms are the abstract of social 
relations: so, formal analysis is in its own modest way an analysis of power” 
conversely it is power as domination, oppression and resistance which is strangely 
absent from his evolutionary paradigm of language differentiation in Graphs, Maps, 
Trees.20 There the emphasis is instead on the organicist lexicon of Darwinian theory: 
If language evolves by diverging, why not literature too? For Darwin 
‘divergence of character’ interacts through history with ‘natural selection 
and extinction’: as variations grow apart from each other, selection 
intervenes, allowing only a few to survive.21 
My description of this process as organic refers to Moretti’s uncritical 
superimposition of rigid classification of species-isolation according to certain 
interpretations of Darwin, onto the phenomenon of language itself. The 
development of linguistic norms is no more organic than the development of state-
form is a natural evolution of primitive accumulation. As Manuel DeLanda has 
pointed out, the forms which evolution takes are not discrete categories: 
 [The isolation of species] need not result in perfectly impermeable barriers. 
Many plant species, for example, maintain their ability to exchange genes 
with other species, so their identity is fuzzy in the long-run. But even the 
defining boundaries of fully reproductively isolated animals like ourselves 
may be breached through the use of biotechnology, for example, or through 
the action of retroviruses, a fact that confirms the contingent nature of the 
boundaries.22 
But as well as undermining the primacy of the organism in evolutionary theory as a 
discrete object with an essential nature, these examples also point towards how 
Moretti’s substitution of species of animals for species of languages in Graphs, 
                                                          
20 Moretti, “Conjectures”, p.59. 
21 Moretti, Graphs, Maps, Trees p.71-72. 
22 Manuel DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity, 
(London: Continuum 2006), p.27. 
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Maps, Trees also relies upon essentialist tendencies in his linguistic sources. This 
essentialism is the crux of Deleuze and Guattari’s antagonism towards scientific 
linguistics in A Thousand Plateaus, but I will now show how this antagonism is still 
unresolved as regards to world literary theory and why the Chomskyan roots of 
Moretti’s linguistic trees cause the supposed epistemological break of Conjectures 
to misfire. 
 If for Moretti the models of abstraction which constitute literary texts are 
political in nature, then the order of abstraction by which this political nature can 
be derived is mistaken, according to Deleuze and Guattari. In Chomsky’s linguistics, 
they argue, “a constant or invariant is defined less by its permanence and duration 
than by its function as a centre”.23 These centres effect a system of standardisation 
where the identity of grammatical logos transcends the instances of variation which 
structure the actual use of language in the real world. Because of this, aspects of 
parole - speech, style, performance – which literature draws upon were considered 
irrelevant to the academic field of linguistics as it existed at the time Deleuze and 
Guattari wrote A Thousand Plateaus.  The philosophy of language which serves as 
the material for Moretti’s evolutionary models is in actuality disinterested in the 
activity of literature which it demotes to examples of rhetoric or poetics. If Moretti 
sees in the Chomskyan linguistic tree a continuity with the role of markets in the 
literary field rather than a contradiction, this is because a concept of 
communication and interpretation is common to both. Where in capitalist societies 
commodities are subject to the signifying regime of exchange, the transcendent 
sign of value is the principle through which the reality of the market is knowable. 
Similarly, for Deleuze and Guattari linguistics extracts from language the 
standardised laws which privilege langue (as communication) over parole (as the 
stylistic hetereogenity within language) in order that the integrity of the system not 
be compromised. When concepts of difference or variation are introduced into the 
system, it is only as elements in a series rather than units which shift the qualitative 
dynamic of the linguistic structure: “Brekle, for example, proposes adding an 
‘idiosyncratic performatory competence’ factor tied to a whole constellation of 
                                                          
23 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.105. 
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linguistic, psychological, or sociological factors. But what use is this injection of 
pragmatics if pragmatics is in turn constants or universals of its own?”24 Whilst 
concepts of force, politics or domination can be introduced into the linguistic tree, 
they are introduced as local phenomena within a hierarchical grammar of 
universals. Jean-Jacques Lecerle describes this hierarchy of a structure of 
standardised variants over a structure which could theoretically by defined by its 
variation as: 
The wrong type of immanence and the wrong level of abstraction: it is based 
on the separation of language from the rest of the phenomena (let us call it 
‘the world’ for short) and the separation within language of the relevant and 
irrelevant phenomena, thus using a ‘postulate of immanence’ to construct 
an internal linguistics, and in doing so leaving out a remainder that only 
literature is able to capture.25 
Where Chomsky’s linguistic tree transcends the internal difference of language use, 
the micro-politics of utterance and speech and the intensive rather than extensive 
heterogeneity of languages, Deleuze and Guattari posit an anti-linguistics in which 
language is political all the way down. This new pragmatics or anti-linguistics, 
conceived of as a theory of action not representation, is palpable for them in the 
work of William Labov who “when he brings to light lines of inherent variation, he 
does not simply see them as “free variants” pertaining to pronunciation, style, or 
non-pertinent features that lie outside the system and leave the homogeneity of 
the system intact”.26 Linguistic pragmatism - in pertaining to the multiple and 
heterogeneous functions of language in the real world - would be organised for 
Deleuze and Guattari according to the logic of difference rather than logos – which 
strives towards the self-identity of the world with the subject who perceives it. In 
this way stylistics or pragmatism would escape the structures of representation and 
meaning inherent in interpretative criticism. 
                                                          
24 Ibid. p.102. 
25 Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Deleuze and Language, (London: Routledge 2002), p.154. 
26 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus p.103. 
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 The role of literature in this anti-systemic structuralism is now a primary 
rather than secondary concern for linguists, and presents a counter theory to the 
abstract models of Moretti, where the text is able to represent relations of power in 
the world only as signifying contractions within the order of the symbolic. 
Consequently, the “pressure of cultural selection” Moretti sees in practice in early 
British detective fiction actually disguises the apolitical nature of the Chomskyan 
linguistics at work in his analysis where the literary field operates according to an 
idealised version of the market where “readers discover that they don’t like a 
certain device, and if a story doesn’t include it, they simply don’t read it (and the 
story becomes extinct)”.27 In this market, competition may be ruthless and survival 
never guaranteed, but power works only at a certain level of abstraction. The 
linguistic material from which the concept of “a text” is derived is neutral as regards 
to power – the language is simply the bearer of devices of plot, narrative and 
character which it freely communicates to the reader. The ontological unity of the 
subject is untouched by the encounter with language. From the perspective of the 
market, subjects are the a priori units whose interests political economy aims to 
mediate. This is why Fredric Jameson defines the activity of the critic in his version 
of historical materialism in much the same terms as Moretti, as interpretation: 
[of priority is] the political interpretation of literary texts. It conceives of the 
political perspective not as some supplementary method, not as an optional 
auxiliary to other interpretive methods current today […] but rather as the 
absolute horizon of all reading and all interpretation it merely represents 
this form through signifying practices.28 
When the signifying practices in question are precisely phenomena whose 
interpretation can be radicalised, but where the political content of stylistics is at 
the macro or molar level of narrative and the mode of enunciation is subjective. In 
Moretti’s use of Jameson’s socially-symbolic narratives the world of social 
reproduction has only an abstract relationship to the text which can gesture 
                                                          
27 Ibid. p.72 
28 Fredric Jameson, The Political Unconscious: Narrative as Socially Symbolic Act, (Lonon: Routledge 
1983; repr. 2002), p.1. 
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towards the political but cannot enter into it. Language as an immaterial substance 
can never have access to the real, but has to be mediated and interpreted through 
representation. 
 In a later essay, “Evolution, World-Systems, Weltliteratur” Moretti does 
retreat from some of the positions regarding literature and evolution in his 
Conjectures, arguing after the fact that “evolution has no equivalent for the idea of 
social conflict” such that an encounter between historical materialism and the 
natural sciences is bound to misfire before it gets started: 
Competition among organisms, or among similar species, yes, as well as 
arms races between predators and prey: but nothing like a conflict whose 
outcome may redefine the entire ecosystem. Nor is this a problem of 
evolution only; from what I understand complexity and network theory have 
exactly the same blind spot—which clearly, no theory of culture can allow.29 
Moretti clearly doesn’t have in mind Deleuze and Guattari’s utilisation of 
complexity theory and a certain kind of Marxism (which, I would argue, precisely 
does attempt to think the role of struggle, dissent and rupture within social 
systems), but I would argue that their method of interdisciplinarity in which 
concepts are removed from their original context and placed in new ones, but 
which therefore transforms the concept itself, has some advantages over Moretti’s. 
As I gesture towards above, this is because Moretti’s particular practice of 
interdisciplinarity relies upon a logocentric intellectual methodology for which the 
tree is the model, the model of the model as it were. This is not by any means fatal, 
and my goal is not polemic, but it does serve to explain why there is no cross-over 
between Moretti and Deleuze-Guattari’s respective projects in spite of their similar 
materials. When in the same essay, for instance, Moretti acknowledges that 
Stephen Jay Gould’s evolutionary theory places more emphasis on convergence as 
well as divergence (“what if the convergence of distinct lineages could produce new 
forms?”) this does not alter the way in which evolution as metaphor might be 
applied to literary history in itself, whereas for Deleuze and Guattari the existence 
                                                          
29 Franco Moretti, “Evolution, World-Systems, Weltliteratur”, in Distant Reading p.122. 
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of convergence (which they take from Bergson’s concept of involution) demands 
the radical reversal of the relation between identity and difference itself—the 
identity of distinct lineages or segmented lines is only the effect of a more 
fundamental continuum of difference which subtends the entire system itself.30 
When it comes to their materialist semiotics, it is what makes systemicity itself 
possible as the differential field or plane of immanence from which individual 
enunciation is always subtracted.31 
 At this point the philosophical and theoretical gap between Deleuze and 
Guattari’s philosophy and the praxis of world-literary criticism comes into sharp 
focus. To counterpose the dogmatic servitude to Platonic representation in 
(mainstream) linguistics, Deleuze and Guattari’s immanent-materialist philosophy 
of language begins from the standpoint of parole as style, in literature and poetics, 
rather than needing to be retroactively fitted to literary studies as in Moretti’s 
treatment of Chomsky. If Deleuze and Guattari provide us with the materials to 
construct a counter-geography to world literary theory’s reliance on the conceptual 
apparatus of representation as its ontological underpinning, this is reflected in the 
hostility with which their work has been received in the field. As a prime example 
consider Pascale Casanova in an article for the New Left Review: 
The second constitutive feature of the literary world is its relative 
autonomy. Issues posed in the political domain cannot be superimposed 
upon, or confounded with, those of the literary space, whether national or 
international. Much contemporary literary theory seems bent on creating 
this short-circuit, constantly reducing the literary to the political. […] 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Kafka, which claims to deduce from a single diary 
entry (25 December 1911), not only a particular political stance—thus 
                                                          
30 Ibid. p.129. 
31 I will expand these arguments in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s materialist semiotics in 
Chapter 2. The similarity to structuralism here is evident (Deleuze and Guattari’s theory is directly 
derived from Volosinov’s), and underlines the disappointment that there is not a more sustained 
engagement with structuralism in Moretti’s oeuvre. 
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affirming that Kafka is indeed ‘a political author’—but a political vision that 
informs his entire oeuvre.32 
But it is precisely the autonomy of the literary field which is at issue here and which 
Casanova takes as given. In Casanova’s republic of letters, politics is indexed to the 
national allegories of small or peripheral nations; it’s in the centre where the 
aesthetic earns its relative autonomy from the economic realm (which is to say, 
political economy). As Lorna Burns argues, “Casanova maintains that the singularity 
of literature is measured by its distance from the political, and she poses a 
trajectory that moves from an initial relation between literature and politics (in 
short, national literature bound up with nationalist struggle) to the independence 
of literature from politics”.33 Deleuze and Guattari would undoubtedly agree with 
Casanova that we should resist the reduction of writing to politics, but at the same 
time insist that the division of labour between centre and periphery (where the 
periphery desires to author itself as nation in a way which the formal experiments 
of the modernist centre have freed themselves from) is a false one. As I argue in 
Chapter 3, this division of labour systemically ignores peripheral or semi-peripheral 
modernist (or at least non-allegorical) writing at the same time as it ignores the 
politics of a European modernism which are equally unreducible to the nation. 
Deleuze and Guattari, on the contrary, want a politics of writing and even language 
which is prior to individual enunciation: a micropolitics of writing or libidinal 
economy of the text which is already social and hence worldly. Throughout Anti-
Oedipus one can observe a multitude of ways in which writing and the political are 
immanently embedded in one another. In fact, we will see how the very idea of the 
autonomous literary sphere or “the republic of letters” could only have been 
envisioned within a capitalistic framework. 
 
1.3. The libidinal economy of the text 
 
                                                          
32 Pascale Casanova, “Literature as a World”, New Left Review, 31 (2005), pp.71-90 (p.84). 
33 Lorna Burns, “Postcolonial Singularity and a World Literature Yet to Come”, Angelaki: Journal of 
The Theoretical Humanities, 20:4 (2015), p.247 
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 In How to do Things With Words (1962) J.L. Austin develops a theory of 
speech-acts or “performatives” as specific kinds of utterances where language does 
not simply give meaning to a world of objects and bodies, but where a codification 
of social space is produced. He defines performative speech as that by which “the 
uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which again would 
not normally be described as, or as ‘just’, saying something” but where the sense of 
the speech overflows or is not limited to the medium of language which gives it a 
form of expression.34 This sense is not opposed to non-sense but in fact forms part 
of a larger network of sign-relations which cannot be reduced to the linguistic. 
Austin gives many examples of these kinds of expressions, several of which are 
obvious, but notes how “the performance of [the action] is also the object of the 
utterance, but it is from far from being usually, even if it is ever, the sole thing 
necessary if the act is deemed to have been performed”.35 Speech acts function by 
establishing a virtual connection between the utterance and the objects, bodies and 
territory in which they are uttered. The act of sentencing by a judge relies upon the 
affective qualities of their dress, their voice, the court building, the jury and a whole 
series of imperceptible elements in order for its ability to transform the body of the 
accused into that of the condemned to have authority. In their social constructions 
then, Austin’s performatives can be said to function much like that of the machine 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology – as a productive connection between parts 
and partial objects (sounds, affects, organs). Indeed Deleuze and Guattari borrow 
much of Austin’s analysis in their development of the concept of a micropolitics 
immanent to and productive of social space against that of an ideology which 
determines meaning from above. However, they go further than Austin by rejecting 
the ontological primacy of speech over writing so central to representational 
literary criticism. 
 In opposition to political history seen as a competing field of ideologies and 
discourses Anti-Oedipus is a history of desire from below – that is, a political 
economy of desire which is immanent to the material rather than imposed on 
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matter from without. In this respect there is no undifferentiated ground from which 
being or substance can be thought, and it is difference itself which produces from 
within itself concepts of life. One example of this is in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
discussion of the function of cruelty in so-called primitive or despotic societies. 
Drawing on Foucault’s analysis of the role of torture in sovereign societies, they 
describe a surplus-value within desiring-production which produces the 
transcendence of certain bodies: 
The primitive territorial machine codes flows, invests organs, and marks 
bodies. To such a degree that circulating – exchanging – is a secondary 
activity in comparison with all the others: marking bodies, which are the 
earth’s products. The essence of the recording, inscribing socius, insofar as it 
lays claim to the productive forces and distributes the agents of production, 
resides in these operations: tattooing, excising, carving, sacrificing, 
mutilating, encircling, and initiating.36 
The pain inflicted on the body is a sign of subjection to the despot’s power but also, 
as affective spectacle, organises the bodies which make up the tribe through the 
collective threat of violence. This is identical to Foucault’s understanding of how 
sovereign power is manifested through visual affect:  
[Torture] must mark the victim […] torture does not reconcile; it traces 
around or, rather, on the body of the condemned man signs that must not 
be effaced […] public torture and execution must be spectacular, it must be 
seen by all almost as its triumph. The very excess of the violence employed 
is one of the elements of its glory.37 
The disequilibrium between the punishment and the crime establishes the body of 
the sovereign seemingly as the origin of law itself – the visual excess of cruelty 
which “pursues the body beyond all possible pain” is counterpoised to the finite 
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force of the bodies of the crowd and confirms the transcendent position of the 
despot in relation to the social.38 It is the inscription of bodies themselves, their 
organs and surfaces, which produces a transcendent law through a surplus of 
desiring-production – desire’s libidinal economy. Writing cuts into the body in order 
that the subject be affected. This account of law is micropolitical and anti-humanist 
in refusing to ground history and culture in a transcendent human essence, but 
rather explains the formation of the subject through an excess of desire and cruelty 
which traverses bodies and organisms, forming connections between them and 
structuring territory: 
Cruelty has nothing to do with some ill-defined or natural violence that 
might be commissioned to explain the history of mankind; cruelty is the 
movement of culture that is realised in bodies and inscribed on them, 
belabouring them. That is what cruelty means. This culture is not the 
movement of ideology: on the contrary, it forcibly injects production into 
desire, and conversely, it forcibly inserts desire into social production and 
reproduction.39 
It is no longer solely the affective capacity of speech-acts to organise bodies and 
territories; but the very formation of “a” body itself which is effected through the 
act of writing. Moreover, the sign of punishment on the body establishes a ‘sense’ 
which is not linguistic in which the social field is affected by the combined yet 
unequal differentiation of matter prior to its representation in subjects. For Deleuze 
and Guattari the evolution of signs cannot be reduced to the evolution of language, 
while difference cannot be understood in terms of a language system which the 
body is born into – as in structural linguistics: 
[Desire] makes men or their organs into the parts and wheels of the social 
machine. The sign is a position of desire; but the first signs are the territorial 
signs that plant their flags in bodies. And if one wants to call this inscription 
in naked flesh “writing” then it must be said that speech in fact presupposes 
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writing, and that it is this cruel system of inscribed signs that renders man 
capable of language, and gives him a memory of the spoken word.40 
Here Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of cruelty in Anti-Oedipus forms above all a 
theory of action, not representation, which dovetails with their rejection of 
linguistics in A Thousand Plateaus in favour of a politicised theory of speech-acts or 
pragmatics. Bodies, subjects and territories are not represented by writing but 
instead it is the very praxis of writing, inscribing and encoding which works to 
sustain these categories. Literature in this sense is not considered a derivative form 
of speech—but as that by which the subject presupposes her ability to speak as a 
subject. 
 From this theory of praxis can be derived several reactionary critiques which 
world-literary studies has directed at Deleuze and Guattari’s text on Kafka. 
Casanova, for instance, remarks: 
Deleuze and Guattari, in rereading [Kafka’s entry diary of 25/12/1911] 
diminish the specifically literary character of literature by applying to it – 
particularly in connection with the highly ambiguous notion of “minor 
literature” – a crude and anachronistic interpretation that deforms his 
meaning.41 
But this criticism in turn misattributes Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the minor 
as derived from Kafka, when their deployment of the term is actually situated 
within the context of their own ontology and moreover intended to deform the 
dominant reading of Kafka’s texts. Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature was written 
between the publication of the first and second volumes of Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia and, I argue, forms a coherent and sustained engagement with the 
political philosophy articulated in those texts. Whilst the accusation that Deleuze 
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and Guattari wilfully abuse their sources is not new, this is for the most posed as a 
question of academic standards when in reality it forms a major part of the 
philosophical project from the beginning.42 This is not to say that all interpretations 
are equally valid (as Casanova would no doubt object) but that at the same time 
criticism is not the rehearsal of correct and incorrect positions. Deleuze and 
Guattari’s prolonged and detailed encounter with Kafka’s texts would function 
perfectly well without the biographical context of his diary. Indeed, in taking up 
Casanova’s critique of Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature Stanley Corngold repeats 
some of the worst mistakes of pre-structuralist literary criticism by considering 
“Kafka’s views as he states them” as the final authority on the textual objects 
themselves.43 
This Oedipalisation of Kafka, which Deleuze and Guattari subvert, now 
repeats itself in order to transform him into the father of his own texts. The 
mapping of a politicised socio-linguistics onto a high-modernist aesthetic theory is 
problematic, but Corngold’s claim that Deleuze and Guattari held “the mistaken 
view that Kafka wrote in a dialect called ‘Prague-German’ simplifies and flattens 
their concept of the minor as only a synonym for dialect”.44 Rather, as they 
themselves point out, “a minor literature doesn’t come from a minor language”, 
which is to say, the linguistic field is not made up of constants and variables as in 
the Chomskyan paradigm.45 For Deleuze and Guattari variation is primary in 
language to the extent that the possibility of language is the result of a 
transformation of the body: “the mouth, tongue and teeth find their primitive 
territoriality in food. In giving themselves over to the articulation of sounds, the 
mouth, tongue and teeth deterritorialise”.46 There is no undifferentiated substance 
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or grammar that stands behind difference, on the contrary, language differs from 
itself. As Ronald Bogue has argued in regards to language’s internal variation: 
Consider the statement “I swear!” for example. Phonemically one may view 
variations in the pronunciation of “swear” as insignificant deviations from a 
standard phonemic unit, but Deleuze and Guattari look on all the possible 
pronunciations of “swear” as forming a continuum of sounds, a line of 
continuous variation, which has a virtual existence, real without being 
actual. Each speaker actualises a particular portion of that continuum, and 
the regular patterns of action of a dominant social order determine which 
point along the continuum counts as the “correct” pronunciation and which 
points are “incorrect”, “non-standard”, “deviant”.47 
Rendered crudely, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of minor literature appears to 
suggest that all linguistically non-standard texts are always already political. 
However, this misses the fact that the concepts of the minoritarian and 
majoritarian are not limited to the field of language – it is not that there are 
concrete assemblages of bodies and discursive assemblages of sounds which 
represent the former, but rather that both are immanent to the world and 
presuppose one another. The concept of the minor does not refer to the condition 
of a particular language group (to a minority) but instead to the possibility for 
infinite variation which all languages disavow in the process of their 
standardisation. In the evolution of language, the development of recognisable 
forms is a result of the contraction of variation and difference, rather than their 
origin. The site of this contraction is political only in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense of 
the micropolitical: as the process through which a people come to exist and can be 
represented.  
 It is this dedication to the conditions under which “the assemblage of a 
collective enunciation” is possible – through the carving out of a subject and a 
world from within the world – which makes the theory of minor literature a 
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materialism.48 In contrast to which Casanova’s speculative republic of letters is, I 
contend, profoundly anti-materialist in its tendency towards transcendentalism and 
representation. She states that: 
[Deleuze and Guattari] project upon Kafka their view of politics as 
subversion, or “subversive struggle,” whereas for him, in the Prague of the 
early twentieth century, it was identified solely with the national question. 
[…] In other words, Kafka was a political author who had no real political 
interests, who did not care about the burning political questions of his 
time.49 
But this could not be further from the truth. In as much as Kafka’s personal views 
can be established (and despite Stanley Corngold’s insistence on “the trustworthy 
authority” of Max Brod, we should remain sceptical) the national question is at the 
same time a personal one, for it consists not only in the manner in which to 
represent the Prague-German people but the manner in which a people can be said 
to exist at all.50 There are two orders of the political at work here – the macro or 
major politics of peoples, subjects and parties, and the molecular or micro-politics 
of organs, intensities and desiring-production. Deleuze and Guattari’s focus on the 
latter is not to suggest the former doesn’t exist but, to borrow a term from second-
wave feminism, that the personal is also the political. That is to say, subjects and 
peoples are not the units upon which politics is staged – but rather the existence of 
subjects and peoples (as in Foucault’s analysis of sovereign power) is the result of a 
politics – an over-coding of surplus desire which produces the appearance of 
transcendence from within immanence. Politics and subjectivity are bound all the 
way down. So Kafka’s observation that “literature is less a concern of literary 
history than of the people” does not only refer to the competitive struggle of 
national or majoritarian literatures as Casanova insists but, in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s hands, to the specific problem which modern works encounter - the 
existence of a people at all.51 This is the way in which Deleuze and Guattari consider 
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Kafka’s texts (the novels, stories and diaries as a whole) to be prophetic, not in their 
prediction of the actual bureaucratic forms of Stalinism, Fascism and Capitalism—
"as prophet and seer, capable of divining and announcing events to come”—but in 
their relationship to the concept of “the people” as a specific problem in 
modernity.52 
Against the dominant trend in world-literary studies, we should insist that 
the concept of “a people” be of as much ontological and historical importance as 
“the world”. Where in Casanova’s taxonomy of genres, the people appear as the 
screen upon which politics is projected (the problem for the so-called political 
author is how best to represent such a people) for Deleuze and Guattari the 
problem concerns how a people come to be constituted in the first place. Reading 
Anti-Oedipus as a Nietzschean critique of positivism, in The Political Unconscious 
Fredric Jameson corroborates our earlier accusation that the interpretative 
tendency of world-literary critics is in the first instance reactionary: 
It is, for instance, increasingly clear that hermeneutic or interpretative 
activity has become one of the basic polemic targets of contemporary post-
structuralism in France […] what is denounced is therefore a system of 
allegorical interpretation in which the data of one narrative line are radically 
reduced by their rewriting according to the paradigm of another narrative, 
which is taken as the former’s master code or Ur-narrative and produced as 
the ultimate hidden or unconscious meaning of the first one.53 
Jameson’s text is cited variously by both Casanova and Moretti, each of whom 
would seem to have forgotten this earlier moment of continental thought which 
Jameson here articulates as a critique of textual hermeneutics. Rather than any 
linguistic turn, this moment in continental philosophy (in which I will tentatively 
include Lyotard’s Libidinal Economy (1974) as well as Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
and Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature) is wholly disabused of the notion that the 
world is a text: “The unconscious poses no problem of meaning, solely problems of 
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use. The question posed by desire is not “what does it mean?” but rather “How 
does it work?”.54 World-systems analysis as it is presently practiced in world-literary 
studies, I will argue, operates in the same manner as the Freudian unconscious does 
for Deleuze and Guattari – always already there, waiting to be discovered, its 
meanings lying under the surface of our everyday perceptions. This is the truth of 
Moretti’s empirical observations and Casanova’s Bourdieusian sociology – where 
the realisation of value in the form of a given text’s representation in the world 
system is taken as validation of the system itself: 
The hierarchical structure that orders the literary world is the direct product 
of the history of literature in the sense I have described, but it is also what 
makes this history […] the events of the literary world take on meaning 
through the structure that produces them and gives them form and, in so 
doing, makes literature at once stake, resource, and belief.55 
Casanova’s world republic works to the degree that it describes a systemic 
circulation of texts which verifiably exists according to the data: 
In the world republic of letters, the richest spaces are also the oldest, which 
is to say the ones that were first to enter into literary competition and 
whose national classics came also to be regarded as universal classics. The 
literary map that has taken shape in Europe since the sixteenth century 
cannot be regarded, then simply as the result of a gradual extension of 
literary belief or the idea of literature (in keeping with the familiar image of 
the ‘dissemination’, ‘fortune’, or even ‘influence’ of a literary form or 
work).56 
The existence of a “common condition of dependency” which exists along a 
continuum between centre and periphery and which gives form to the relations 
between various literatures (where each specific instance is always a mixed 
situation of central, semi-peripheral, and peripheral conditions in a given historical 
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situation) is not under contention here.57 What is under contention is the form and 
character of these historical structures, which are certainly not just a matter of 
competition, but also the violent suppression, extermination or outlawing of certain 
literary ecologies belonging to both core and periphery. The historical existence of 
literature as literature, or the means by which certain forms of inscription and 
utterance are ascribed literary status against others, is a case of primitive 
accumulation as well as marketisation. If Max Brod had followed Kafka’s wish to 
have his work destroyed, one might ask if “Kafka” would exist as literature of the 
world republic at all, being invisible to the system as such. Indeed the most vital 
aspects of Casanova’s theory are those moments where the texts at hand threaten 
to disappear into the margins of her sociology. This is the case with Kafka and, I will 
argue in chapter 3, with Dambudzo Marechera. The relationship between literature 
and the nation is not given, but was rather institutionalised by the British Empire as 
the cultural logic to the first truly capitalist world-system. As Michael Gardiner has 
argued: “From the inception of the British state at the end of the seventeenth 
century, culture has been charged with the ideological task of describing a common 
ground for the ‘nation’, understood in terms of ethnicity and empire”.58 It is 
precisely against the national question as Casanova theorises it (the establishment 
of economic and political independence, the formalisation of constitutional rights, 
and so on) through which English Literature as discipline became a “surrogate” 
constitution for peoples and countries assimilated into an enlarged national 
community in the form empire but who were denied their rights to self-
determination.59 This is perhaps unique to the British-imperial world-system as it 
develops from around the start of the seventeenth century up until the First World 
War, but underlies the fact that “the construction of national literary space” is not 
in itself a synecdoche for political or literary freedom as it is for Casanova.60 
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Forms of cultural violence, linguistic suppression, or literary domination are 
often kept under the place-holder of “competition” in Casanova’s work, in which 
they exist as a kind of archival unconscious.61 This is certainly the case when it 
comes to the postcolonial novel, where: 
Increasingly it is the case that the literary power of a central nation can be 
measured in terms of the literary innovations produced by universally 
recognised writers from its suburbs. For a language no less than the literary 
tradition associated with it, these outsiders supply a new way of keeping up 
with modernity and thereby of revaluing the nation’s stock of literary 
capital. The importance of notions such as ‘Commonwealth literature’ or 
‘francophonie’ lies in precisely this, for they make it possible to lay claim to, 
and then annex, peripheral literary innovations under a central linguistic and 
cultural aegis.62 
The proximity of Casanova’s language to finance here (valuation, stock, literary 
capital) is not incidental considering, as Gardiner points out, the concurrent rise of 
English Literature and financial capitalism throughout the Eighteenth century.63 But 
here the world-system stands in for what used to be called imperialism, where the 
laws governing literary value are sustained and reproduced by colonial structures of 
inequality and independence. The ambiguity here is the extent to which Casanova’s 
sociology relies upon those colonial structures of patronisation, recognition and 
assimilation rather than critiques them. Is it possible, for instance, to include those 
forms of literary solidarity and exchange which are not mediated by the capitalist 
world-system in a world republic of letters? The importance of transgressive 
reading practices by those engaged in anti-imperial struggle (where the circulation 
of Marx’s texts throughout the Southern hemisphere, for example, serves as a 
counterpoint to market-based analysis) is largely absent in The World Republic of 
Letters.64 My present concern is not simply to state the value of some previously 
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overlooked or ignored body of texts, but rather to argue that those literary works 
which are largely invisible to Casanova’s world republic, can be thought and studied 
in a relational and comparative way, but the method and style of systemisation 
must be changed, in addition to the notion of world which they disclose.65 
Here the structural similarity between Casanova’s literary space and an 
earlier form of Saussurean linguistics, which we gestured towards previously, lies in 
the absence of an outside to their relative systems. As Ronald Bogue notes: 
In the Saussurean theory of the sign, as many have noted, the signifier 
effectively dominates the signified: signifier and signified are paired in the 
vertical relation of the sign, but the relative (or ‘value’) of the signified is 
determined by the horizontal relations of difference between signifiers […] 
Deleuze and Guattari insist that the structural account of meaning 
presupposes two complimentary forces – one that creates arbitrary 
signifiers (i.e extracts a deterritorialised flux), and on that fixes the signifier-
signified bond (i.e. imposes the transcendent law of language).66 
This transcendent law of language manifests itself in the world republic of letters 
through value as the signifier which fixes all the others – a capitalist axiomatic 
whereby the law of abstraction is regulated from within (rather than via the body of 
a despot or sovereign). Casanova mistakenly assumes that the world republic of 
letters retains its autonomy through a certain antagonism to political 
representation, when it is in fact its fullest articulation:  
The unification of literary space through competition presumes the 
existence of a common standard for measuring time, an absolute point of 
reference unconditionally recognised by all contestants. It is at once a point 
in space, the centre of all centres (which even literary rivals, by the very fact 
of their competition, are agreed in acknowledging), and a basis for 
measuring time that is peculiar to literature.67 
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The people as the citizens of this abstract republic are only such by their 
assimilation into the regime of transcendence as subjects to be represented. The 
very praxis of world-literary studies in this instance requires the ontological 
impoverishment of the text, by turning the literary object into a proliferating series 
of signifiers which require their own interpretation. Equally, actual people only exist 
as political subjects only in the sense of a rigid division of labour between author-
producers and reader-consumers. Against the despotism of the signifier, Deleuze 
and Guattari’s encounters with literature give back to their sources an ontological 
autonomy which representational criticism strips of them: 
How do these machines, these desiring-machines, work – yours and mine? 
[…] Desire makes its entry with the general collapse of the question ‘What 
does it mean?’ No one has been able to pose the problem of language 
except to the extent that linguists and logicians have first eliminated 
meaning; and the greatest force of language was only discovered once a 
work was viewed as a machine, producing certain effects, amenable to a 
certain use.68 
 As a pragmatics, their schizoanalytical reading of Kafka’s texts directly influences 
the conceptual vocabulary of the Capitalism and Schizophrenia project. The concept 
of the desiring-machine flattens the ontological hierarchy of representation until 
only an immanent field of desiring-production and layered strata remains. 
 
1.4. Schizoanalysis as textual cartography 
 
To speak of a politics of desire which is radically de-personalised and to say 
“the personal is political” is not a contradiction. Rather, each body is already an 
assemblage of desiring production – an over-coding of material flows which 
constitutes in itself a writing on the body. This is the sense in which Deleuze and 
Guattari conceive of writing as a social practice which acts directly on the material, 
as a cut in the materials of sensation (affect and percept) which don't belong to any 
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particular organism but are in fact that which the concept of organism presupposes. 
If the primary forms of language in capitalist society are the slogan and order-word 
which are “not to be believed but obeyed, and to compel obedience” then what 
interests Deleuze and Guattari in literary works are those instances in which the 
communicative content of the utterance is overtaken by a de-personalised and a-
signifying flow of linguistic matter.69 Minor literature aims, in contrast, “to make 
the sequences vibrate, to open the word onto unexpected internal intensities – in 
short, an asignifying intensive utilization of language”.70 In the context of the 
becoming-animal of Kafka’s texts: 
There is no longer a subject of the enunciation, nor a subject of the 
statement. It is no longer the subject of the statement who is a dog, with 
the subject of the enunciation remaining ‘like’ a man; it is no longer the 
subject of enunciation who is ‘like’ a beetle, the subject of the statement 
remaining a man. Rather, there is a circuit of states that forms a mutual 
becoming, in the heart of necessarily multiple or collective assemblage.71 
This view of language as an intensive distribution of forces in various states of 
acceleration and calcification could easily slide into a linguistic idealism, but this 
would only be the case because the literary sources of the conceptual assemblage 
of Capitalism and Schizophrenia and Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature are those 
where the signifying gap between writing and action is at a minimal degree of 
separation. In fact the concept of the machine, as a series of cuts in the material 
rather than a structure which represents matter from without, receives its fullest 
expression in the literary work. As Ronald Bogue asserts: 
The function of machines is to “machine” – to form syntheses, to produce 
flows through binary connections, inclusive disjunctions and nomadic 
conjunctions. The problem for Kafka is to create a writing machine that 
synthesises flows of desiring production, that forms multiple connections, 
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disjunctions and conjunctions, and thereby produces and sustains 
movement.72 
This materialist investment in writing as a machine for the coding of flows can be 
intuited in Deleuze and Guattari’s break with linguistics in favour of a pragmatics 
consisting of metamorphosis contrary to metaphor. The opposition here is between 
structure and machine as two competing ontological schema – the former 
constantly fixing and co-ordinating everything it encounters according to its own 
internal organisation and the latter proliferating through a series of heterogeneous 
connections which change its internal nature – tree and rhizome. The concept of 
the desiring machine in its linguistic variant is a materialist concept to the extent 
that it privileges the standpoint of production, but without the deterministic 
language of base and superstructure which submits language to the order of 
representation. What the theory of pragmatics gains over structural linguistics, 
according to Jean-Jacques Lecercle, is “a sense of the importance of language as 
social practice (the shift from production compels a shift away from individualism 
and the centrality of the speaker qua speaker) [and] an insistence on the concrete 
workings of language, as opposed to the abstract ideality of the system”.73  If a text 
like The Trial is significant for Deleuze and Guattari it is not because of the ways in 
which it represents, signifies or in other ways stands in for the world, but for the 
way in which its linguistic materials are already immanent to the historically 
bureaucratic and institutional forms from which it both derives and to which it 
intervenes as an abstract machine. Austin reminds us that speech acts do not exist 
in a vacuum but function in tangent with a whole array of material and immaterial 
affects which produce non-corporeal changes in the world – the act of sentencing 
alone does not transform the body of the condemned but requires the presence of 
the jury, the dress and manner of the judge, the building of the courtroom etc. The 
Trial is constituted by a series of speech-acts which overflow their institutional 
structures and individual speakers and enter into a machinic assemblage which 
produces the law as social machine. The law is never located in a single character or 
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location but instead seems to always take place in adjacent rooms, passages and 
subsidiary chambers to be overheard or experienced only second-hand. In this way 
the text places its linguistic matter in a dynamic flux. The coding of bodies and 
territories by speech-acts is constantly overflowing its area of effect such that the 
geography of the novel is progressively illogical as the law machine is reconfigured 
in different settings. 
Where world-systems analysis has until recently only interpreted the world, 
for the schizoanalyst, the world is composed of machinic flows: “Everywhere it is 
machines – real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving other machines, 
machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and 
connections”.74 In the speculative cartography of literary lines of flight I will go on 
to construct, the world is not a text to be interpreted (as it is for both 
deconstruction and world-systems analysis) but is rather understood through the 
immanent desiring-production of machinic flows of matter-energy whose lines 
traverse the page as already worldly: a libidinal-textual economy. I here follow 
Charles Stivale in his claim that schizoanalysis is first and foremost a literary 
assemblage of theoretical and practical concerns: 
In re-reading the works of various authors in light of the machinic syntheses, 
Deleuze and Guattari reveal the molecular and fragmented discourse of 
schizophrenic deterritorialization, and such a re-reading itself is an overt 
political act inherent to the schizoanalytic project, meant to subvert the grip 
of power exerted by capitalist and Oedipal reterritorialization.75 
Where for Moretti’s abstract models and Casanova’s world-republic content is 
primary (as character, plot, narrative etc) for the schizoanalyst these linguistic-
signifying forms are always already a molar crystallisation of impersonal desire – a 
political economy of signs is already in operation. The components of literary 
schizoanalysis are the circulation of affects and percepts which are not located in a 
speaker but which, as blocs of sensation, traverse bodies, subjects and territories. 
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Hence Deleuze and Guattari’s fascination with texts whose linguistic materials are 
always in a process of breaking down – stuttering, stammering, repeating – and 
whose ultimate goal is the final dissolution of the subject (Kafka, Artaud): 
In language and in writing itself, sometimes the letters as breaks, as 
shattered partial objects – and sometimes the words as undivided flows, as 
non-decomposable blocks […] constitute asignifying signs that deliver 
themselves over to the order of desire: rushes of breath and cries.76 
But I will go further than Deleuze and Guattari in attempting to disinvest the text of 
any determining relation to its author-function. The danger of schizoanalysis 
understood as both theory and praxis lies in its tendency (such as at times in Kafka: 
Towards a Minor Literature) to reflect its own decoding of Oedipal desire back onto 
the body of the author as the site of deterritorialisation. Alongside the invocation to 
“kill metaphor” should have been the ultimatum to remove from literary studies 
the pervasive influence of the proper noun.77 Thus the geoliterature which I will 
map will not be read canonically – as the articulation of a history of authorial 
personae however marginalised – but as a radical cartography of desiring-
production without subjective predicates. This cartography of textual-machines 
takes at face value Foucault’s claim that “It would be a mistake to read Anti-
Oedipus as the new theoretical reference (you know, that much-heralded theory 
that finally encompasses everything, that finally totalises and reassures, the one we 
are told we ‘need so badly’ in our dispersion and specialization” and 
anachronistically redirects it towards the claim that world-literary studies has finally 
done away with questions of ontology.78 In fact, it is the practices of interpretation, 
representation and signification which return with renewed vigour in Moretti’s 
Conjectures and Casanova’s World Republic of Letters. My goal, however, will not be 
to do away with theoretical abstraction in itself, but rather to reveal the insufficient 
degree of abstraction presently at work in world-systems analysis. As Manuel 
DeLanda has pointed out, abstract machines are not metaphorical devices (which 
                                                          
76 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus p.264. 
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78 Michel Foucault, “Preface” in Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus p.xiv. 
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give meaning to their referent) but rather express the organisational composition of 
heterogeneous elements in any given structure: 
When we say (as Marxists used to say) that "class struggle is the motor of 
history" we are using the word "motor" in a purely metaphorical sense. 
However, when we say that "a hurricane is a steam motor" we are not 
simply making a linguistic analogy: rather we are saying that hurricanes 
embody the same diagram used by engineers to build steam motors, that is, 
that it contains a reservoir of heat, that it operates via thermal differences 
and that it circulates energy and materials through a (so-called) Carnot 
cycle. Deleuze and Guattari use the term "abstract machine" to refer to this 
diagram shared by very different physical assemblages.79 
By replacing the Jamesonian language of abstract models with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept of the abstract machine, our speculative cartography will aim to 
collapse the ontological gap between text and world such that the map is immanent 
to the territory it expresses as an abstract instance of desiring-production. The 
world—as a perceived relation between the subject and the Earth—is already a 
territorialisation of celestial space. 
In this way I will situate Deleuze and Guattari as part of an emerging minor 
line of materialism in contemporary European philosophy which literary studies has 
thus far overlooked. Jane Bennett has summarised the concerns of this new 
materialism as, firstly, “to paint a positive ontology of vibrant matter, which 
stretches received concepts of agency, action, and freedom sometimes to the 
breaking point” and secondly “to dissipate the onto-theological binaries of 
life/matter, human/animal, will/determination, and organic/inorganic using 
arguments and other rhetorical means to induce in human bodies an aesthetic-
affective openness to material vitality” which cumulates in a speculative “style of 
political analysis that can better account for the contributions of nonhuman 
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actants”.80 This commitment to the creative capacity of matter to self-organise 
through a process of differentiation immanent to itself (which Deleuze and Guattari 
refer to as “a life proper to matter, a vital state of matter as such, a material 
vitalism” will be read against the grain of the Marxism familiar to students of world-
literary studies.81 In this case any materialism which is at the same time an 
immanent philosophy, must begin with the aesthetic as a reconfiguration by means 
of artistic materials the flows of matter-energy which cut across subject positions 
via lines of flight and vectors of transformation in the real world.82 By revealing the 
subject not as the authorial origin of a text but as an effect of writing, the following 
chapters will progressively constitute a speculative cartography of lines of flight 
wherein the text takes a piloting role in the political and not just its a posteriori 
representation. World literary theory is tempted to take the world as given, just as 
for Freudian psychoanalysis (according to Deleuze and Guattari) the unconscious is 
that which pre-exists desire: the “theatre of representation” on which the Oedipal 
tragedy plays itself out.83 The problem here is not with conceptual abstraction per 
se – but the type of abstraction at work. Moretti’s abstract models (from his earliest 
definitions of World Literature through to his contemporary work on networks) 
consistently fail to identify the regime of the signifier as the form of abstraction 
proper to Capital itself. Deleuze and Guattari describe the signifier as “despotic” 
because of the way it subordinates all the elements in its structure under an 
axiomatic principle.84 Value, as the signifier under capitalist social relations, 
decodes all previous modes of desiring-production only to reterritorialise them 
under the principle of exchange as the form of abstraction par excellence. By 
concerning itself too often with metaphor and representation, world-literary 
studies gives away too much ground to Capital’s continual capture of resistance. By 
contrast, Deleuze and Guattari oppose the concept of machine to that of structure 
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81 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.454. 
82 In this sense Deleuze both is and is not a Kantian, because he makes the third critique the whole 
basis of his philosophy of sensation rather than the outlier historians of philosophy have usually 
considered it. 
83 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p.294. 
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in order to show how Capital attempts to fix desire as Oedipal abstraction, but is 
itself capable of being overtaken by new connections between the machinic 
elements of desiring-production – new relations of material flows between organs, 
bodies and territories. In his preface to Guattari’s early articulation of the concept 
of the machine in Psychoanalysis and Transversality (1972), Deleuze states its 
antagonistic relation to structures of signification:  
It’s about grasping that point of rupture where, precisely, political and 
libidinal economy are one and the same. The unconscious is nothing else 
than the order of group subjectivity which introduces explosive machines 
into so-called signifying structures as well as causal chains, forcing them to 
open to liberate their hidden potentialities as a future reality influenced by 
the rupture.85 
Political and psychological oppression, conceived as a co-extensive field, render the 
revolutionary potential of the aesthetic not in terms of an avant-garde or individual 
artistic autonomy (as some hard-won compromise with Capital) but as a line of 
flight embedded as deeply as possible in the circuits of capital itself. This is the 
object which a schizoanalytic cartography of literary forms will aim towards. 
If, therefore, for Deleuze and Guattari desire is always already social, it does 
not enter into the social by way of trauma resulting from the separation from the 
mother and identification with the law of the father. The connection of organs and 
material flows which produces the body of the infant is already a social coding of 
desire. Freudian desire is characterised by lack – by separation from the object. In 
the same way Moretti and Casanova are at all times obsessed by discovering the 
world-system as the determining ground from which the text has been cut off. For 
schizoanalysis the world—conceived as both la Terre and la terre (planet and 
land)—is constantly in a state of being produced anew by the machinic flows, lines 
and cuts in the self-organising matter which constitutes it. Literary works belong to 
the field of desiring production as specific strata on the plateaus of material history 
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and are never totally captured by representation in the form of value. All texts are 
political in their major or minor relation to desire as a socially constituted-
constituting force, by the lines of flight which they choose to activate or disavow, 
and not in the content of their enunciation. “Every political economy is libidinal”.86 
If the aim of schizoanalysis is the production of the unconscious as the collective 
decoding of desire, I will adapt this method not in order to discover the world-
system upon which literature rests, but in order to express the capacity of literary 
works to creatively intervene in the world as an immanent cartography of material, 
linguistic, textual, bodily, institutional and cultural lines of flight. Rather than the 
interpretative models of Jamesonian cultural studies, or the discourse analysis of 
deconstruction, or the data-mining of world-systems analysis, I will argue for a 
geoliterature whose aberrant movements, deterritorialising vectors and lines of 
flight are immanent to the encounters between textual, linguistic, human and non-
human bodies in the world. World literature is a war-machine whose revolutionary 
potential, its becoming-minor, has until now only sporadically been mapped.
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2. Towards a Geoliterature 
 
2.1. Machinic capitalism and the “general intellect” of World Literature 
 
Destroy the 'I' in literature: that is, all psychology. The sort of man who has 
been damaged by libraries and museums, subjected to a logic and wisdom 
of fear, is of absolutely no interest anymore. We must abolish him in 
literature and replace him once and for all with matter [...] capture the 
breadth, the sensibility, the instincts of metals, stones, woods, and so on, 
through the medium of free objects and capricious motors. Substitute, for 
human psychology now exhausted, the lyrical obsession with matter.1 
Marinetti’s Technical Manifesto For a Futurist Literature wants to both 
describe and effect a becoming-material of language. On this question the various 
groups of the European avant-garde, from Italian futurism to Oulipo, have all at one 
point or another shared an aim to create a materialist semiotics—a language of the 
Earth—either by a-signifying graphology (visual matter) or a poetics of pure noise 
(sonic matter). That is to say, the “matter” of writing (the substance upon which 
markings are inscribed) becomes expressive at the same time as its signifying 
capacity is nullified. For Deleuze, in The Logic of Sense, this expressive capacity of 
writing has two competing trajectories, which he identifies on the one hand with 
Lewis Carroll—whose portmanteau words have sense without meaning—and 
Antonin Artaud on the other (whose texts tend towards a visceral phonetic chaos).2  
If we also consider the possibility of a materialist semiotics one of the main 
philosophical projects behind Deleuze’s collaboration with Félix Guattari, the 
literary aspects of their work (collaborative writing, a fondness for neologism, 
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experimental structure, rhetorical irony) enter into a poetic constellation that 
places them firmly within the European avant-garde tradition of the twentieth 
century.  
To refer to this constellation as a genre, however, already gives us several 
problems. With and without Guattari, Deleuze’s writing continually flirts with the 
idea of its own literariness, despite the alleged separation between literature and 
philosophy one finds in What Is Philosophy?3  It’s possible we could read several of 
Deleuze’s works as manifestos in that they perform the rhetorical content of their 
arguments (The Logic of Sense at one point describes itself as “a psychological 
novel”).4 Yet Deleuze is also disdainful of manifestos, and generally disavows avant-
gardism as a political stance—a point to which I will return later. The question 
remains, then, what does it mean to write for Deleuze? Responding to the 
philosophical problems which underlie this question will provide the basis for my 
reading works of world literature as several lines of flight which act on the real via 
an a-signifying semiotics, rather than representing the real, or history, or culture, to 
us. The full scope of this reading, the capacity for literary texts to posit “a new 
Earth, a new people” from within the confines of the present, will be the focus of 
my later chapters.5 As part of that argument, I need to now confront how Deleuze 
and Guattari’s materialist semiotics forces us to reconsider the book or text in light 
of the production of subjectivity under capitalism—that social relation which, as 
many have noted, makes a weltliteratur possible. The concept of geoliterature will 
extract from Deleuze and Guattari’s materialist semiotics a way of thinking the 
immanent metamorphoses which texts undergo, as a “becoming with the world”, 
that is other than representation or metaphor. 
In Franco Moretti’s Darwin-inspired reading of the European novel, 
emphasis is placed on the individuation of different forms across time. New forms 
and styles branch off from singular roots and spread across a local territory 
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(“foreign form and local materials”).6 In its relation to time, the novel is singularly 
able to represent the growing domination of capital over all areas of social life in 
the nineteenth century both materially (as the literary form most amenable to 
commodification and mass production) and in content (narrative form binds 
together time and action through the figure of the character). The growth of the 
novel expresses the historical dominance of the value-form over time and space, as 
well as reflecting back onto its readers the image of the bourgeois individual as the 
social subject of capital.7 In this respect Moretti’s materialism so far follows from 
Marx’s in Capital Vol.1, where the production of subjects is merely an effect of the 
production of commodities. The manifesto, however, has its own peculiar relation 
to time. As Helen Palmer notes: 
[The manifesto] somehow pre-empts itself; [...] there is something outside 
of conventional temporality that announces itself as a lack. The manifesto 
genre has its own strange temporality, perched between the state of things 
either as they are or as they have been, but necessarily addressing and 
attempting to shape the future from within its structure.8 
The manifesto-as-form doesn’t quite fit into Moretti’s evolutionary schema which 
tends to resist cross-contamination and contagion once forms have been 
individuated (the tree only grows outwards in space and time). The manifesto does 
violence to formal categories by introducing alien or mutant elements into their 
make-up which announce their newness to readers via their very unreadability 
according to preestablished norms. In this way, manifestos aim to actively produce 
the kinds of subjects by whom they are intended to be read. By announcing an 
antagonism to the present (the “now” of which the manifesto speaks which is both 
beyond the now of its audience and less than any one moment “in time”), the 
manifesto effaces its own origin as a product of labour-time. Instead they appear as 
messages from another time or another world: their formal mode of anti-formalism 
is inherently revolutionary.  
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The first victim of this effacement is the idea of the author. In naming 
“futurism” Marinetti and his co-conspirators call for the creation of an archetype 
which does not yet exist (the futurist), but which reflexively refers to a group-
subject (the futurists) as the author(s) of the manifesto who are without a given 
community or nation. In contrast to the way language is usually conceived as a 
representational or symbolic system, here the subject of the enunciation (the 
futurist) is an effect of the utterance rather than its progenitor.9 Updating and 
expanding upon J.L Austin’s theory of speech acts, Deleuze and Guattari refer to 
this phenomenon as the pragmatics of language—having to do with language-as-
action—and make it the cornerstone of their critique of linguistics in A Thousand 
Plateaus. In effect, they reverse the way sociolinguistics as the study of language 
use is usually conceived as a minor field of linguistic science, and reject any study of 
language that doesn’t begin with the material effects of utterances in the real 
world. This is the principle of immanence we encountered in the previous chapter, 
but with a more radical inflection than that found even in structuralism, where 
language as a system is immanent to itself, but not the world. As one of several 
regimes of signs, language is for Deleuze and Guattari a dynamic system interacting 
with other matter-flows in the real world. As an example, Deleuze and Guattari 
make an (untypical) reference to Lenin’s text of 1917: 
Pragmatics is a politics of language […]. We may take as an example […] the 
formation of a properly Leninist type of statement in Soviet Russia, basing 
ourselves on a text by Lenin entitled “On Slogans”. This text constituted an 
incorporeal transformation that extracted from the masses a proletarian 
class as an assemblage of enunciation before the conditions were present for 
the proletariat to exist as a body. A stroke of genius from the first Marxist 
international, which ‘invented’ a new type of class: workers of the world 
unite! Taking an advantage of the break with the social democrats, Lenin 
invented or decreed yet another incorporeal transformation that extracted 
from the proletariat class a vanguard as an assemblage of enunciation and 
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was attributed to the ‘Party’, a new type of party as a distinct body, at the 
risk of falling into a properly bureaucratic system of redundancy.10 
More so than its communicative content, the slogan is a type of sign (or regime of 
signs) that effects a transformation of the social body by extracting certain 
elements (the bodies of the masses) and reconstituting them as a new class-body. 
 What Deleuze and Guattari want is a philosophy of language entirely other 
than linguistics or the kind of empirical historiography practiced by Moretti, in 
which the incorporeal production of subjects, classes and parties is enmeshed in 
the corporeal and material production of commodities, factories, institutions. The 
relation between those spheres thought to be immaterial, ideological or symbolic 
and the material ground of those phenomena in the means of production is no 
longer the latter determining the former but is instead a machinic relation in which 
each part interacts with and acts upon the other in a mode of social reproduction 
which is simultaneously abstract and concrete. Abstract machines contain material 
and immaterial or linguistic elements, but neither takes precedence over the other. 
To conceptualise social reproduction as a kind of machinic relation between 
material and immaterial elements destroys the notion of the psychological 
individual as the necessary subject of capital. In fact, Marx speculates on this very 
conclusion in his notebooks from February-May of 1858, known as “the fragment 
on machines”. The machine in this instance is not reducible to technology as is 
common in some of the reductionist readings the fragment has inspired since its 
rediscovery in the 1960’s.11 Instead it is the relation between the worker (variable 
capital) and the machine (fixed capital) which tends to directly imbue objects with 
social knowledge—what Marx refers to as the development of a “general intellect” 
analogous to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the abstract machine: 
The worker’s activity, reduced to a mere abstraction of activity, is 
determined and regulated on all sides by the movement of the machinery, 
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and not the opposite. The science which compels the inanimate limbs of the 
machinery, by their construction, to act purposefully, as an automaton, does 
not exist in the worker’s consciousness, but rather acts upon him through 
the machine as an alien power, as the power of the machine itself.12 
The argument that follows in the fragment is a description of a type of social 
consciousness distributed across material and immaterial elements in a co-
determinate, that is, machinic relation of mutual production: 
The production process has ceased to be a labour process in the sense of a 
process dominated by labour as its governing unity. Labour appears, rather, 
merely as a conscious organ, scattered among the living workers at 
numerous points of the mechanical system; subsumed under the total 
process of the machinery itself, as itself only a link of the system, whose 
unity exists not in the living workers but rather in the living (active) 
machinery, which confronts his individual, insignificant doings as a mighty 
organism.13 
Hence capital is engaged not only in the social reproduction of the subjects it 
requires, but also in the active breaking down of these subjectivities in the course 
of its increasing objectification of social knowledge. It is the simultaneously 
determined and contingent position of the worker’s consciousness that provides 
the potential for sabotage – the introduction of slogans and signs into the social 
body which short-circuit the incorporeal production of subjectivity. Hence Guattari, 
echoing Marx’s sentiment, proposes the concept of the machine as a distributed 
and non-technical (i.e abstract) principle of social organisation: 
In the history of philosophy the problem of the machine is generally 
considered a secondary component of a more general question, that of the 
techne, the techniques. Here I would like to propose a reversal of the view 
in which the problem of technique is a part of a much more extensive 
machine issue. This 'machine' is open to the outside and its machinic 
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environment and maintains all kinds of relationships to social components 
and individual subjectivities. It is hence a matter of expanding the concept 
of the technological machine into one of the machinic assemblage.14 
As general intellect, language and literature are specific elements in a machinic 
assemblage of production that is simultaneously constituting of social subjectivity 
and constituted by those subjects as their collective enunciation.15 This double 
articulation of machinic and discursive assemblages renders Moretti’s sociology 
only one-sided, as both presuppose one another but without any kind of causal 
relation between the two. The rise in popularity of the manifesto since the late 
nineteenth century is evidence to this fact—as it shows how the evolutionary 
development of bourgeois consciousness (the subject of Moretti’s late work) is 
periodically subjected to periods of devolutionary anti-production, schizophrenic 
cuts and a-signifying breaks by textual matter. As a cliché with at least some degree 
of truth, new works of art are never recognised as such when they first appear. 
If, following Mckenzie Wark, we should consider Moretti’s sociology of 
literary forms a “computationally assisted distant reading […] technique of 
discovering the general intellect at work” then the manifesto, in fact the entire 
history of the European avant-garde, might better be understood in terms of an 
anti-genre for the way in which it attempts to reverse-engineer the conditions of its 
reception and the subjects to whom it lays claim.16 By becoming imperceptible to 
its readership (where they are no longer able to discern what it is exactly they are 
reading) the manifesto is no longer “just” a commodity, but in fact withdraws from 
the object-world of the bourgeoisie. Likewise, Deleuze and Guattari’s materialist 
semiotics (the philosophy of language they extract from the non-standard 
linguistics of Louis Hjelmslev, J.L. Austin and V.N. Voloshinov) is better read as an 
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anti-sociology of language, by considering the stylistic and formally experimental 
aspects of the work as integral to the workings of the textual machine.  
Why, then, does Deleuze discourage the writing of manifestos? In a short 
essay published alongside the Italian dramatist Carmelo Bene’s version of Richard 
III, Deleuze writes admiringly of Bene that he “is disgusted by so-called avant-garde 
formulas” and “does not believe in the avant-garde”.17 The problem, for Deleuze 
(with and without Guattari), is that avant-gardism too easily turns upon the relation 
between the aristocratic and the popular: between the subject of futurism and the 
people they lay claim to. The manifesto begins and ends with a new kind of person, 
whereas the minor literature Deleuze begins in the middle (“le milieu”) and works 
by subtraction (“amputation”) from both language and polity.18 If manifestos 
include non-representational or performative uses of language, this can only ever 
(according to Deleuze) be instrumental. Minor literature (or, in this instance, 
theatre) “does not change the world or cause a revolution”, does not belong either 
to the past or the future but is itself “untimely”.19  For the same reason, Deleuze is 
sceptical of a popular theatre such as Brecht’s which only mirrors the narcissism of 
Bourgeois theatre’s private, individualised affairs with “a narcissism of the worker” 
which forms a kind of: 
communication between the theatre maker and the people [which] 
privileges a certain representation of conflicts, conflicts of the individual and 
society, of life and history […] but Brecht himself only wants them to be 
‘understood’ and for the spectator to have the elements of a possible 
‘solution’. This is not to leave the domain of representation but only to pass 
from one dramatic pole of bourgeois representation to an epic pole of 
popular representation.20 
                                                          
17 Gilles Deleuze, “One Less Manifesto”, in Mimesis, Masochism and Mime: The Politics of 
Theatricality in Contemporary French Theatre, ed. Timothy Murray (Michigan: Michigan University 
Press 1997), pp.245-252. Originally published in Carmelo Bene and Gilles Deleuze, Superpositions: 
Richard III Suivi de Un Manifeste de Moins, (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit 1979). 
18 Ibid. pp.241-242. 
19 Ibid. pp.252, 242. 
20 Ibid. p.252. 
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Conflicts, either between individuals or groups, are for Deleuze already the 
aggregates of minor lines of becoming and variation which are pre-individual and 
non-linguistic. Bene’s theatre is, by contrast, “humble” in that it does not call for an 
anti-theatre or an end to theatre or for a new theatre but “amounts almost to 
nothing” by placing all the aggregates of the theatrical institution (stage, actor, 
character, prop, set, language, audience) into variation, amputating each element 
in turn so as to create sensations which are affectual and a-signifying.21 Deleuze 
finds a similar operation in Kafka, whose austerity of style subtracts from language 
as many representational elements as possible in order to express what is not 
linguistic (the chattering of insects and other animals) or in Bacon’s triptychs, where 
figuration gives way to that which has no representational subject (the scream or 
cry). 
 If not exactly an avant-garde poetics, how can Deleuze and Guattari’s 
materialist semiotics be made to speak to literature? How does writing as social 
praxis exist between a collective assemblage of enunciation and a machinic 
assemblage of production if not via metaphor, reflection or representation? If the 
basic function language is, according to Deleuze and Guattari, to enact “incorporeal 
transformations” which code and recode the world, and not to symbolise or 
represent the world, then language must be understood as a certain kind of 
materiality (a composition of forces) amongst a wider plane of material interactions 
between things.22 This is to deny the scientific aspect of linguistics which sets up 
language as an ideal or abstract system with universal rules that mirror the natural 
laws of objects studied by the physical sciences. Against these universal laws taken 
to be innate in the brain, persons or subjects are the after-effects of a language 
system which enacts incorporeal transformations on bodies. I simply am what can 
be said about me. For Deleuze, Thomas Hardy is a better linguist on this point than 
Chomsky: 
Take as an example the case of Thomas Hardy: his characters are not people 
or subjects, they are collections of intensive sensations, each is such a 
                                                          
21 Ibid. 
22 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.89. 
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collection, a packet, a bloc of variable sensations. There is a strange respect 
for the individual, an extraordinary respect: not because he would seize 
upon himself as a person and be recognised as a person, in the French way, 
but on the contrary because he saw himself and saw others as so many 
'unique chances' - the unique chance from which one combination or 
another had been drawn. Individuation without a subject. And these packets 
of sensations in the raw, these collections or combinations, run along the 
lines of chance, or mischance, where their encounters take place—if need 
be, their bad encounters which lead to death, to murder.23 
This is the central role of literature for Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of 
language: to interject itself between the collective assemblages of enunciation 
which legislate that which (as Foucault describes) is seeable and sayable in any 
given society, and the machinic assemblages of production which provide the 
institutional, economic, and concrete contents of those enunciations. This is not the 
same as the base and superstructure of orthodox Marxisms, where the former 
determines the latter, instead both are arranged in a relationship of “reciprocal 
presupposition”.24 Writing is thus not representing the world (orthodox Marxism) 
or retreating into an ideal realm of the symbolic (orthodox Lacanism) but is a 
process of metamorphoses that redistributes along a chaotic trajectory what can be 
said about the world and who can do the saying—rarely, if ever, a person.  
Here again we need to return to the concept of the line of flight, the 
aberrant movement which escapes the regime of signification through which 
human bodies are subjected via the capitalist axiomatic. In the chapter on 
linguistics from A Thousand Plateaus these movements are given the name “style” 
and refer not only to specific instances of language use, but are themselves those 
incorporeal transformations which escape signification, or are otherwise extra-
linguistic. Where the subject of an enunciation (which traditional linguistics takes as 
its objective fact) is exposed to their outside—to the forces, codes and regimes of 
                                                          
23 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues II, trans. Hugh Tomlinson, Barbara Habberjam and Eliot 
Ross (London: Continuum 2006; Paris: Flammarion 1977), p.40. 
24 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.50. 
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signs which compose them as a subject who speaks and of whom we can speak—
they become imperceptible to those structures. In reference to Jean-Luc Godard, 
Deleuze again invokes those utterances and intercessions in speech (silence, 
stammering, screaming) that are imperceptible to linguistics, but are in fact the 
conditions by which we can separate words and things, subject and world—the 
deafening silence of what is non-human in language:  
Language is presented to us as basically informative, and information as 
basically an exchange. Once again, information is measured in abstract 
units. But it's doubtful whether the schoolmistress, explaining how 
something works or teaching spelling, is transmitting information. She's 
instructing, she's really delivering precepts. And children are supplied with 
syntax like workers being given tools, in order to produce utterances 
conforming to accepted meanings. We should take him quite literally when 
Godard says children are political prisoners. Language is a system of 
instructions rather than a means of conveying information […] then there's 
something like silence, or like stammering, or screaming, something slipping 
through underneath the redundancies and information, letting language slip 
through, and making itself heard, in spite of everything. […] So how can we 
manage to speak without giving orders, without claiming to represent 
something or someone, how can we get people without the right to speak, 
to speak; and how can we restore to sounds their part in the struggle 
against power? I suppose that's what it means to be like a foreigner in one's 
own language, to trace a sort of line of flight for words.25 
It is never a person who speaks, but bodies and forces which are spoken o’. 
Everything is hearsay: a machine for producing subjectivity. Updating this familiar 
structuralist notion (where language already is an other which inhabits us) for 
Deleuze the system of langue is not a structure with specific variations, but a 
continuous variation with specific instances of structuration. This is why literature 
or poetry does not need an avant-garde: because the system (as continuous 
                                                          
25 Gilles Deleuze, “Three Questions on Six Times Two”, in Negotiations 1972-1990, (New York: 
Columbia University Press 1995; Paris: Les Editions de Minuit 1990), p.40-41. 
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variation with only abstract standardisation) is open at every point, exposed to its 
own redundancy and vulnerable to sabotage at every turn. If minor literature had 
heroes, they would not be artistic geniuses able to transcend the everyday, but 
bureaucrats, clerks and other workers composed out of a bricolage of institutional 
forms run amok: the merchant Georg Bendemann whose “I swear!” Kafka has take 
a life of its own; Bartleby the scrivener, whose “I would prefer not to” Melville turns 
into a kind of corporate virus.26 It is, conversely, wherever language is at its most 
rigid and stratified that it is most open to subterfuge. This is why the Algerian novel 
offers a counterpoint to the way the postcolonial novel is usually conceived by, for 
example, Moretti and Casanova (as foreign form unevenly combined with local 
content). Instead Algerian writing undergoes an extreme degree of formal and 
compositional variation (partly influenced by the rise of the noveau roman in 
France) but where Algerian identity is absent, effaced or impossible. The people do 
not exist. It’s in Algeria that the European avant-garde exhausts itself, at the same 
time as newer forms of economic and cultural oppression are coming over the 
horizon. The creative response to this situation by certain Algerian texts constitutes 
a line of flight away from national allegory, from identity, and from the 
representational role of the text. 
My argument, that the Algerian novel is best conceived of as a line of flight, 
follows Deleuze and Guattari in mapping these aberrant movements, where the 
French language is made to stutter under Algerian hands, via the materialist 
semiotics of J.L. Austin, Louis Hjelmslev and V.N Volosinov, each of whose ideas 
they draw upon in order to develop an alternative philosophy of language to the 
Saussurean signifier-signified model. This alternative, sometimes called pragmatics 
but not consistently so, draws from Anglo-American literature more so than 
structuralist linguistics, but I will depart from Deleuze and Guattari’s reading habits 
and instead focus on the form of the Algerian novel following the war for 
independence from 1954-1962. This may seem an odd decision given Deleuze’s 
famous claim of the superiority of English and American literature, but will provide 
                                                          
26 See Franz Kafka, “The Judgement: A Story for F”, in Metamorphoses and Other Stories, trans. 
Michael Hofmann, (London: Penguin 2007 [1913]), pp.35-50, and Herman Melville, “Bartleby the 
Scrivener”, in Billy Budd, Bartleby and Other Stories, (London: Penguin 2016 [1853]), pp.17-55. 
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us with clues as to why avant-garde writing or so-called revolutionary aesthetics 
reaches a stumbling block for Deleuze writing in 1979. Here the Algerian novel is 
significant in that it consists in a subaltern use of a high-modernist, European 
literary form by a colonised people—but at the very point at which those cultures of 
European domination undergo a transformation to the forms of neo-colonialism 
practised by the global or integrated financial capitalism which still dominate 
today.27 
 What becomes of minor literature once the new institutions of global 
capitalism (such as the IMF, World Bank, United Nations—all formed shortly before 
or after Algerian independence) succeed in incorporating those immaterial aspects 
of labour (subjectivity, language, communication, memory) thought to be the 
preserve of literary authors, into the very fabric of capitalist reproduction? Under 
these conditions, the idea of narrating the nation which World-Literary Theory 
continually wants to move beyond, is simply redundant: because the people given 
the name “Algerian” do not exist, or are missing. Reading Kateb Yacine’s Nedjma, 
Nabile Farès’ Exile and Hopelessness and Assia Djebar’s Fantasia alongside A 
Thousand Plateaus, I extrapolate from Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy a 
geoliterature which works to counter the capture of literary expression by new 
modes of capitalism working via language and sensation themselves. This 
geoliterature is composed out of three moments or concepts in the materialist 
pragmatics developed by Deleuze and Guattari—the “order-word” or slogan (mots 
d’ordre) extracted from Austin’s speech-act theory; the notion of “double 
articulation” borrowed from Hjelmslev’s structuralist semiotics; and the theory of 
free-indirect style Deleuze and Guattari take from Voloshinov’s philosophy of 
language.28 In doing so I will make the figure of the line of flight the key refrain in 
my reading of world literature in later chapters—as those aberrant movements, 
passages and escapes by which literature discloses a people and an Earth yet to 
come. 
                                                          
27 C.f Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 2001). 
28 There is some suggestion that V.N Voloshinov was in fact a pseudonym of Bhaktin, and Deleuze 




The term geoliterature is not my own, but I do want to significantly develop 
and expand its application by Kenneth Surin, whereby it denotes a Deleuzian 
literary imaginary in which “the book is an assemblage, and that one is a writer 
precisely because one invents assemblages (of a particular and quite specific 
kind)”.29 Here Surin draws upon Deleuze’s distinction between the supposedly 
arborescent tendencies of French literature and the affinity between Anglo-
American literature and British empiricism, Spinozism and Stoicism. This affinity 
centres on the concept of the assemblage in A Thousand Plateaus, whereby in the 
book-as-assemblage: 
one side of the assemblage faces what Deleuze and Guattari call `the strata', 
that is, a plethora of codes and milieux characterised above all by a 
ceaseless mobility. The other side of the assemblage faces `the body 
without organs', that is, what is fundamentally an agglomeration of part-
objects that interrupts the functioning of the three great strata (the 
organism (l'organisme), signifiability (la signifiance) and subjectification (la 
subjectivation) as organising principles).30 
The originality of this configuration for world-literary studies lies in its breaking with 
the dominant hermeneutic models of the kinds of materialism I identified in my 
introduction as Bourdieuian (in the case of Casanova) and Marxist (in the cases of 
Moretti and the theory of combined and uneven development derived from Trotsky 
utilised by the Warwick Research Collective). Rather than the familiar Marxist sense 
in which base and superstructure are conceived as two separate series, Surin (via 
Deleuze) theorises a geoliterature made up of several overlapping strata in which 
processes of signification pass between the series (rather than simply from modes 
of production to cultural forms which represent those productive forces as social 
relations in abstraction). In what follows I want to expand upon Surin’s indexing of 
geoliterature to the concept of assemblage, and propose a tripartite map of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s materialist semiotics via the concepts of order word, 
                                                          
29 Kenneth Surin, “A Question of the Axiomatic of Desires: The Deleuzian Imagination of 
Geoliterature”, in Deleuze and Literature, ed. Ian Buchanan and John Marks, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press 2000), p.167. 
30 Ibid. pp.170-171. 
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assemblage (or their double articulation), and indirect discourse. In each case the 
book-as-assemblage replaces the book-as-object familiar to the various kinds of 
literary sociology conducted by world-literary theory in its materialist guise—
wherein the particular scale or lens by which one reads world literature changes but 
the preponderance to see texts only as collections of metaphors, meanings and 
social relations in the abstract endures.31 In the case of geoliterature, texts are 
themselves always already worldly, and immanently bound up in processes of 
signification and subjectification which they (in specific cases and specific ways) are 
capable of breaking down. What I’m after, then, is a political unconscious of the 
text but not figured in terms of hermeneutics or representation, but a political 
machinic-unconscious of the text where modes of de-subjectification and 
deterritorialisation are immanent to reading and writing as forms of social praxis. In 
chapter 3 I will also distinguish Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of literature 
as geoliterature from certain kinds of hermeneutics belonging to postcolonial 
studies, in which some agency or capacity to make worlds rather than simply 
represent them is given back to the text, but often at the expense of returning us to 
an idealist or transcendent disposition towards what constitutes a world.32 
 
2.2. Kateb Yacine’s Nedjma, or, the order-word 
 
Deleuze was fond of referencing a remark by Proust, that “beautiful books 
are written in a sort of foreign language”.33 A cursory glance finds Deleuze directly 
quoting or paraphrasing this comment in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, 
Dialogues (with Claire Parnet), Essays Critical and Clinical, “S for Style” from the 
televised L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze, and a 1976 interview with Cahiers du 
Cinema, on the subject of Jean Luc Godard’s TV miniseries Six Fois Deux. It’s unusual 
                                                          
31 One can see the dominance of this hermeneutic model in words such as ‘signifies’, ‘reflects’, 
‘represents’ and ‘registers’, for instance. 
32 See, for example, Pheng Cheah’s What is a World? On Postcolonial Literature as World Literature, 
(North Carolina: Duke University Press 2016). 
33 Marcel Proust, “Notes on Literature and Criticism”, in Against Saint-Beuve and Other Essays, trans. 
John Sturrock, (London: Penguin 1988 [1908]), p.93. 
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to find such consistency in Deleuze’s vocabulary across the breadth of his work, 
which suggests that this idea holds a certain power over Deleuze’s various literary 
encounters, and is instructive for how he understands the special instances of 
language-use called literary. In the same passage from Against Saint-Beuve, Proust 
goes on to say that reading does not consist in understanding or communicating 
but, paradoxically, in misinterpretation. It just so happens that in great works “all 
our misinterpretations are beautiful”.34 Proust is referring not to a convergence 
between author and reader, but a process of diffraction and transformation that 
passes in-between the signifier and the signified: interpretation or the transmission 
of meaning in fact refers to a composition of forces which are pre-individual (the 
misinterpretations are not intentional). This short sentence comprises all the 
essential elements of Deleuze (and Guattari’s) alternative theory of language they 
call “pragmatics” opposed to mainstream linguistics.35 Pragmatics situates language 
within Deleuze’s larger philosophy of immanence, as a theory of language-in-the-
world, and will form the basis of my reading of world literature according to 
processes of de- and re-territorialisation—aberrant transformations named by the 
concept of the line of flight. 
Mainstream or dominant theories of language operate by a series of rules or 
axioms Deleuze and Guattari diagnose as “the postulates of linguistics”.36 In A 
Thousand Plateaus these postulates consist of what Deleuze and Guattari see as 
four major mistakes. Firstly, linguistics is based on the study of language qua 
communication and the transmission of information. Secondly, it assumes the 
separation of language from other social phenomena. Thirdly, it postulates 
language as a science with universal laws and only local variation (whereas, as 
Deleuze and Guattari show, the minor field of sociolinguistics actually reveals 
language as a system in continuous variation and only contingent rules). Finally, it 
substitutes the study of linguistic signs for the study of all types of signs (when 
there are, in reality, several regimes of signs active in a given historical moment). 
                                                          
34 Ibid. 94. 
35 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.91. 
36 Ibid. 83. 
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These axioms are not consistent with any one linguistic theory or thinker, but seem 
to crop up at various times as transcendental rules or assumed orthodoxies across 
figures from a range of disciplines such as Noam Chomsky or Ferdinand de 
Saussure.37 In response to these axioms, Deleuze and Guattari develop several 
conceptual weapons designed to replace them in the study of language and 
literature. Of these concepts, I will focus on three—the order-word, double 
articulation, and free-indirect discourse—as the three components of what I call a  
geoliterature, which will be used to map the social, political and cultural 
transformations undertaken by the Algerian novel prior to and following Algeria’s 
independence in 1962. 
The theory of geoliterature which emerges is at the same time non-
representational (it is fully part of the world and doesn’t stand hermetically or 
epistemologically apart from it), materialist (it consists of textual matter or 
inscriptions which are fully real and not symbolic), and political (because the texts 
themselves take part in and are a component of the transformations to Algerian life 
in the middle of the twentieth century). The first of these concepts, the order-word, 
is extracted from Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of J.L. Austin’s theory of speech 
acts and is key to articulating a way of reading world literature that is not 
representational.38 This becomes especially important in the postcolonial context of 
Algeria, where the question of enunciation—of those bodies allowed to speak and 
which can be spoken of—is always already a politically vexed one.39 
                                                          
37 The importance of Chomsky’s universal grammar for Franco Moretti’s systemic approach to 
literature should make the relevance of Deleuze and Guattari’s intervention obvious for our 
purposes. 
38 As it is for Moretti and Casanova, c.f previous chapter. 
39 I mean this literally seeing as, from the perspective of the coloniser, the colonised do not exist as 
social subjects and are instead the background against which white subjectivity is fashioned. As 
Saidiya Hartman has expressed: “the slave is the object or the ground that makes possible the 
existence of the bourgeois subject and, by negation or contradistinction, defines liberty, citizenship, 
and the enclosures of the social body.” Saidiya V. Hartman, Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and 
Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997), p.62. C.f 
Chapter 4 on ‘blackness’ and social death. 
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 In Kateb Yacine’s Nedjma (1956)—published during the height of the 
Algerian war for independence but written and set largely in the years preceding 
it—Lakhdar, a student, is travelling by train from the city of Constantine to Bône: 
Entouré de mégots consumés, Lakhdar contemple par le portière les champs 
de tabac, la plaine… 
 Travailler dans la nature comme grand-père, ne serait-ce pas la 
meilleure manière de vivre, puisqu’il n’est plus question d’étudier? 
Dans ce wagon de troisième classe, une famille de compagnards 
s’apprête à descendre. Un jeune marin français aide le mari à rassembler 
une demi-douzaine de couffins, où les poules et les légumes voisinent avec 
les layettes du bébé. Lakhdar triture sa moustache: signe d’émotion ou de 
perplexité? 
 
[Surrounded by stubbed-out butts, Lakhdar stares through the doorway at 
the fields of tobacco, the plain… 
 To labour with nature, like grandfather, wouldn’t that be the best 
way to live, now that he couldn’t study anymore? 
 In this third-class railway car, a farmer family is about to get off. A 
young French sailor helps the husband get together a half dozen crates 
where hens and vegetables are jumbled in with the baby’s rags. Lakhdar 
nibbles his moustache: a sign of emotion or confusion?]40 
The passage takes place just after the Algerian protests of May 1945 and the 
subsequent massacre by French police in Sétif in which Lakhdar is caught up. After 
his arrest and torture by French officers, Lakhdar finds his student status has been 
revoked, forcing him to return to his relatives in Bône. The journey between 
Constantine and Bône is undertaken by several characters at different points in the 
novel’s chronology, and carries both narratological and linguistic significance. 
                                                          
40 Kateb Yacine, Nedjma, trans. Richard Howard, (Charlottesville and London: Caraf Books 1991; 
Paris: Éditions de Seuil 1956), pp.83-84 [69-70]. Hereafter references to the English translation will 
be given in square brackets after the original. 
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Constantine, one of the last Algerian cities to be conquered by the French, seems to 
retain its Arabic character in its physical and psychological architecture, where: 
French authorities proved very reluctant to undertake the massive 
destruction and reconfiguration they had implemented everywhere else; 
they limited themselves to widening a few streets and creating an esplanade 
on the spot where their artillery had pierced the fortifications, recalling with 
its name the open wound in the city’s defences: the Place de la Brèche.41 
The city-as-wound transports its characters along its winding, confusing streets 
both spatially and temporally, where it serves as a portal to other points in Algeria’s 
history: its predecessor, Cirta, being the site of the Numidian king Jugurtha’s 
insurgency against the Romans. The novel and its protagonists often slip between 
these two chronologies, where: 
les Romains sont remplacés les Corses; tous Corses, tous gardiens de prison, 
et nous prenons la succession des esclaves, dan le même bagne, près de la 
fosse aux lions, et les fils des Romains patrouillent l’arme à la bretelle. 
[it’s Corsicans instead of Romans now; all Corsicans, all prison guards, and 
we play the slaves’ roles, in the same prison, near the lion pit, and the sons 
of the Romans do guard duty with rifles on their shoulders].42 
Both spatially and temporally, Algeria’s history of conquest and insurgency 
becomes an open-air prison for its inhabitants, repeating across the novel’s 
different locales and chronologies. 
 Bône, by contrast, offers a possible escape from the prison of colonial 
history, but only because the ancient city of Hippo on which it stands has been 
replaced by: 
le terne avenir de la ville décomposée en îles architecturales, en oubliettes 
de cristal, en minarets d’acier repliés au cœur des navires, en wagonnets 
                                                          
41 Seth Graebner, ‘Kateb Yacine and the Ruins of the Present’, Substance, 36:1 (2007), pp.139-163 
(p.146). 
42 Yacine, Nedjma, p.47 [56]. 
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chargés de phosphates et d’engrais, en vitrines royales reflétant les 
costumes irréalisables de quelque siècle futur 
[a sombre future of the city decomposing in architectural islands, in 
oubliettes of crystal, minarets of steel screwed into the heart of ships, in 
trucks loaded with phosphates and fertilizer, in regal shop windows 
reflecting the unrealizable costumes of some century to come].43 
The metropolitan and mercantile Bône (now Annaba) in which the novel’s 
protagonists wander after the student uprising of May 1948, labouring on an un-
named construction project, offers one possible future, but only to the extent that 
it effaces and obscures the characters’ historical and cultural specificity to the same 
degree. 
 If, as Seth Graebner has suggested, the novel’s chapters (divided into six, 
each with one or two sets of twelve parts) form a grid rather than a line, the cites of 
Constantine and Bône serve as wells or attractors that suck in surrounding 
characters and histories (hence the willed slippage between the Roman and 
Corsican/French colonisers).44 This is where Lakhdar finds himself caught on his way 
to visit his relatives in Bône—including his cousin Nedjma, the French-Algerian 
woman with whom each of the novel’s four protagonists is in love and who serves 
as the missing-centre of the novel’s non-linear plot. The problem of the novel’s 
structure—its often-confusing temporal and perspectival jumps—is rendered as a 
kind of linguistic guerrilla warfare. Cultural histories, competing Arabic vernaculars, 
Algerian mythology, and French authority all fight to override and stabilise their 
relationships with one another. In the train carriage, Lakhdar’s confusion (or 
nervousness) arises not from the lack or impossibility of speech, but from his 
already having said far too much.45 His desire to return to some pastoral 
relationship with the land, which he associates with patrilineal succession, is 
presented as internal monologue but without any personal pronouns. When this 
                                                          
43 Ibid. p.76 [92]. 
44 Graebner, p.147. Systems theory would also classify the two cities as ‘attractors’ – points to which 
a dynamic system (the novel’s narrative) gravitates over time. 




desire comes up against the reality of the impoverished farmer and his family, the 
novel switches to a third-person narrator, but whose authority is circumspect—
questioning their own ability to “read” Lakhdar’s gestures and movements. In fact, 
it’s Lakhdar’s own utterances which alienate him from his fellow traveller – his 
French education distancing him from the Algerian farmers, “trémousser à chaque 
station, de crainte d’être arrivés”; “fidgeting at every station, afraid of missing their 
stop”, because they cannot read the names of the stations.46 Lakhdar’s internal 
monologue, punctuated by ellipsis, and lacking an I, comes up against his already 
being spoken-for by language. His body is already constituted in and through 
language even before the act of utterance— “Lakhdar lorgne avec une moue son 
pantalon de coutil”; “Lakhdar stares sourly at his own drill trousers”.47 There is no 
individual utterance prior to Lakhdar’s social being (as in Chomsky’s universal 
grammar) but a social organisation of signs and utterances out of which Lakhdar’s 
subject position is condensed or individuated. This effect of overcoding by 
language, where bodies and things are spoken for by language prior to their being 
spoken about by a speaker or subject, Deleuze and Guattari term the effect of the 
order-word (mot d’ordre).48 Deleuze and Guattari will in fact claim that the order-
word is “the elementary unit of language” over and above the subjects and objects 
of utterances which are merely the aggregates or after-effects of language.49 It’s 
the effect of the order-word which allows us to make sense of the world and 
distinguish it from our selves. As to the first postulate of linguistics, that language is 
primarily about communication or that communication is the “stuff” of language, 
Deleuze and Guattari argue: “language is made not to be believed but obeyed, and 
to compel obedience”.50 
 As previously discussed, the concept of the order-word or slogan expands 
and updates the English linguist J.L. Austin’s theory of speech-acts. For Austin, there 
are instances of language in which the performance of an utterance is also the 
                                                          
46 Yacine, Nedjma, p.70 [84]. 
47 Ibid. p.71 [85]. 
48 Massumi’s translation of ‘order word’ for mots d’ordre is possibly too literal, where it can also 
mean ‘slogans’ in the sense of political campaigns or advertisements. 




performing of an action, such that “when we say ‘I promise that…’ the case is very 
different from when we say ‘He promises that…’, or in the past tense ‘I promised 
that…’ For when we say ‘I promise that…’ we do perform an act of promising—we 
give a promise”.51 Here the saying of the utterance is not simply a representational 
or symbolic gesture, it effects a social obligation between two bodies that 
transforms their relation to one-another. The same can be said when a judge passes 
a sentence which transforms the body of the accused into the body of the 
condemned.52 A force passes over the subject of the statement (the “I” who 
promises) and the object of the statement (the one to whom a promise was made) 
that does not consist in the exchange of information, but the transposition of 
authority: “it was promised that…”. The social convention (the promise) exists prior 
to its inculcation in the body of the speaker, and is merely individuated by the act of 
language, such that all possible versions of the statement “I promise” can be said to 
exist as a virtual continuum, from which a specific instance is actualised by the act 
of promising, but which implies all potential variations of the promise as its social 
character: which Deleuze and Guattari call the “implicit presuppositions” of any 
statement.53 The performative, considered as the elementary unit of any 
statement, assumes that there is a subject who speaks (I), a body or group of bodies 
which can be spoken of as subjects (you), as well as the social convention of 
promising understood by all speakers (the continuum of speech acts), in addition to 
the extra-linguistic and institutional predicates necessary for the statement to have 
force (the child that makes a promise to their parent, the lover that makes a 
promise to their beloved). These extra-linguistic or non-linguistic elements 
differentiate Deleuze and Guattari’s pragmatics from those transcendent studies of 
language called linguistics which assume language’s abstract or ideal nature in 
relation to the material world. Rather, for Deleuze and Guattari language is part of 
                                                          
51 J.L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press 1970), p.242. 
52 The statement “I swear!” is also key to Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Kafka’s The Trial. 
53 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.87. 
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a wider “regime of signs” which striates the real and gives meaning to the order of 
things.54  
This is why Deleuze and Guattari describe the operation of order-words as 
one of “redundancy” – they implicitly presuppose the existence of the things they 
speak about (when I make an utterance, I’m reflexively performing my visibility and 
knowability as an individuated subject, which is really the expression of the forces 
which inscribe my being): 
We call order-words, not a particular category of explicit statements (for 
example, in the imperative), but the relation of every word or every 
statement to implicit presuppositions, on other words, to speech acts that 
are, and can only be, accomplished in the statement. Order-words do not 
concern demands only, but every act that is linked to statements by a ‘social 
obligation’. Every statement displays this link, directly or indirectly. 
Questions, promises, are order-words. The only possible definition of 
language is the set of all order-words, implicit presuppositions, or speech 
acts current in a language at any given moment.55 
Lakhdar’s predicament in Nedjma, as well as the other major characters whose 
movements across the narrative’s spatial grid compose its a-temporal structure, is 
not to find the authentic means to communicate his being, but always to escape or 
to flee the obligations, precepts and redundancies by means of which he can be 
“spoken of” in language. When the French officer offers Lakhdar a cigarette, what 
occurs is less a confrontation between the coloniser and the other, than an 
incorporeal transformation which passes between the two bodies: 
Pourquoi tant de gentillesse? Ils veulent faire oublier leurs crimes…>> 
Lakhdar chasse vite cette idée. << Brave marin! Peut-être que son père aussi 
est un miserable… Peut-être connaissait-il la faim sur le Vieux Port… Il n’a 
pas eu le temps d’être contaminé par ceux d’ici. D’ailleurs il changera 
                                                          
54 The reference to Foucault is not incidental, as Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of a regime of 
signs is loosely parallel to Foucault’s discursive formations which define the ‘seeable’ and ‘sayable’ 
of any historical situation. 
55 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.87. 
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comme eux. On lui dira: ce sont des voleurs, des ingrats, ils ne respectant 
que la matraque. Il n’offrira plus de cigarette à un fellah… 
[Why so nice? They want us to forget their crimes…’ Lakhdar quickly 
dismisses this notion. ‘A decent one! Maybe his father’s poor too… Maybe 
he used to be hungry in Marseille… He hasn’t had time to be contaminated 
by the ones around here. Besides, he’ll change like them. They’ll tell him: 
they’re thieves, ingrates, all they respect is a bludgeon. He won’t offer 
cigarettes to a fella any more…]56 
Lakhdar’s evasion comes from his desire to avoid the function of the order-word—
the knowledge that his boarding school dress trousers, as well as his literacy, mark 
him out from his fellow passengers and identify him more with the French officers 
than with the peasant farmer. The passage is conveyed in reported speech, but is 
presumably Lakhdar’s internal monologue, and thus seems to alienate him from his 
own enunciations. What occurs is closer to an operation of language seeking new 
combinations of presuppositions. Perhaps the officer was poor himself? Perhaps he 
hasn’t yet been co-opted by racial hatred? These escape-routes would allow 
Lakhdar to escape the social fact of his own assimilation into Francophone identity. 
There are in fact no individual enunciations in Nedjma, only sets of order-words and 
presuppositions (“collective assemblages” of enunciation) from which the novel 
tries to wrestle its characters away.57 The novel’s title-character, Nedjma (meaning 
“star” and symbolically associated with Algeria) barely appears in the novel, and 
instead serves as the missing signifier or empty space towards which each of the 
protagonists are simultaneously drawn. Her signifying role is void, because the 
people she supposedly represents do not exist: 
De Constantine à Bône, de Bône à Constantine voyage une femme… C’est 
comme si elle n’était plus; on ne la voit que dans un train ou une caliche, et 
ceux qui la connaissent ne la distinguent plus parmi les passantes; ce n’est 
                                                          
56 Kateb, Nedjma, p.70 [84]. 
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plus qu’une lueur exaspérée d’automne, une citée traquée qui se ferme au 
désastre; elle est voilée de noir. 
[From Constantine to Bône, from Bône to Constantine a woman travels… It 
is as if she no longer existed; as if she were seen only in a train or a carriage, 
and those who know her no longer distinguish her from the other women 
passing by; she is no longer anything but a final gleam of autumn, a besieged 
city fending of disaster, she is veiled in black.]58 
The novel is not based around the Platonic dualism of form and simulacra—there is 
no authentic self to be revealed behind the veil. There is no reveal (voila!) but only 
a process of veiling (voilage) which folds and refolds the various transformations 
the Algerian body undergoes. The veil, veiling, becomes its own figure of movement 
and change. It doesn’t represent some other meaning except for the lines made by 
its folds. But nor is the veil fetishised as Arabic resistance to the colonial desire to 
see and recognise the face of the colonised—which would only reterritorialise 
Nedjma within a precolonial patriarchy. Characters’ Desire for her is experienced 
not simply as sexual or marital conquest, but a process of open-ended transgression 
or flight from the despotic assemblages which possess and inscribe the bodies of 
Lakhdar and his friends. Here the other sense of the phrase line of flight (ligne de 
fuite) becomes apparent: the vanishing point (pointe de fuite) in painting where, 
from the perspective of the observer, lines appear to converge on the horizon and 
disappear. Curiously, the Arabic veil as a figure of imperceptibility does appear in 
Deleuze’s work. In The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, Deleuze is fascinated by the 
photographs of veiled Arabic women taken by the Nineteenth century French 
psychiatrist Gaëtan Gatian de Clerambault. Clerambault’s photography “amounts, 
despite what has been said, to much more than a simple personal perversion. […] If 
Clerambault manifests a delirium, it is because he discovers the tiny hallucinatory 
perceptions of ether addicts in the folds of clothing”.59 The fold creates an inside 
from what is outside, by revealing the figure of the body at the same time as it 
                                                          
58 Yacine, Nedjma, p.196 [pp.244-245]. 
59 Gilles Deleuze, Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley, (London: Continuum 2003; Paris: Les 
Editions de Minuit 1988), p.43. 
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obscures and differentiates its shape along several lines and contours.60 Deleuze’s 
description of the “figures without objects” which Clerambault’s photographs 
disclose could equally be applied to Nedjma’s linguistic folds—the lines of flight on 
which it disperses character, plot, and history.   
 Nedjma is thus not a hermeneutic or signifying object in the usual sense 
representational or hermeneutic literary criticisms assume, but a collection of 
statements, order-words, performative utterances which the narrative tries to fold 
and refold in ways which will escape or evade the prefabricated identities of 
French, Algerian or even Maghrebian literature. The people are missing. Likewise, 
Deleuze and Guattari conceive of books as assemblages which are subtracted from 
the collective assemblage of enunciation active within the social and historical 
situation of their writing and which take on a life of their own.61 Geoliterature is not 
opposed to a transcendental or idealist canon, but to a way of reading which 
assumes the existence of subjects and worlds prior to their representation in 
language. This is the majoritarian position of linguistic science, against which 
Deleuze and Guattari craft a minor science—pragmatics—which is attuned to the 
way in which the world is always having to be organised, territorialised, or created 
anew. Literary texts are compounds or assemblages of linguistic materials and 
technical objects subtracted from the world, but they are not of a different order of 
being (i.e. the symbolic or the signifier) than the world itself. To demonstrate how 
texts are doubly articulated as worldy and as somehow subtracted from the world, I 
will now turn to Nabile Farès’ Exile and Hopelessness (L’Exil et le Déssaroi) (2012, 
[1976]) to conceptualise the second component of geoliterature— the book-as-
assemblage. 
 
                                                          
60 There is similarity to how, in his work on discipline, Foucault describes the appearance of 
transcendence from within immanence—as discussed in chapter 1. 
61 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.4. 
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2.3. Assemblages and double articulation: Nabile Farès’ Exile and 
Helplessness 
 
Lakhdar’s conundrum in Nedjma is not one of lack or absence, his speech 
stolen from him, but a surfeit of language (as a set of order-words) which striate 
and constrain him. The order-word renders his dream of a mythical or rural-
Algerian identity impossible next to the actual and lived experience of the peasant 
farmers beside him, alongside the equal impossibility of solidarity with the French 
officer on the other side of the carriage. For Deleuze and Guattari the problem of 
linguistic colonialism is not one of hybridity or bilingualism, but the multiplicity of 
types of language active at any given time. In their work on Kafka, Deleuze and 
Guattari categorise these types of language-functions (though not yet developed 
into the full theory of language based on order-words from A Thousand Plateaus) 
into four essential characteristics borrowed from the linguist Henri Gobard:  
Vernacular, maternal, or territorial language, used in rural communities or 
rural in its origins; a vehicular, urban, governmental, even worldwide 
language, a language of businesses, commercial exchange, bureaucratic 
transmission, and so on, a language of the first sort of deterritorialisation; 
referential language, language of sense and of culture, entailing a cultural 
reterritorialization; mythic language, on the horizon of cultures, caught up a 
spiritual or religious reterritorialization. The spatiotemporal categories of 
these languages differ sharply: vernacular language is here; vehicular 
language is everywhere; referential language is over there; mythic language 
is beyond.62 
The vernacular is the everyday, lived or colloquial use of language by a given 
community, whereas the vehicular is a state-language which imposes a false 
universality on the vernacular, subordinating it to a standard grammar and syntax. 
The referential is the partial reterritorialization of the vernacular-vehicular along 
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national or hegemonic lines, whereas the mythic is a full reterritorialization of the 
mixture of vernacular and vehicular into an imagined future which would reconcile 
their difference. Mythic language, however, is always deferred or at the horizon of 
culture—referring to an ideal or utopian space beyond the present community of 
speakers. The fields and plains always “over there” or outside the carriage 
constitute Lakhdar’s invocation of the deferred-mythical Algiers, whereas the 
peasant farmer and French officer enact the interplay between the vernacular use 
of Arabic (frequently in its oral or dialectic form) and the vehicular or 
deterritorialising movement of French (here spoken but elsewhere expressed as the 
written or institutional force of the protagonists’ education) which sucks Lakhdar 
into its orbit.63  
 In this case the referential language of “culture”, frequently understood in 
terms of national allegory or hegemonic structures, is missing. For Réda Bensmaïa, 
Algerian writers at the time of independence were confronted with the 
impossibility of writing in a national or standard language not co-opted by colonial 
rule, and the absense of a public or community of speakers who would read the 
said work: 
Not only were ‘products’ (or producers) lacking but so was the actual terrain 
where such products could come into being and take on meaning—the 
material and objective conditions for the existence of a public, a public 
sphere. And so at the time independence, cultural problems were never 
posed in the abstract or universal terms of expression and production, but 
always, necessarily, in the regional and concrete terms of territorialisation 
or reterritorialisation using the fragmentary material, cultural, and spiritual 
elements the country had inherited so as to create a new geopolitics.64 
                                                          
63 This is a crude way of personifying Deleuze and Guattari’s taxonomy of languages, but explains the 
point well. 
64 Réda Bensmaïa, Experimental Nations: Or, the Invention of the Maghreb, (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press 2003), p.13.  
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 In the context of Algeria’s soon-to-be independence, these material and objective 
conditions consisted in a constricted or heavily segmented terrain that was at once 
linguistic/ incorporeal and spatial/corporeal: 
Culturally, religiously, and linguistically, French Algeria was rigidly 
segregated, though not in the way that South Africa was during the 
apartheid regime. There were no special places reserved for Muslim or 
French on public transport. Instead, French Algeria was crisscrossed by a 
series of invisible barriers which could not be transgressed […] The main 
streets of the European quarters of Algiers, with their wide tree-lined 
boulevards, were particularly elegant. Yet not a stone’s throw from the 
grand façades was a totally different world, the world of the casbah with its 
overcrowded housing and tiny trap-like streets.65 
Bensmaia’s notion of an Algerian geopolitics is based on a relationship of mutual 
presupposition between the material and the cultural, where each intersects with 
the other in a machinic rather than determining manner. The term is adapted from 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the “assemblage” as way of thinking social 
organisation that has direct application to the postcolonial situation even if it 
wasn’t their original intention. 66 Nevertheless, accounting for this intermingling of 
the material and immaterial, the way in which the apparently symbolic role of 
language “bleeds into” the physical and corporeal structure of reality by way of the 
order-word will lead Deleuze and Guattari to significantly expand upon the 
taxonomy of languages they briefly sketch out in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. 
If the vernacular, vehicular, referential and mythical modes of language are the 
molar aggregates or sets of order-words active in any given language, in a A 
Thousand Plateaus these modes are further elaborated as elements as a mixed 
semiotics that also includes non-linguistic features such as bodies, objects, 
institutions and architectures. Hence there are machinic assemblages of production 
and “collective assemblages” of enunciation that are (as we have seen) social 
                                                          
65 Martin Evans and John Phillips, Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press 2007), p.39 
66 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.94. 
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before they are individuated.67 As a mixed semiotics comprising both material 
interactions and transmissions of force between physical objects, bodies or things, 
as well as the “incorporeal transformations” or meanings “expressed” by those 
interactions, the concept of assemblage provides Deleuze and Guattari with an 
escape route out of the second of their postulates of linguistics: that language can 
be studied as an internally-consistent system (or “abstract machine”) that relies on 
no external factors in order to function.68  
 In their introduction, Deleuze and Guattari gesture towards an 
understanding of the book as an assemblage, rather than a mimicry or mimesis of 
the world, but the concept receives its fullest elaboration in the final passages of 
Plateau 3 “On the Geology of Morals”, extending into Plateau 4 “Postulates of 
Linguistics” and ending up in Plateau 5 “On Several Regimes of Signs”.69 
Concentrating primarily on the middle of these three, Deleuze and Guattari’s use of 
the Danish linguist Louis Hjelmslev’s alternative to the signifier-signified binary (as 
forms of expression and forms of content) provides us with a map to the notion of 
geoliterature—that is, how literary works both engage in and subtract themselves 
from a given territory. Or, how literature weaves in between the incorporeal 
transformations enacted on bodies by order-words, redistributing the sense or 
meaning given to assemblages of bodies, affects, institutions, objects, and so on, 
along a line of flight. The work of Nabile Farès will be particularly instructive here, 
for the way in which his novel Exile and Helplessness (2012/1976) confronts the 
impossibility of Algerian identity, where to write is to plug into the assemblages’ 
colonisation.70 Exactly how to do this is not given in advance, but requires 
experimentation. The novel is an open assemblage connected to its outside rather 
than a hermetically sealed object, where “to create or recreate a terrain, to define 
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68 Ibid. p.94-95. 
69 Ibid. p.12. 
70 C.f Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature: “[Kafka] is a political author, prophet 
of the future world, because he has two poles that he will know how to unify in a completely new 
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something like a national trait, is an act of reterritorialization” that must remain 
incomplete as the text encounters new contexts, new readers and new social 
assemblages.71 The role of the reader, therefore, is not to create value judgements 
or interpretations that exist for all time, but precisely to encounter the book-as-
assemblage by repeating it in new historical circumstances—connecting it to new 
political, philosophical and historical assemblages that might be made stutter or 
break down.72 
This indeterminacy is key to the novel’s engagement with the way in which 
bodies (understood in the widest possible sense to include non-human bodies) and 
territories become organised such that they express the incorporeal attributes of 
social, historical, religious, political or cultural aggregates. The problem for the 
Algerian novel, as Réda Bensmaïa argues, lies in selecting which elements of the 
assemblage to force to take flight, which order-words to detach from their 
referents: 
But which elements were to be used to do this? The forgotten past? The 
ruins of popular memory? Folklore? Tradition? None of these carried with it 
enough force and cohesion to allow it to be a stable anchor for a national 
culture worthy of the name. Furthermore, believing in the possibility of a 
reterritorialisation through folklore, the past, tradition, or religion, would 
mean believing in the sub specie aeternitatis existence of a norm or an 
essence of an Algerian people on whom 135 years of colonialism had 
absolutely no impact.73 
Breaking down, reterritorializing, or naming a territory—assembling—never 
happens ex nihilo, but instead needs to be synthesised from within the elements of 
colonial Algeria that overdetermine, striate and otherwise ensure the impossibility 
of writing or speaking “as an Algerian” whilst facing up to the equal impossibility of 
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not writing.74 The impossibility of not writing is the effect of the cramped 
conditions, the overdetermined nature of the colonised, the crisscrossed lines of 
affiliation that fix Lakhdar to his seat, the encounter with the order-word, that 
demand the creation of a line of flight: “something in the world forces us to 
think”.75 
 Reading Nabile Farès’ Exile and Helplessness along representational or 
hermeneutic lines is a particularly difficult task—the novel’s structure is even more 
fragmented than Yacine’s work. There are no characters in the conventional sense 
and the narrative often mutates into prose-poetry (for lack of a better description 
of Farès’ truncated language). Better is the concept of assemblage for allowing the 
reader to “think with” Farès’ text than forcing interpretation (Marxist, 
psychoanalytic, or otherwise) onto it. In this way the assemblage acts as a relay 
between text, reader, and world which disorganises the unity of those identities in 
order to ask what it does and not what it means. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
comparison of the assemblage to a synthesizer is an apt way of apprehending the 
way representational or subjectivist ways of encountering the text are placed into 
variation, pulverised, or otherwise redistributed in the course of reading it.76  
Borrowing from Louis Hjelmslev’s non-Sausserean semiotics, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s assemblage has four components: substance of content; form of content; 
substance of expression; and form of expression. These replace the binary signifier-
signified in favour of a double articulation of form and content which they apply to 
several regimes of signs beyond the linguistic. Collectively the double articulation of 
form and content can be expressed as a “Hjelmslev net” and is one of A Thousand 
Plateaus’ notorious abstract machines—abstract because it exists in several locales, 
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machinic because it organises and distributes elements on physical strata in a way 
that is absolutely non-symbolic and non-representational. Abstraction here is not 
opposed to concrete (as it was, for example, in Moretti’s abstract models). It is not 
a metaphor.77 
Where the relation between signifier and signified is arbitrary (signs have no 
direct relation to things they signify) the relation between expression and content is 
horizontal. Expression and content are doubly articulated as the two directions 
which formed matter takes in the world. There is no essential difference between 
speech (parole) and writing (langue) for Deleuze and Guattari, simply differences in 
contents (phonemes, sound waves, inscriptions, paper, or screens) which become 
expressed in forms they mutually presuppose (voice, rhetoric, enunciation, the 
book, text or pamphlet and so on). Content and expression are Hjelmslev’s way of 
understanding how matter comes to be overcoded and organised into larger 
aggregates or metastable wholes. He adds a fifth term (purport) which loosely 
corresponds to unformed matter or chaotic flows of matter-energy which Deleuze 
and Guattari term the plane of consistency. From unformed matter (such as all the 
possible combinations of sounds made by the body’s organs of speech) content 
selects substances (specific sounds or phonemes) that together form productive 
aggregates (recognisable speech): 
In one of the two entities that are functives of the sign function, namely the 
content, the sign function institutes a form, the content-form, which from 
the point of the purport is arbitrary and which can be explained only by the 
sign function and obviously solidarity with it […] expression and content […] 
are each defined only oppositively and relatively, as mutually opposed 
functives of one and the same function.78 
If the content-form can be said to look “inwards” towards the elements and partial-
objects of matter-energy, the form of expression looks “outwards” as the sensible 
wholes expressed by those contents functioning together. The form expressed by 
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my phonemes and utterances is the recognisable “English language” even if 
underlying that functional whole is a continuum of differences such as region, 
dialect, accent and so on:  
Precisely the same thing can be observed in the other of the two entities 
that are functives of the sign-function, namely the expression. […] Just as, 
for example, [words for colour] or [combinations of phonemes] are 
subdivided differently in different languages in that each language has its 
own number of colour words, its own number of numbers, its own number 
of tenses, etc., so we can also disclose, by subtraction from a comparison of 
languages, zones in the phonetic sphere which are subdivided differently in 
different languages.79 
These zones or specific combinations of sounds form functional wholes which can 
be collectively expressed in the form of “the English language”/”the French 
language”/”the German language” even if underlying those functional wholes is a 
continuum of differences between each specific utterance or speech act which are 
the substances of those forms of expression “just as an open net casts its shadow 
on an undivided surface”.80  
 It is worth noting that Deleuze returns to Hjelmslev’s materialist semiotics in 
his later work on Foucault (in a rare instance in which Deleuze’s terminology is 
largely the same as his previous work). Here we get a clear example of how content 
and expression are not limited to systems of coding and overcoding on the linguistic 
strata, but are part of a larger cosmology or regime of signs which are not 
necessarily linguistic. In analysing Foucault’s work on disciplinary power, Deleuze 
argues that the forms of content of discipline are the institutions, such as prisons, 
whose substances are prisoners, whereas the form of expression for those 
institutions are the various discourses on delinquency, whose substance are 
medical reports, examinations, behaviour records, timetables and so on: 
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Form [of content] is prison and the substance is those who are locked up, 
the prisoners. […] Form [of expression] is penal law and the substance is 
‘delinquency’ in so far as it is the object of statements. Just as penal law as a 
form of expression defines a field of sayability (the statements of 
delinquency) so prison as a form of content defines a field of place of 
visibility (‘panopticism’, that is to say a place where at any moment one can 
see everything without being seen).81 
The double articulation of content and expression (they mutually presuppose one 
another) demonstrates how Deleuze’s and Guattari’s mixed semiotics can be 
deployed to analyse the ways in which social objects (such as books, novels and 
other literary media) can be thought of as functional wholes or assemblages which 
remain open to their outside in concrete historical situations or everyday uses of 
language without the former being reducible to the later and vice-versa. The 
relation between world and text is horizontal rather than vertical, and doesn’t rely 
on a reductive idealism (symbolism, metaphor, representation) in order to reduce 
the complexity of their interaction. This is why Deleuze and Guattari’s pragmatics 
can be described as an a-signifying semiotics.  
Turning back to the Algerian novel as a war-machine or assemblage which 
takes flight and attempts to disturb the operation of power as it defines what is 
sayable and who is visibile, the fiction and poetry of Nabile Farès is instructive for 
the geoliterature I wish to theorise. In moving away from traditional narrative 
structure (where the contents are predetermined and only exist to be represented) 
Farès can be said to collapse forms of content and expression into one another so 
as to produce aesthetic effects and discursive forms which are not immediately 
recognisable or understandable to readers, Algerian or otherwise. Yet it is that 
moment of alienation or estrangement (where the Other stops being simply the 
mirror image of the White, Western subject) that I have argued is constitutive of 
the line of flight in world literature. 
                                                          




In contrast to works of minority, which exist to represent a subordinate 
subject position to the majority, Farès’ fictions are peculiarly homeless. Despite the 
fact that his writing can be read under the sign of a number of identity categories 
(“French”, “Algerian”, “Berber”) his novels and poetry are animated by the figure of 
the exile as a linguistic, narrational and poetic refrain:  
Des vies / Nos Voix / entendues / pénétrantes / veines / vivantes / animées / 
chaudes / du voyage / végétal / l’arbré? / Comment pourrait-il être détruit / 
ou / dénoncé / dans l’Exil / des / pouvoir / et / des choses / L’arbre est 
parcouru / de mots, phrases idées qui expriment plusieurs équivalences 
entre les volontés de vivre, ou, de mourir, ou, plus simplement se taire: fuir 
le langage, et, l’amour, dans la rivalité du temps, de l’espace, accomplir le 
non-sens, ou, lorsque la crise a lieu, dire l’irréductible espoir de manintenir 
le vrai dans l’exiguité même de la matière et du champ. 
[Our lives / Our voices / heard /penetrating / veins / alive / animated / warm 
/ from the vegetal /journey / the tree? / How could it be destroyed / or / 
denounced / in the Exile of powers / and / things / The tree is shot through 
with words, phrases, ideas that express several equivalence between the 
wills to live, or to die, or, more basically just to keep quiet: to flee language, 
and love, in the rivalry of time and space, to achieve nonsense, or, when the 
crisis arrives, to pronounce the irreducible hope of holding on to truth in the 
very meagreness of matter and the soil.]82 
From the perspective of the narrative, this passage takes place as the novel’s 
pseudo-protagonist, Mokrane, is staring at a mural opposite his bedside. The words 
of the mural are italicised in the text (also reproduced in the translation) but the 
syntax remains fragmented after the slogans on the wall have supposedly stopped 
being narrated—blurring the boundary between what is reported speech, 
Mokrane’s internal monologue, and the narrator’s own speech. The poetic interplay 
between the figure of the tree and vegetal or rhizomatic life, as well as the 
                                                          
82 Nabile Farès, Exile and Helplessness, trans. Peter Thompson, (New Orleans: Dialogos 2012; Paris: 
Maspero 1976), p.28 [36]. Translation modified. References to the English translation will hereafter 
be given in brackets following the original. 
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validation of nonsense as literary style, are only the most obvious comparisons to 
Deleuze’s conceptual world. More significant are the stylistic flattening of speech 
and inscription (langue and parole) and the utilisation of free indirect discourse. I 
will return to the concept of free indirect style in my reading of Assia Djebar’s 
Fantasia: An Algerian Cavalcade, but here I want to register its importance for 
Hjelmslev and Deleuze/Guattari’s understanding of the literary assemblage. The 
notion that subjects are spoken by language is a familiar structuralist trope, but it 
receives a new inflection in Deleuze and Guattari’s takeup of Hjelmslev’s linguistics, 
where, as we have already seen, a continuum or field of difference (purport) 
underlies all language use. Every speech act contains within it every possible 
iteration or variation of that speech act (hence Kafka’s “I swear” which ‘travels’ 
across different contexts and terrain, or Deleuze and Guattari’s interest in the 
paronomasia or associative phonemic play by schizophrenics).83 This means there 
are, strictly speaking, no individual enunciations only collective ones through which 
a subject position is spoken of: 
There is no individual enunciation. There is not even a subject of 
enunciation. […] The social character of enunciation is intrinsically founded 
only if one succeeds in demonstrating how enunciation in itself implies 
collective assemblages. It then becomes clear that the statement is 
individuated, and enunciation subjectified, only to the extent that an 
impersonal collective assemblage requires it and determines it to be so. It is 
for this reason that indirect discourse, especially ‘free’ indirect discourse, is 
of exemplary value: there are no clear, distinctive contours, what comes 
first is not an insertion of variously individuated statements, or an 
interlocking of different subjects of enunciation, but a collective assemblage 
resulting in the determination of relative subjectification proceedings, or 
assignations of individuality.84 
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The formula might be expressed in a modification of Cartesian dogma: I am spoken 
of therefore I am. The set of order words active in a language, which affect 
incorporeal transformations on bodies and things (contents), can now be thought 
of as a collective assemblage of enunciation corresponding to an assemblage of 
material processes—whose interaction and mutual presupposition constitute a 
regime of signs. 
 Rather than a definite or individuated character, Mokrane’s subjectivity is 
precarious and indeterminate. In contrast to the rich and sometimes impressionistic 
passages of poetry in the novel, the narration is often sparse and impoverished—
leading to the sense that Mokrane’s interiority is not really of literary interest to the 
work, or at least is not sentimentalised as the object of the story. Lying on his bed, 
Mokrane is as trapped or transfixed as Lakhdar in his train carriage (or Gregor 
Samsa in his room): 
Il repose le verre de café sur la table qui sert à tout, travailler, manger, 
quelquefois dormir, jouer aux cartes, aux dominos, ou aux dames. Mokrane 
a peur, semble observer l’intérieur de lui-même, les perspectives 
immédiates de recontres, de salut […] Il étend le bras gauche vers la table, 
prends un paquet disques bleu vieux d’une semaine—celle qu’il a passée 
dans sa chamber, au lit—le frappe au cul, prend la cigarette qui sort des 
rangées de filtres blanc. […] A la troisième bouffée, il avale, sent la fumée 
accomplir les mêmes trajets corporels, et, pour ainsi dire, visibles, que ceux 
accomplish quelques instants plus tôt par le café.  
[He sets the glass of coffee down on his all-purpose table, his working, 
eating, sometimes sleeping table, table for cards, dominos, checkers. 
Mokrane is afraid, seems to observe his very interior, the immediate 
prospects of meetings, of health. […] He extends his left arm towards the 
table, takes a pack of Disque Bleus that is a week old—the week he spent in 
bed—raps its bottom, plucks out the cigarette that emerges from the rows 
of white filters. […] At the third puff, he inhales, feels the smoke running 
85 
 
over the same tracks in his body, almost visible ones, that were invaded a 
few minutes earlier by the coffee.]85 
Body and text are crisscrossed by lines of deterritorialization, where expression 
(Mokrane’s subjectivity, the “body” of the narrative) is in danger of collapsing into 
contents (matter-flows of coffee, tobacco, blood, oxygen and language-flows of 
free-indirect style) or where expression becomes detached from its content 
(Mokrane’s own life, the novel’s plot) and takes off on an a-signifying line of flight.86 
 This distinguishes Exile and Helplessness from the sometimes reductive way 
in which peripheral works are assigned allegorical or representational labour by 
theorists of World Literature.87 The novel could be read as coming from a double or 
folded peripheral as emerging from the Kabylie region of Algeria of which the Petite 
Kabylie or Berber are one ethnic minority with a distinct language (Berber) and 
cultural history apart from that of Algeria or the Maghreb, which at the time of 
publication stood in a colonial or minority position to French sovereignty.88 But 
Farès turns the refusal of this allegorical or representational labour into a political 
and aesthetic strategy based on an ethics of exile: “This is why / Exiles and 
Discoveries / Powers and Renunciations / Fatherlands and Depravities / Everything 
is heaped upon us / Like worn-out clothes / and here we are, wanderers / —having 
become wanderers—many miles down the road”.89 For Bensmaia, the exile or, 
better, the exilic as a pre-personal phenomenon, is opposed both to the state and 
to the migrant (because the migrant is one whose deterritorialisation is 
reterritorialised in an adoptive community and thus returns to a majoritarian 
mould): 
                                                          
85 Nabile Farès, Exile and Helplessness, p.27 [35]. 
86 “[In minor literature] it is expression which precedes contents, whether to prefigure the rigid 
forms into which contents will flow or to make them take flight along lines of escape or 
transformation”. Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, p.85. 
87 Although more recent works are substantially more nuanced on this point. C.f Warwick Research 
Collective, Combined and Uneven Development: Towards a New Theory of World-Literature, 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 2015). 
88 c.f. Reda Bensmaia, ‘The Exiles of Nabile Farès: Or, How to Become a Minority’, trans. Jennifer 
Curtiss Gage, Yale French Studies, 83:2 (1999), pp.44-70. 
89 Farès, Exile and Helplessness, pp.19-20 [15-16]. 
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What interests Farès is not belonging to a minority whose values, cultural 
patrimony, and political interests he ardently defends (this agenda is the 
legitimate aim of writers such as Mammeri, Feraoun, or Memmi) but rather 
using this minority status as a pretext for setting in motion a ‘war machine’. 
In radical opposition to the ‘minority’ as an already constituted ensemble or 
State, this ‘war machine’ (inseparable from a ‘writing machine’) unleashes 
the ‘minoritarian’ as a becoming or a process.90 
The concept of the “writing machine” which Bensmaïa here adapts from Deleuze 
and Guattari’s encounter with Kafka, extends in several directions in A Thousand 
Plateaus—one of which being the assemblage. As an assemblage, writing loses its 
signifying or representational function in Exile and Helplessness and instead 
becomes a process of reengineering, where the narrative seeks a suitable form of 
content (Islam, the Arabic language, Algerian nationalism, French, Berber, Kabyle 
identity) suitable for a form of expression (the novel) which constantly escapes and 
slips away from those categories—like plugging into different modules on a 
synthesizer. But ultimately the line of flight escapes these combinations in favour of 
a becoming-minor of the Maghrebian territory in which the periphery becomes 
disengaged from its oppositional stance to the centre.91 The Maghreb, a movement, 
instead becomes a bloc or mixed semiotics of forms and contents, an a-signifying 
distribution of elements of the assemblage: 
Autour, existe ce vaste pays que les constructions les plus vastes, et, le plus 
digestives, ne peuvent masque, ce vaste pays où le ciel trace des auréoles de 
bonheur, et, de vie, au-dessus du souffle miraculeux de la mer, et, du vent. 
[All around this vast land exists, which the vastest and most devouring 
constructions cannot hide, this vast country where the skies traces aureoles 
                                                          
90 Bensmaïa, ‘The Exiles of Nabile Farès: Or, How to Become a Minority’, p.55. 
91 This is sometimes registered ironically in Farès’ work, where ‘the Maghreb’ is not the geographical 
region but a movement or process of transformation which undermines its actual relation to 
territory. ‘Maghreb’ simply means ‘West’ in Arabic, deterritorialising the notion of ‘Western’ in 
English usage, but sharing something in common with Deleuze’s fascination for Anglo-American 
writers that ‘take off West, on the road’. 
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of happiness, and of life, above the miraculous breath of the sea, and the 
wind.]92 
“Terre”, “terre”, “pays”: the text subjects the French language to 
deterritorialisation, where the form of expressions (Terre meaning “the Earth” and 
terre or land) become disarticulated. A deterritorialisation where terrestrials are 
those assemblages of animal and human, collective enunciations, traces and 
journeys made in exile from a country which is no longer reducible to the state, the 
people, or a subject. Exile and Helplessness is a map to this becoming, which 
engages in the creation “of a new Earth and a people that do not exist yet”.93 
 In what follows I will extend this cartography of a becoming-other that 
consists in nothing less than a geoliterature and finds its ethics in the figure of the 
exile. In so doing, Assia Djebar’s Fantasia: An Algerian Cavalcade provides us with 
the final component of Deleuze and Guattari’s materialist semiotics to which I have 
already alluded: free-indirect style conceived as a linguistic operator, a 
metamorphosis-machine that forms a line of flight. 
 
2.4. Indirect discourse, or, how to write a scream: Assia Djebar’s Fantasia: 
An Algerian Cavalcade. 
 
Thus far I have drawn a general topology of geoliterature consisting of a 
materialist semiotics of forces, which is doubly articulated along the axes of content 
and expression. In line with Deleuze’s broader metaphysics, there is no pre-
linguistic or originary void (as in the Lacanian real) which the symbolic can only fail 
to represent. Instead there are several regimes of signs (including but not limited to 
the linguistic) which are constantly stratifying and organising a self-differentiating 
being-in-becoming variously named by the concepts body-without-organs, plane of 
consistency, or plane of immanence. Now it remains to uncover how books-as-
                                                          
92 Farès, Exile and Helplessness, p.17 [22]. Translation modified. 
93 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p.108. 
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assemblages work to escape those stratifications or lines which criss-cross them 
and “plug” them into the various social assemblages they are situated within.  This 
leads us to Assia Djebar’s L’Amour, La Fantasia (1985, translated as Fantasia: An 
Algerian Cavalcade 1993) which both draws upon and departs substantially from 
earlier Algerian writing responding to colonisation and the war for independence. 
Existing approaches to the novel revolve around the twin figures of silence 
and aphasia—those pre-symbolic voids or absences I have worked to dispel.94 As 
such, reading the novel as geoliterature goes against much of the postcolonial 
criticism that has encountered the novel thus far.95 Fantasia is constructed as a 
narrative counterpoint between a fictionalised autobiography of Djebar’s own life 
and experiences, and historical sections which transcribe from various sources and 
documents the French invasion of Algeria in 1830. The way in which Djebar uses 
silence as, paradoxically, a means of expression, centres on the dichotomy between 
oral Arabic cultures, voice and speech, and its domination by the written (French) 
word. For Mildred Mortimer, Djebar’s novel recovers the capacity of speech for 
Algerian women in order to “give voice to surviving heroines, the porteuses de feu 
of the Algerian revolution, and allows them to tell their own stories”.96 Djebar’s 
giving voice to the silent women of Algerian history works, as Soheila Ghaussy 
concludes: 
by deliberately blending fiction and experience, fictionality and language, 
and especially by gendering writing (ecriture) as male and orality (Kaalam) 
as female, moreover associating the former with French and the latter with 
                                                          
94 As Simone Bignall and Lorna Burns argue, the Hegelian model much postcolonial theory is built 
upon belongs to an entirely different philosophy of difference from which Deleuze’s own Bergsonian 
metaphysics should be disarticulated. See Simone Bignall, Postcolonial Agency: Critique and 
Constructivism, (London: Bloomsbury 2010), Lorna Burns, Contemporary Caribbean Writing and 
Deleuze: Literature Between Postcolonialism and Post-Continental Philosophy, (London: Bloomsbury 
2012). 
95 See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Acting Bits/Identity Talk”, Critical Inquiry 18:4 (1992), 770–773. 
96 Mildred Mortimer, ‘Language and Space in the Fiction of Assia Djebar’, Research in African 
Literatures, 19:3 (1988), 301-311 (p.303). 
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Arabic, Djebar creates subtle and complicated links between the ‘feminine’ 
spheres of oral languages and the ‘male’ domain of writing.97 
Whilst I don’t want to dispute these feminist readings, I do wish to contend that the 
dichotomy between orality and writing in the novel, with the latter dominating the 
former, often ends up investing more in Djebar’s own life than in the work itself. 
That is to say, it risks reducing the text to a symbolic screen which misses the fact 
that the opposition in the text is not so much between orality and writing as 
between the written transcription of oral history (writing oral Arabic testimony 
back into the language of the coloniser) and the written history of French conquest 
which, counter-intuitively, fictionalises itself as a humanitarian endeavour. That is 
to say, the novel’s real formal relation is between writing and writing. 
 I will to take a different approach to reading the text which, following 
Deleuze and Guattari’s materialist semiotics, erases the distinction between speech 
(parole) and writing (langue) where the former is considered a more authentic or 
primary site of enunciation, and the latter a purely signifying or ideal realm where 
the meanings of enunciations freely circulate. The central characters of the novel 
are not Djebar herself as the autobiographical narrator, nor the Algerian women 
whose testimony she rescues from their imposed exile, but rather zones of 
indetermination between the two where writing is at once singular and collective: a 
collective assemblage of enunciation. The key figure here—the diagram or function 
by which the novel becomes an a-signifying machine or assemblage—is the scream 
or cry, as opposed to silence and absence. My reading of the novel will allow me to 
introduce the third element in the materialist semiotics I have culled from Deleuze 
and Guattari’s postulates of linguistics—the notion of free indirect style they take 
from the Russian linguist V.N Volosinov (a pseudonym they attribute to Bakhtin) 
and which they take as the basis for their theory of collective assemblages of 
enunciation. 
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 In a latter section of the novel, entitled “Voice”, whilst recounting the oral 
testimony of an Algerian woman who joined the partisans (whom Djebar ironically 
renames maquis after the French resistance during World War Two), the narrator 
reflects on her own role as historical interlocuter: 
Je ne m’avance ni en diseuse, ni en scripteuse. Sur l’aire de la dépossession, 
je voudrais pouvoir chanter. 
 Corps nu—puisque je me dépouille des souvenirs d’enfance—, je me 
veux porteuse d’offrandes, mains tendues vers qui, vers les Seingeurs de la 
guerre d’hier, ou vers les filettes rôdeuses qui habitent le silence succédent 
aux batailles… Et j’offre quoi, sinon nœuds d’écorse de la mémoire griffée, je 
cherche quoi, peut-être la douve où se noient les mots de meurtrissure.  
[I do not claim here to be either a story-teller or a scribe. On the territory of 
dispossession, I would that I could sing. 
 I would cast off my childhood memories and advance naked, bearing 
offerings, hands outstretched to whom?—to the Lords of yesterday’s war, 
or the young girls who lay in hiding and who now inhabit the silence that 
succeeds the battles… And what are my offerings? Only handfuls of husks, 
culled from memory, what do I seek? Maybe the brook where the wounding 
words are drowned.]98 
The notion of recovering the lost voices—or those which were stolen—from out of 
the history of Algeria’s dispossession is at once desired and revealed to be 
impossible. There is no way in which the narrator’s French can capture the Arabic 
testimony of her subject that doesn’t come back empty handed, bearing only husks 
rather than the full voice of memory.99 Since those voices the narrator wishes to 
channel or summon can only be spoken of as victims, it is their victimhood which 
                                                          
98 Assia Djebar, Fantasia: An Algerian Cavalcade, (New Hampshire: Heinemann 1993; Paris: Editions 
Jean-Claude Lattès 1985), p.142 [p.202]. References to the English translation will hereafter be given 
in square brackets following the original. 
99 Emily Apter has critiqued World Literature from the standpoint of translation theory, and I 
respond to these arguments in my conclusion. See Emily Apter, Against World Literature: On The 
Politics of Untranslatability, (London: Verso 2013). 
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must come back even when one attempts to overwrite the words of the coloniser. 
The page remains a palimpsest in which Djebar’s narrator can never fully recover 
her subjects: “Ta voix s’est prise au piège; mon parler français la déguise sans 
l’habiller. A peine si je frôle l’ombre de tons pas!”; [“I have captured your voice, 
disguised it with my French without clothing it. I barely brush the shadow of your 
footsteps!”].100 Djebar’s novel which, like those of Kateb Yacine and Nabile Farres, is 
written in French, finds itself bound to a history it wishes to escape but lacks the 
means of expression to do so: 
Cherifa! Je désirais recréer ta course: dans le champ isolé, l’arbre se dresse 
tragiquement devant toi qui crains les chacals. Tu traverses ensuite les 
villages, entre des gardes, amenée jusqu’au camp de prisonneirs qui grossit 
chaque année […] Lets mots que j’ai cru te donner s’enveloppent de la 
même serge de deuil que ceux de Bosquet ou de Saint-Arnaud. En vérité, ils 
s’écrivent à travers ma main, puisque je consens à cette bâtardise, au seul 
métissage que la foi ancestrale ne condamne pas: celui de la langue et non 
celui du sang. 
[Charifa! I wanted to re-create your flight: there, in the isolated field, the 
tree appears before you when you are scared of the jackals. Next you are 
driven through the villages, surrounded by guards, taken to the prison camp 
where every year more prisoners arrive […] The words that I thought to put 
in your mouth shrouded in the same mourning garb as those of [the French 
documenters of the war] Bosquet or Saint-Arnaud. Actually, it is they who 
are writing to each other, using my hand, since I condone this bastardy, the 
only cross-breeding that ancestral beliefs do not condemn: that of language, 
not of blood.]101 
Over the course of the novel, the narrator discovers that the absence or aphasia 
which one confronts when searching for accounts by Algerian women of the 1830 
invasion and, latterly, the war for independence, is not a blank space or void, but 
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rather a history overrun with identification and signification on their behalf. The 
task of the narrator (who is less a cipher for Djebar than a machinic archivist or 
“scanner” of history) is to wrest from both oral Arabic testimony and orientalist 
documentary those errant utterances or traces that suggest a becoming-other than 
the victims of colonial violence. But such becomings do not happen “in” language, 
as the enunciation of a speaking/writing body, but as those movements which are 
imperceptible to language—an a-signifying rupture. For both Djebar and Deleuze, 
the desert (in this case the physical desert the Algerian partisans retreat to, as well 
as the “desert” of historical testimony by female voices) is “peopled” but the people 
are not within history.102 They are yet-to-come. The novel acts as an assemblage or 
machine which seeks to extract from the history of coloniser and colonised a 
differential becoming that might escape such a determination: a collective 
assemblage of enunciation. The primary method through which the novel 
constructs this collective assemblage is free indirect discourse: those enunciations 
which escape the bodies which emit them and take flight, producing incorporeal 
transformations that are not pre-determined by the order-word. 
 If the double articulation of forms of content and forms of expression make 
up the two horizontal axes of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of assemblage 
(arranged not hierarchically as signifier and signified, but in mutual presupposition) 
then its vertical axis can be considered the process of de-/re-territorialisation. The 
three axes or dimensions can be plotted, at the risk of simplifying their movement, 
so as to show the zone or desert at their base, where content and expression 
become indistinguishable as chaotic matter-energy, which Hjelmslev calls purport 
and Deleuze and Guattari refer to in A Thousand Plateaus as the plane of 
consistency, taking over from Anti-Oedipus’ body-without-organs and preceding the 
plane of immanence from What is Philosophy? 
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Language becomes, in this configuration, one of “several regimes of signs” 
(the title given to the plateau immediately following The Postulates of Linguistics) 
which can contain linguistic and non-linguistic elements.103 The order-word, as the 
primary unit of language conceived as heterogenous system in constant variation, 
effects incorporeal transformations at the level of formed matters (i.e. expressions 
and contents) which contribute to their territorialisation as perceptible objects or 
assemblages. Human bodies are assemblages of contents (such as flesh, bone, 
nervous systems) as well being that which is expressed as an incorporeal attribute 
of their functional unity (“a” body).104 Frankenstein’s monster, despite being 
partially composed of the correct contents, struggles to attain the sense of 
embodiment that the order-word “I” withholds from him (where he would 
otherwise become expressible or perceptible as a person). The order-word 
therefore has a transverse side, or de-territorialising mode, which Deleuze and 
Guattari refer to as “pass-words” (somewhat confusingly, seeing as they don’t 
necessarily mean a different category of linguistic elements) which collapse 
expressions and contents into one-another such that they become imperceptible to 
their social, cultural and historical reality.105 All assemblages are therefore in a 
constant process of de- and re-territorialisation, rather than steady-states, and the 
judgements handed down by order-words are always contingent, partial, or open to 
breakdown: 
There are pass-words beneath order-words. Words that pass, words that are 
components of passage, whereas order-words mark stoppages or organised, 
stratified compositions. A single thing or word undoubtedly has this two-
fold nature: it is necessary to extract one from the other—to transform the 
compositions of order into components of passage.106 
The book-as-assemblage, rather than a symbolic or mimetic object, is a machine for 
transforming the components of order into components of passage. This is how I 
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choose to read Djebar’s novel from the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
pragmatics—which I have extrapolated into a geoliterature of becomings, flights 
and transformations set against the despotism of meaning and interpretation. The 
becoming which Djebar’s novel enacts occurs through the displacement of order-
words by pass-words—free-indirect discourse in place of the naming and speaking 
“on behalf of” others enacted by the historical archive.107 Here the scream or cry 
works as an a-signifying figure, in place of the imposed choice between identity or 
silence and against which it refuses both. 
 Djebar’s use of the archive is paradigmatic of the way in which Deleuze and 
Guattari insist books are assemblages with the world, as fully social, rather than 
simply mimetic or symbolic objects that pass judgement on the world. The historical 
archive becomes itself a kind of fictioning machine, from which Djebar’s text is 
subtracted.108 The historical chapters of the novel, which are recovered from 
various accounts of the French invasion of Algeria, stress the trans-individual nature 
of this fictioning; the way in which history occludes as much as it produces the 
sense of events. The archive is a writing-machine that Djebar “plugs into” in the 
manner Deleuze and Guattari argue Kafka “plugs into” the socio-juridical apparatus 
of his social assemblage.109 But this writing-machine has the structure of delirium:  
Une fièvre scripturaire a saisi en particulier les officers supérieurs. Ils 
publient leurs souvenirs dès l’années suivante; les chef d’état-major est les 
premier, d’autres peu après feront comme lui. Jusque vers 1835, dix-neuf 
officeirs de l’armée de terre, quatre ou cinq de la marine, contribueront à 
cette littérature. 
[The senior officers in particular are infected by a veritable scribbleomania. 
They start to publish their memoirs the following year; the chief of general 
                                                          
107 Deleuze (to Foucault): “You were the first to show us […] there is an indignity in speaking for 
others”. See Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze “Intellectuals and Power” in Michel Foucault, 
Language: Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. D. Bouchard, Trans. 
Donald Bouchard and Sherry Simon, (Ithica: Cornell University Press 1977), pp.205-217. 
108 This is roughly analogous to Deleuze’s argument in Difference and Repetition, that simulacra are 
‘fully real’ rather than quasi-ontological beings. This puts him at odds with the thrust of much of the 
‘postmodernist’ canon to which he is (incorrectly) compared. 
109 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature, p.41. 
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staff is the first, followed shortly afterwards by others. By 1835 or 
thereabouts, nineteen army officers, with four or five from the navy, have 
contributed to this literary output.]110  
The accounts and documents this delirium produces effect a series of incorporeal 
transformations in the social body of coloniser and colonised: 
Les mot lui-même, ornement pour les officiers qui le brandissent comme ils 
porteraient un œillet à la boutonnière, le mot deviendra l’arme par 
excellence. Des cohortes d’interprètes, géographes, ethnographes, 
linguistes, botanistes, docteurs divers et écrivans de profession s’abattront 
sur la nouvelle prioe. Toute une pyramide d’écrits amoncelés en apophyse 
superfétatoire occultera la violence initiale. 
[Words themselves become a decoration, flaunted by officers like the 
carnations they wear in their buttonholes; words will become their most 
effective weapons. Hordes of interpreters, geographers, ethnographers, 
linguists, botonists, diverse scholars and professional scribblers will swoop 
down on this new prey. The supererogatory protuberances of their 
publications will form a pyramid to hide the initial violence from view.]111 
Although I have described incorporeal transformation as a process of overcoding, 
they differ from biological or technical codes in the crucial respect that their 
outcomes are not predetermined. Biological or computer codes enact direct 
communication, but the incorporeal transformations enacted by the order-word 
are not predetermined in advance, nor are they controlled by a central processing 
unit (such as the individual speaker). Rather, they intermingle in bodies indirectly. 
The claim that all discourse is indirect in origin is the source of the third 
element in Deleuze and Guattari’s materialist semiotics: that “there is no individual 
enunciation. There is not even a subject of enunciation”.112 Fantasia’s attempts to 
pin down, to circumscribe, the subject-position from which an Algerian-feminist 
                                                          
110 Djebar, L’amour La Fantasia, p.66 [p.44]. Emphasis added. 
111 Ibid. p.67 [p.45]. 
112 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.88. 
96 
 
subaltern might finally be able to speak is continually thwarted. As Jane Hiddlestone 
argues: 
While Djebar strives to locate a sense of feminine specificity, the text also 
splits and fragments the collective identity it wants to evoke. Differences 
between women are as notable as similarities and the nature of their 
oppression is shaped by historical events in contrasting ways. Not only does 
language gloss over the temporal and spatial displacement of each singular 
being, but also the collective feminine voice hides multiple difference, 
contradictions and contrasts.113 
In one of the novel’s prolonged comparisons between acts of love and acts of war, 
the contradictory nature of female oppression in colonial Algeria comes to the fore. 
The narrator recounts an episode from her childhood in which her father has sent 
her mother a postcard addressed in French: 
La revolution était manifeste: mon père, de sa propre écriture, et sur une 
carte qui allait voyager de ville en ville, qui allait passer sous tant et tant de 
regards masculins, y compris pour finir celui du facteur de notre village, un 
facteur musulman de surcroît, mon père donc avait osé écrire le nom de sa 
femme qu’il avait désignée à la manière occidentale: << Madame untel…>>; 
or, tout autochtone, pauvre ou riche, n’évoquait femme et enfants que par 
le biais de cette vague périphase: << la maison >>. 
The radical change in customs was apparent for all to see: my father had 
quite brazenly written his wife’s name, in his own handwriting, on a 
postcard which was going to travel from one town to another, which was 
going to be exposed to so many masculine eyes, including eventually our 
village postman—a Muslim to boot—and, what is more, he had dared to 
refer to her in the Western manner as ‘Madame So-and-So…’, whereas, no 
local man, poor or rich, ever referred to his wife and children in any other 
way than by the vague periphrasis: ‘the household’.114 
                                                          
113 Jane Hiddlestone, Assia Djebar: Out of Algeria, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press 2006), p.71. 
114 Assia Djebar, L’amour La Fantasia, p.57 [p.37]. 
97 
 
In contrast to the territorialising machine of the archive, the language of the 
coloniser in this case remains open to a reterritorialisation. The social character of 
the interaction, of being-seen-to-be a beloved, belies the fact that utterances are 
indirect before they are direct, collective before they are individuated. Belovedness 
exists as a virtual line or potential of utterances to become part of the assemblage 
“beloveds” before it is actualised in specific bodies. It is the indirectness of the 
utterance, the collective assemblage of its enunciation, which affects an incorporeal 
transformation in the body of the narrator’s mother. In a similar vein, the narrator 
details how her and her childhood friends are engaged in writing pen-pal letters to 
unknown interlocuters in other parts of Algeria and further afield: 
Les jeunes filles cloîtrées écrivaient; écrivaient des lettres; des lettres à des 
hommes; à des hommes aux quatre coins du monde; du monde arabe 
naturellement. 
 Letres d’Irak, de Syrie, du Liban, de Libye, de Tunisie, d’étudiants 
arabes à Paris ou à Londre. Ces missives parvenaient de partout! Envoyées 
par des correspondants choisis dans les announces d’un magazine féminin 
largement répandu, à l’époque, dans les harems. 
 
[These girls, though confined to their house, were writing; were writing 
letters; letters to men; to men in the four corners of the world; of the Arab 
world, naturally. 
And the letters came back from far and wide: letters from Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon, Lybia, Tunisia, from Arab students in Paris or London. Letters sent 
by pen-pals chosen from adverts appearing in a women’s magazine with a 
circulation at the time in the harems.]115 
These small acts of subversion which, by disguising the name of the sender, the 
narrator’s childhood friends successfully hide from patriarchal eyes (including the 
eldest’s Arabic-speaking father) become, in retrospect, the mode of composition by 
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which the novel will seek to deterritorialise the French language as a means of 
expression for Algerian women. The doubly-oppressed position of Algerian women 
in respect to French occupation and the patriarchy which both preceded and 
continued throughout it, leads to a contradiction in which writing in French is both 
subjection to, and means of undermining, their own oppression. But this relies 
upon the language being open ended, its discursive arrangements distributed 
rather than hierarchically structured as a series of abstracts or constants. This 
makes Djebar’s style in L’amour La Fantasia, her mode of narration as a form of 
collective autobiography for a people that (from the perspective of the archive) do 
not exist, in a strange correspondence with Deleuze and Guattari’s literary-
philosophical style in A Thousand Plateaus. That book also contains sheets or 
plateaus of the past between which lines of flight escape, traverse and 
territorialise.116 The centrality of indirect discourse to language’s incorporeal 
transformations is what enables creative sabotage against the striated and 
dominant forms of its usage. Deleuze and Guattari’s Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
can be read in this way, a series of aberrant readings of the history of philosophy, 
literature, linguistics, geography and so on, in the same manner that Djebar’s novel 
inserts itself into the historical archive as a machine of deterritorialisation, or, “war 
machine”.117  
The notion of free-indirect discourse as the poetics by which a writing 
machine plugs into its social apparatuses is taken from the Russian linguist V.N 
Volosinov (whom Deleuze and Guattari, perhaps correctly, take to be a pseudonym 
of Bakhtin). In Volosinov/Bakhtin’s Marxism and the Philosophy of Language 
(1973)[1929], Deleuze and Guattari find a proto-diagram of collective assemblages 
of enunciation, based on Volosinov/Bakhtin’s analysis of free indirect discourse: 
Any utterance, no matter how weighty and complete in and of itself, is only 
a movement in the continuous process of verbal communication. But that 
                                                          
116 For a more detailed discussion of Deleuze’s concept of history as ‘sheets of the past’ or the 
virtual, see chapter 4. 
117 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.387-467. 
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continuous verbal communication is, in turn, itself only a moment in the 
continuous, all-inclusive, generative process of a given social collective.118 
As Jean-Jacques Lecercle argues, Volosinov/Bakhtin’s is an “external linguistics” that 
proceeds by five theses in anticipation of Deleuze and Guattari’s materialist 
semiotics:  
[1] Langue qua system is merely an abstraction that fails to account for the 
concrete reality of language; [2] Language is a process of continuous 
evolution which is actualised in the verbal interaction of speakers; [3] The 
laws of linguistic evolution are sociological, not psychological laws: they do 
not take individuals as their object; [4] The creativity of language cannot be 
grasped independently of the ideological contents and values that are 
involved in it; [5] The structure of verbal interaction is strictly a verbal 
structure.119 
Volosinov’s insistence that the speaker is already collective, is the product of a 
collective process in which they are “spoken by” language is familiar to the 
Saussurian theory of signs, but Volosinov goes further to argue that consciousness 
itself inheres in speech acts, as indirect discourse, rather than in the mind of a 
subject: “Language acquires life and historically evolves precisely here, in concrete 
verbal communication, and not in the abstract system of language forms, nor in the 
individual psyche of speakers”.120 The reliance of langue on what is external to it 
(on the non-signifying or extra-linguistic) reverses the relation between inside and 
outside fundamental to the bourgeois psychology of the novel (as the individual 
enunciation of a “great” writer). For Volosinov, the inside is the outside just as the 
narrator of Djebar’s novel is the accumulation of rhetorical, discursive and 
incorporeal transformations enacted by the historical archive. She is not marked by 
silence, but by the cacophony of order-words which crush her under their weight.  
                                                          
118 V.N. Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, trans. Ladislav Matejka and I.R. Titunik, 
(Cambridge, Mass: Havard University Press 1973 [Moscow: 1929]), p.95. Original emphasis. The 
French edition of this text read by Deleuze and Guattari attributes the work to Bakhtin.   
119 Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Deleuze and Language, (London: Routledge 2002), p.172. Original 
emphasis. 
120 Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, p.95. 
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 Djebar’s writing machine does not proceed, therefore, simply by shining 
light on what is obscured, or recovering a lost history of female voices that could be 
read apart from those of their oppressors, but by making cuts in the archive. The 
collective assemblage of enunciation mapped by her use of free indirect style exists 
in between the historical accounts and oral testimony she transcribes. These cuts 
occur in the text, not as silence or void, but in the figure of the scream or the cry.121 
The scream or cry emerges from the archive as an a-signifying breakdown in 
communication: as that which overcomes the body from which it originates and 
cannot be held in place by the archival striation of the order-word. A strategy of 
refusal, the scream emerges at various points throughout the novel:  
Le cri, douleur pure, s’ect chargé de surprise en son tréfonds. Sa courbe se 
développe. Trace d’un dard échorché, il se dresse dans l’espace; il 
emmagasine en son nadir les nappes d’un << non >> intérieur. 
[The cry, pure pain, secretes an inner core of wonderment. It soars in a 
swelling curve. Wake of thrusting dart, it rises in the air; falling at its nadir, 
in multi-layered sediment, lurks an unspoken ‘No!’.]122 
The cry is the extra-linguistic element that the colonial archive cannot 
subdue, it escapes identification with a subject and leaks across the temporalities of 
the page, bringing the narrator into communion with her historical forebears: 
Ce cri, dans la maison de la clandestinité. […] Le cri déroula les voloutes de 
refus et parvint jusqu’aux linteaux du plafond. […] Circulant dans le métro, 
les jours suivants, je dévisage d’un regard avide les femmes, toutes les 
femmes. Une curiosité de primitive me dévore: —Pourquoi ne disent-elles 
pas, pourquoi pas une ne le dira, pourquoi chacune le cache: l’amour, c’est 
le cri, la douleur qui persiste et qui s’alimente, tandis que s’entrevoit 
l’horizon de bonheur. 
                                                          
121 Comparison can be made here between Artaud’s use of cris-souffle or ‘cries-breaths’ Deleuze 
discusses in The Logic of Sense. 
122 Djebar, L’amour La Fantasia, p.153 [p.107]. 
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[That cry, in the house of our clandestine existence. […] that cry unfurled its 
spiral of refusal and reached up to the timbers of the ceiling. […] Travelling 
in the Métro during the next few days, I stare closely at all the women I see 
around me. I am devoured with curiosity as if I were some primitive 
creature: ‘Why do they not say, why will not one of them say, why does 
each one hide this fact: love is the cry, the persistent pain which feeds upon 
itself, while only a glimpse is vouchsafed on the horizon of happiness?]123 
The cry is a pass-word similar to those instances of indirect discourse whereby 
characters become beloved—become transformed by the social character of love, 
which enacts transformations on bodies. But in this case the cry or scream cannot 
be re-territorialised, and is in this sense trans-historical, as that which refuses to be 
individuated by the archive—a process of becoming-woman that dissolves the 
binary structures of coloniser-colonised, French-Arabic, which might seek to 
circumscribe it: 
Propulsion interminable. S’étirant dans mes membres, se gonflant dans ma 
poitrine, écorchant mon larynx et emplissant mon palais, un cri enraciné 
s’exhale dans un silence compact; une poussée anime mes jambes. Tout 
mon être est habité par ces mots: << Mamma est morte, est morte, est 
morte! >> ; je porte ma doleur, je la devance même, j’appelle ou je fuis je ne 
sais, mais je crie et ce cri ne signifie plus rien, sinon l’élan d’un corps de 
filletes en avant… 
[I am driven relentlessly onward. A scream is implanted within me; it shoots 
through my limbs, swelling in my chest, rasping my larynx, fills my mouth 
and is exhaled in a dense silence; my legs move automatically. My whole 
being is inhabited by these words: ‘Mamma is dead! Is dead!’; I carry my 
grief with me, I even run ahead with it, I don’t know whether I’m calling out 
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or fleeing, but I’m screaming and this scream no longer means anything 
except that a child is being driven on and on…]124 
The silence is dense, but not with subjects waiting to be unveiled. Subjectivity is 
already a fold in a veil, is already a threshold or becoming: “I is an order-word”.125 
The scream or cry is that aesthetic figure through which the novel draws together 
the occluded, forgotten, overlooked or forbidden histories of Arabic female 
experience towards a collective assemblage of enunciation. But the assemblage 
does not come about ex nihilo—out of the void—but is criss-crossed and composed 
out of a line of flight, an a-signifying rupture, that redistributes the sense attributed 
to bodies, the capacity to name a people. The novel does not simply (or not only) 
represent the horrors of colonisation, but extracts from that history a singular line 
(the scream) which refuses to belong to history. The scream, or cry, emerges in the 
course of novel’s historical narrative as a zone of crisis or non-signifying semiotics 
that opens up the narrator’s own, specific history, to virtual continuum of 
screaming that precedes and extends beyond her being-in-the-present. Djebar’s 
novel maps the transverse movement of the scream across the colonial archive, as 
that element which cannot be represented by historicism alone, and therefore 
allows for a differential future that would not be determined by the horrors of the 
past.126 In that sense Djebar can be said to “write the scream” rather than 
represent the horror of her subject matter, in the same manner that Deleuze 
describes Bacon as “paint[ing] the scream” and not the horror in his work.127 In the 
context of A Thousand Plateaus, the scream collapses the forms of content and 
forms of expression which attempt to capture and subdue it (female, Algerian, 
                                                          
124 Ibid. p.271-272 [p.193]. In fact, the very idea of postcoloniality as a desire to move beyond the 
binary structures of coloniser-colonised is the claim made by Lorna Burns in Contemporary 
Caribbean Writing and Deleuze. 
125 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.93. Original emphasis. 
126 Lorna Burns makes the case for similar strategies at work of Wilson Harris; where desire functions 
as a force which scans the past in search of an unactualised virtuality, instead of a determinate 
structure acting on the present which is unavailable for recollection or reconstitution. See Burns, 
Contemporary Caribbean Writing and Deleuze, pp.79-86. 
127 “We must consider the special case of the scream. Why does Bacon think of the scream as one of 
the highest objects of painting? ‘Paint the scream’ […] If we scream, it is always as victims of invisible 
and insensible forces that scramble every spectacle, and that even lie beyond pain and feeling. This 
is what bacon means when he says he wanted ‘to paint the scream more than the horror”. Gilles 
Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation trans. Daniel W. Smith, (London: Continuum 2003; 
Paris: Editions de la Difference 1981), p.60. 
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Muslim, colonised, post-colonised, cosmopolitan, marginal) so as to place them in 
continuous variation: 
The relation of presupposition between variables of content and expression 
no longer requires two forms: the placing-in-variation of the variables 
instead draws the two forms together and effects the conjunction of cutting 
edges of deterritorialisation on both sides […] Gestures and things, voices 
and sounds, are caught up in the same ‘opera’, swept away by the same 
shifting effects of stammering, vibrato, tremelo, and overspilling.128 
Fantasia’s contrapuntal structure, its mode of narration as a minor musical 
composition (a fantasia rather than an opera) relies upon this sporadic breakdown 
of signification—where the scream or cry allows voices, motifs or refrains to pass 
between their historical specificity and become part of a collective assemblage of 
enunciation that cannot be contained by the colonial archive. In short, the novel 
becomes a war machine by which the victims of colonialism might populate the 
desert of their non-being. Djebar’s writing, her occupation of the French language, 
allows the silence which precedes and crushes her to become dense with a people 
yet to come; a virtual but not actual people whose lines and contours the novel 
scans for traces of in the “future of the archive”. 
 In the following chapter, the sense in which the line of flight functions in the 
manner of a forced movement will be thought of specifically as a postcolonial 
concept, in turn removing it from the original context in which it was deployed by 
Deleuze and Guattari. That is to say, the line of flight as an a-signifying movement in 
between words and things (an incorporeal transformation) will become key to the 
way I wish to think world literature via Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy—as a 
geoliterature which engages in fictioning the real as well as writing fictions about 
the real.
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3.  (Un)becoming Postcolonial 
 
In the years since his death, the reception of Deleuze’s oeuvre has 
congealed into two distinct images of his thought. The first is the anarcho-desiring 
Spinozist—the rhizomatic schizo-philosopher of pure affirmation – the second is the 
aristocratic pure metaphysician; austere creator of ontological palaces of thought. 
Alain Badiou and Antonio Negri are the two figures at the forefront of this struggle-
for-Deleuze, with the formative event for both being May 1968 and their specific 
proximity to Deleuze at the University of Paris VIII. Negri attended Deleuze’s 
seminars and credits him with “[showing] us a full and sunlit horizon of philosophy 
in Spinoza”.1 Badiou, meanwhile, led brigades of Maoist students in a campaign to 
disrupt Deleuze’s classes.2 Any attempt to think through Deleuze’s conceptual 
vocabulary today has to grapple with these two interpretations. But the way I wish 
to think this conflict follows from Deleuze’s own apprenticeship in the philosophy of 
Henri Bergson. That is, through thinking the task of philosophy according to a 
problematic conceptual field. The problem in Deleuze’s philosophy to which this 
chapter is addressed is the problem of difference. Thinking difference as a 
generative force, rather than as hybridity or dialectical negation, will extend my 
previous analysis of the geoliterature at work in Algerian writing, towards a 
redefinition of world literature according to the processes of differentiation, forced 
movements, and escapes marked by the figure of the line of flight. The work of 
postcolonial theorists such as Simone Bignall and Lorna Burns, working outside of 
the dominant dialectical tradition in postcolonial studies, will inform this argument. 
Furthermore, the fiction of Dambudzo Marechera, which appears in the immediate 
aftermath of Zimbabwe’s transition to independence, but whose response to those 
                                                          
1 Antonio Negri, The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics, trans. 
Michael Hardt, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1999; Milan: Feltrinelli Editore 1981), 
p.xx. 
2 “For the Maoist that I was, Deleuze, as the philosophical inspiration for what we called the 
"anarcho-desirers," was an enemy all the more formidable for being internal to the "movement" and 
for the fact that his course was one of the focal points of the university. […] I attacked him with the 
heavy verbal artillery of the epoch. Once, I even commanded a "brigade" of intervention in his 
course.” Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamour of Being, trans. Louise Burchill, (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press 1999; Paris: Hachette Littérature 1997), p.2. 
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conditions of periphery is aberrant according to the usual conceptual categories of 
world literary theory, will be instructive. 
This problem oscillates in Deleuze’s early study of Bergson between two 
competing concepts of difference (“intensive” and “extensive”) which in Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia become indexed to two divergent approaches to thinking both 
artistic and political creativity. I will diagnose this conceptual problematic as 
ultimately a postcolonial one – in fact the problem which continually undermines 
the field of postcolonial theory – via an encounter between Deleuze and the 
Zimbabwean writer Dambudzo Marechera. In doing so I will frame Marechera’s 
praxis within a Bergsonian understanding of intensive difference, which provides us 
with an alternative way of thinking collective political action against Empire and 
neo-colonialism outside of the dialectical models offered to us by contemporary 
versions of world literary theory. Arguing against commentators such as Badiou, 
Peter Hallward and Gayatri Spivak - for whom Deleuze’s philosophy of difference 
almost entirely neglects real struggles against colonialism - I wish to situate anti-
imperial praxis at the centre of interpretations of Deleuze today, to which I point to 
two studies by Simone Bignall and Lorna Burns as examples.3 Ultimately I am 
concerned with the political content of the early Deleuze in a way which disrupts 
the popular characterisation of his career being split between the praxis of an 
“academic” history of philosophy in texts such as Bergsonism, and the Guattari-
inspired schizo-activism of Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. I therefore 
totally reject Slavoj Žižek’s recent claim that “not a single one of Deleuze’s own 
texts is in any way directly political”.4 
After describing the main tenets of the anti-affirmational critique of 
Deleuze, which focus on the question of agency within systems-theoretical 
ontologies, I will then draw out Deleuze’s concept of intensive or virtual difference 
from his early encounter with the philosophy of Henri Bergson. This will be based 
                                                          
3 See Simone Bignall, Postcolonial Agency: Critique and Constructivism, (London: Bloomsbury 2010), 
Lorna Burns, Contemporary Caribbean Writing and Deleuze: Literature Between Postcolonialism and 
Post-Continental Philosophy, (London: Bloomsbury 2012). 




on two texts which bracket a decade in Deleuze’s early philosophical development 
– the essay “Bergson’s Conception of Difference” and his full length study 
Bergsonism. A closer look at Deleuze’s interpretation of Bergson in these works 
reveals the specificity of Deleuze’s concept of difference in contrast to the 
dialectical tradition dominant in France during the post-war period. This ‘tradition 
of negation’ which begins with the reintroduction of Hegel into French philosophy 
by Alexandre Kojève in the 1930’s and informs both Sartre and Jean Hyppolite has 
to be read into Deleuze’s engagement with Bergson. As Simone Bignall has shown, 
understanding this break with dialectical philosophy is key to addressing the 
perceived loss of individual agency which some argue afflicts Deleuze’s political 
philosophy.5 The Kojève-Sartre tradition, which grounds discussions of agency on 
lack and negativity, in turn informs those strains of postcolonial theory emanating 
from Frantz Fanon. On the other hand, reading the Deleuze of Bergsonism as a 
postcolonial thinker reveals how Hegelian dialectics struggles to adapt once 
national movements for decolonisation succeed only partially in achieving 
autonomy from the global system of capitalist modes of production and 
accumulation. In light of this apparent impasse, I will read the work of Dambudzo 
Marechera against the grain of “the postcolonial” defined as a dialectic of negation 
between centre and periphery, in favour of a postcolonial Bergsonism derived 
jointly from Marechera’s writing-machine and Deleuze’s affirmative philosophy of 
difference - which finds passages of escape, lines of flight, out of the doxa of 
capitalist globalisation. The postcolonial politics of a geoliterature, I argue, cannot 
be thought simply in the dialectical terms of the periphery ‘writing back’ to the 
centre, but effects an immanent “becoming with the world” that undoes those 
geographies of domination themselves. 
Here I draw upon a longstanding relationship between postcolonial studies 
and “World Literature” conceived, not as the literature of globalisation, but as 
certain kind of writing which originates in anti-colonial struggle and which, in 
articulating a resistance to the coloniser’s world, works to create a better one, and 
which predates Moretti and Casanova’s interventions, and in fact still offers 
                                                          
5 See Bignall, Postcolonial Agency, pp.30-59. 
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significant resources for developing an alternative to their systemic arguments 
when it comes to questions of oppression, domination and literary struggle. In The 
Location of Culture (1994), Homi Bhabha responds to Goethe’s speculative remarks 
on world literature by indexing the very condition of such a literature to “a form of 
cultural dissensus” where “non-consensual terms of affiliation may be established 
on the grounds of historical trauma”.6 In contrast to Goethe’s cosmopolitanism, 
Bhabha argues that it is precisely the ways in which “cultures recognise themselves 
through their projections of ‘otherness’” which offers the possibility that 
“transnational histories of migrants, the colonised, or political refugees—these 
border and frontier conditions—may be the terrains of world literature”.7 Like 
Moretti and Casanova, the definition of world-literary texts lies here more in a way 
of reading rather than in generic classifications, with an emphasis on the peripheral 
or frontier condition as the site of creative renewal, but in Bhabha systemicity is 
only the effect rather than the cause of world-literariness—its apparent integration 
and stability as world only ever partial and incomplete because the imbalance of 
power relations and structural asymmetry between centre and periphery are its 
very foundations. There lies a parallel here with Deleuze and Guattari’s reimagining 
of the history of capitalism (and thus the history of imperialism) as defined by the 
dissensual movement of lines of flight rather than a system in equilibrium with 
itself. Reading postcolonial literature as world literature, then, was for Bhabha not 
the imposition of an allegorical master-code (as in the case of Jameson’s remarks 
on third-world literature) but already a call to question the disciplinary modes of 
comparativism themselves prior to Moretti’s conjectures. Edward Said would 
recognise the concurrence of these debates when, in 2000, he noted that “there is 
something basically unworkable or at least drastically changed in the frameworks 
by which we study literature” which he links to the institutional crisis facing 
comparative literature departments subject to “the downgrading of the humanities 
to service functions”.8 The increasing specialisation of literary disciplinarity in terms 
of engagements with minority national literatures, Said suggests “has had one 
                                                          
6 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, (New York: Routledge 1994), p.17. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Edward Said, “Globalising Literary Study”, PMLA Vol. 116, No. 1, pp.64-68, p.64. 
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major casualty, which is the sense of a collective human history as grasped in some 
of the global patterns of dependence and interdependence sketched by Appadurai, 
Wallerstein, and, if I may mention my own effort, the last chapter of Culture and 
Imperialism”.9 Yet despite the acknowledgement of Wallerstein and world-systems 
analysis, the question of how “can one formulate a theory of connection between 
part and whole that denies neither the specificity of the individual experience nor 
the validity of a projected, putative, or imputed whole?” is left open-ended, and 
marks the essential divide which prevents a more thorough synthesis of world(-
systems) literature and postcolonial studies.10 
In what follows I will respond to Said’s question, building on Spivak and 
Cheah’s recent attempts to think world literature and postcolonial literature 
together; as the tension between a spatial and temporal regime of globalisation 
and the various postcolonial space-times it overrides (and, moreover, how to read 
in a “planetary” way other than by the imposition of a whole upon the parts?).11 In 
doing so I will add to the developing overlap between the fields of postcolonial 
studies and Deleuzian philosophy I’ve already gestured towards in the thought of 
Reda Bensmaia, but which also includes the work of postcolonial scholars such as 
Timothy Bewes, Graham Huggan, Simone Bignall and Lorna Burns.12 This overlap 
finds in Deleuze’s philosophy an alternative to the dialectical models founded on 
the opposition between coloniser and colonised, and which was vital to movements 
for national liberation in Africa and elsewhere, but which finds itself unable to 
grapple with the complex, intersecting ways in which violence and oppression 
continue after independence. Timothy Bewes, for example, identifies an event of 
postcolonial shame in which the ability to write from a postcolonial perspective is 
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Peng Cheah, What is a World? On Postcolonial Literature as World Literature, (Durham, North 
Carolina: Duke University Press 2016). 
12 Timothy Bewes, The Event of Postcolonial Shame, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press 2011), 
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already to disassociate oneself from subjection to colonial authority; writing, by its 
very eloquence, enacts a shameful separation of the one who writes from those on 
behalf of whom she writes for. This might be thought about in terms of Spivak’s 
argument that the subaltern, as the excluded category of subjectivity, cannot itself 
be represented, but Bewes also links it to Deleuze’s remarks on shame in the work 
of Primo Levi: 
Levi forges an equation between the experience of shame and the capacity to 
write that has become famous in the literature of holocaust survival. ‘We, the 
survivors, are not true witnesses’, he writes. ‘We are those who by their 
prevarications or good luck did not touch bottom’ […] Levi’s shame is the shame 
of being able to speak, of having the tools to bear witness and, by that same 
fact, nothing to bear witness to.13 
The equating of this thought to the postcolonial situation is not incidental, not least 
because concentration camps were an invention of the British empire to begin with, 
but also because it speaks to the fundamental problem of subjection to which 
postcolonial literatures respond: by what mechanism does resistance, in bearing 
witness to atrocity, speak? If resistance lies in the non-being of the subaltern, then 
by the same token their speaking as subaltern transforms them into being(s) and 
thus not subaltern. The importance of Deleuze’s philosophy for postcolonial 
studies, therefore, lies in articulating a philosophy of creation which does not 
depend on the unveiling of non-being by being. That is, in contrast to the dialectic 
by which being is transformed by what it is not, its opposite or non-being, Deleuze’s 
philosophy of becoming offers an account of subjectivity that escapes the dilemma 
of rightful speech by disarticulating subjectivity from the subject or person, and 
instead gives agency to a range of pre-individual or impersonal affects which might 
escape the demand to speak on behalf of oneself. This is the argument put forth by 
Simone Bignall, that: 
                                                          
13 Bewes, The Event of Postcolonial Shame, p.56. Original emphasis. 
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Deleuze employs a wholly positive conceptualisation of ontological becoming, 
grounded in the concept of positive desiring-production and resulting in an 
alternative view of the self and a non-dialectical view of history […] I will argue 
that this alternative view of ontological desire, becoming and selfhood also 
corresponds to a different conceptualisation of affirmative action, and in turn, 
to alternative theories about historical processes of social change […] social 
forms emerge and transform as an effect of the shifting relations of power into 
which bodies enter. Social agency involves an effort to understand and organise 
one’s relations, in ways that cause the actualisation of preferred forms of 
collective society, such as those that might be described as postcolonial.14 
Deleuze’s ontology of creative actualisation of the virtual shifts the ground of 
subjective agency away from the subject in which that agency is embodied, and 
towards a nebulous understanding of the ways in which power, resistance and 
affirmative action circulate between bodies. In responding to Bignall’s alignment of 
Deleuze’s non-dialectical account of becoming and history with a specifically 
postcolonial theory of subjective action, I wish to argue for the centrality of these 
debates to theories of world literature in which literary acts of resistance are under 
theorised at least in world-systems terminology, let alone literary acts of resistance 
that are not conceptualised via the dialectical relationship between centre and 
periphery (in which the being of the centre is progressively unveiled by the 
incorporation of what was not previously thought of as literature in cultures of the 
periphery and semi-periphery). That is to say, I wish to argue for a non-dialectical 
theory of world literature founded on Bignall’s Deleuzian account of postcolonial 
agency.  
 The rejoinder to this argument would surely be that Deleuze’s philosophy of 
becoming in which categories of identity, subjectivity and being are displaced in 
favour of a much more nebulous, dispersed and complex account of social 
organisation precludes the very possibility for resistance from the outset. Privileging 
the pre- or impersonal over and above the individual or subjective, one could say 
                                                          
14 Simone Bignall, Postcolonial Agency, pp.9-10. 
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Deleuze’s philosophy lacks any solid ground from which a theory of social action 
might be made: where does agency come from if not the antagonism between 
relations of power and those subject to them, and who in being subject to them, 
are uniquely able to express such antagonism? This is the longstanding critique of 
Deleuze’s philosophy made by Peter Hallward in his two works Absolutely 
Postcolonial: Writing Between the Singular and Specific (2001) and Deleuze: Out of 
This World (2006).15 Hallward’s argument depends upon the claim that, dispensing 
with dialectical theories of antagonism, Deleuze’s philosophy lacks any concept of 
relation as such—because his conceptual vocabulary acquiesces to a purely singular 
theory of relationality which excludes specific, defined or localised relations 
themselves: 
Deleuze’s project begins with a critique of merely ‘specific difference’ 
(Aristotle, Hegel), so as to clear a space in which to think singular or Creative 
‘difference of difference as immediate element’, in which it is possible to 
recognise that ‘every creation is singular’. In Deleuze’s somewhat 
idiosyncratic terminology, what is given is relational difference and identity, 
the ‘shackles of mediation’, subjective interiority, equivocity, signification, 
desire-as-lack, transcendence, Oedipus, the ‘long error’ of representation, 
etc. What is real, by contrast, is a vitalist, self-differing force of Creativity in 
its purest form—an absolute intensity or virtuality in constant 
metamorphosis, a desire that is creative of its object, a perception that gives 
rise to what it perceives.16 
What is singular, in Hallward’s reading of Deleuze, is that which creates its own 
conditions of existence: life, the virtual, or desiring-production, which is itself 
indifferent to each specific case of difference (the difference between thing x and 
thing y). To the extent that relations between individual instances of difference 
occur in Deleuze’s work, “the only significant ‘relationship’ between individuals 
must be measured in terms of the virtual which underlies them—a relation of 
                                                          
15 Peter Hallward, Absolutely Postcolonial: Writing Between the Singular and Specific, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press 2001), Deleuze: Out of This World, (London: Verso 2006). 
16 Hallward, Absolutely Postcolonial, p.12 
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purely quantitative difference along a single scale of proximity to the full Creative 
potential of intensity or Life”.17 When it comes to literature, Hallward posits that 
those postcolonial texts closest to Deleuze’s philosophy of creation (such as 
Edouard Glissant) maintain a singular perception of difference at the cost of 
sacrificing any specific relation between the different. In creating the conditions of 
its own existence, singular writing is theoretically universal, but not subject to the 
law of dialectical antagonism over which it has no agency. Yet freed from the 
shackles of mediation and dialectical antagonism between coloniser and colonised, 
postcolonial singularity abandons the possibility of a situated, specific relation to 
other postcolonial literatures and struggles as well.18 
 Hallward’s ontological arguments I understand to be in the same vein as 
those by Badiou and Spivak when it comes to Deleuze (which I will discuss further), 
but they also serve as the baseline by which a Deleuzian reading of postcolonial 
literature as world literature must be staged. Bignall’s study, as I have already 
discussed, is one response to Hallward which develops a fully Deleuzian theory of 
historical change based on actualisation of the virtual, and which makes the case 
for a specific and situated postcolonial politics on those terms. The other recent 
work which seems to me to offer the potential for a suturing of the fields of 
postcolonial and World Literature along Deleuzian lines is Lorna Burns’ 
Contemporary Caribbean Writing and Deleuze: Literature Between Postcolonialism 
and Post-Continental Philosophy (2012). Here she rejects Hallward’s reading of 
Deleuze’s ontology as privileging the virtual over the actual (a configuration which 
leads away from specific situations of oppression and domination and out of this 
world) on the grounds that: 
Hallward bases his reading on a skewed understanding of the Deleuzian 
concepts of singularity and the virtual. […] As Deleuze contends in Difference 
and Repetition (1968), there are two sides to the single, immanent reality 
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that underpins his thinking and these are termed the actual and the virtual. 
Yet, while these two sides are distinct and irreducible, the virtual can 
become actualised while the actual may return to the virtual (counter-
actualisation). In this […] Deleuze adopts Spinoza’s dual sense of actual 
created world and virtual creative force as the two ‘unequal odd halves’ of 
reality.19 
Burns indexes Hallward’s critique of Deleuze to Hegel’s rejection of Spinoza’s notion 
of immanent substance, to which Hallward’s text can be read as contemporary 
elaboration in the field of postcolonial studies. In turning the actual-virtual relation 
into a dualism in which the latter is the privileged term, Hallward not only 
misunderstands Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence, but actively ignores the role 
of counter-actualisation in the production of the new—outside and beyond that of 
the dialectical negation of being by non-being. In this respect Burns’ work is 
fundamental to my own study in asking: 
how can we conceive of an immanent production of difference that involves 
in the first instance no other or limitation? For Deleuze, to polarise 
postcoloniality and colonialism is to reduce not define the contours of their 
difference. Rather than limiting itself to, or being trapped by […] the 
established terms of colonialism, the difference of postcolonialism is not 
defined by opposition (and indeed this is Hallward’s claim albeit one he 
critiques).20 
As Burns recognises, Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence, which works according to 
processes of actualisation of the virtual and counter-actualisation that are 
themselves never resolved in a moment of synthesis or overcoming, “is of great 
significance to postcolonial writers seeking a model of difference which that both 
preserves specific and individual differences, and provides an alternative to the 
dialectical opposition which serves to underpin imperialist discourse”.21 
                                                          
19 Lorna Burns, Contemporary Caribbean Writing and Deleuze, p.13. 
20 Ibid. p.19. 
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114 
 
 Burns’ focus on contemporary writing from the Caribbean as the prime 
example of a postcolonial literature which becomes with the world according to 
immanent categories of differences and relationality outside of dialectical models, 
is one I want to extend and translate to African literature in the form of Dambudzo 
Marechera. Both her and Bignall’s theorising of postcoloniality along Deleuzian lines 
will be indispensable to my own arguments regarding the relationship between 
postcolonial studies and world-literary theory, conceived as a becoming in which 
the capitalist world-system of literary production is subject to its own immanent 
processes of deterritorialisation and counter-actualisation along lines of flight that 
undermine the structural categories of core, periphery and semi-periphery 
themselves. 
 
3.1. The problem of difference: Maoists vs potatoes 
 
Alain Badiou’s notorious review of Deleuze and Guattari’s Rhizome is 
characteristically remorseless in its dissection of the ontological arguments of A 
Thousand Plateaus. This short essay is crucial for the ways in which it encapsulates 
the arguments contained in Badiou’s later treatment of Deleuze and for its laying 
the entire failure of the revolt of May 68 at the door of Deleuze and Guattari. This 
failure, according to Badiou, was a result of “a kind of horizontal storm, or a 
cumulative dispersion, in which on top of everything the petty-bourgeois 
intelligentsia could vindicate the role of tactical vanguard.”22 This betrayal of May 
1968 occurs via their renunciation, in Badiou’s view, of the real meaning of the 
Marxist dialectic: 
Only a moron can confuse the Marxist dialectical principle ‘one divides into 
two’ with the genealogy for family trees concealed in ‘one becomes two’. 
For what the dialectic says is the exact opposite of the ‘strong principal 
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unity’ imputed to it; it is the divided essence of the movement as One […] 
The One has no existence as entity, there is unity only from movement, all is 
process.23 
In making this argument, however, Badiou reduces the ontological force of 
Deleuze/Deleuze-Guattari’s non-dialectical philosophy to a dualism (the one vs the 
multiple) which is itself a phantasm of the dialectical antagonism. What’s missing 
here is the qualitative difference between the non-identitarian politics of Marxist 
dialectics and the non-identitarian politics of Deleuzian multiplicities. That is to say, 
both are philosophies of process, of relation, rather than essence.24 Rather than a 
dualism between points, Deleuze and Deleuze-Guattari’s ontology is in fact directed 
towards the same “labour of division”25 – the differential relation which endlessly 
defers Being in favour of becoming – but which thinks that difference in a 
qualitatively different way I locate in the conept of the line of flight. Otherwise one 
becomes stuck in a numerical regression which, as Badiou correctly observes: “loses 
the thread of the unity of opposites and sees salvation in the redoubling of the One, 
which flips into its opposite, for in the dialectic two times One does not equal Two 
but once again One”.26 The problem which Deleuze’s philosophy seeks to address is 
to think “being […] in becoming” or difference-in-kind as positive, outside of any 
dialectical negation and always “in flight” or “on the line’”. 27 Consequently, 
Badiou’s attack on the rhizome (if only at this stage) can be said to miscarry in two 
ways: Firstly, failure to think difference positively (as difference-in-itself) and, 
secondly, failure to think agency or creation beyond negation (“Whoever renounces 
antagonism […] has the need sooner or later to kneel down, under the cover of the 
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cult of the self, before the real political powers, before the separate unity of the 
state”).28  
That these failures operate at the highest level of abstraction and in the 
pressing moment of leftist strategy (how do you transform the general strike of 
May 68 into a permanent revolution?) simultaneously is crucial: they will serve as 
the two ways in which we can systematically uncover the immediate political 
ramifications to Deleuze’s earliest formulation of his concept of difference. A 
continuity should be drawn between the pre-Guattari, so-called “philosophical 
Deleuze”, and the post-68 “political Deleuze”, which renders the Bergsonian 
problem of difference similar in kind to the strategic problems faced by postcolonial 
and anti-colonial movements in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
Marechera’s work is emblematic of this bind as it emerges at the point at which 
Zimbabwe achieves independence from colonial British rule and consequently is 
caught in an institutional struggle between competing definitions of Zimbabwean 
literature or African Literature - both of which struggle to avoid merely repeating at 
the periphery the canonical structures of national literatures which over-determine 
the imperialist centre. My contention is that Deleuze’s search for a philosophy of 
difference that cannot be reduced to identity or totality finds its immediate political 
corollary in the choices faced by anticolonial struggles following independence. 
Elizabeth Grosz describes this Bergsonian politics of difference as a force of 
unbecoming as much as a becoming or becoming-other; a differential movement 
that isn’t contained by a conceptual unity or totalising perspective that would 
cancel it out or land it in some post-differential world (such as a future utopia or 
perfect world) but always an aberrant movement or line of flight. In this she links 
together Deleuze’s Bergsonism with a critical politics of unbecoming against those 
who argue Deleuze’s philosophy of difference knows only the affirmation of 
differences-in-the-world or what merely appears as different, without concern for 
how those differences might themselves be turned against themselves through the 
power of unbecoming. Bergsonian duration, rendered by Deleuze as a philosophy 
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and a politics of intensive difference or difference-in-itself, is therefore also a 
critical philosophy but without the structural role previously held by negation or 
dialectics that would guide that critical force towards some ultimate end. The 
importance of thinking the power of unbecoming without dialectical negation is 
obvious for those struggles (such as feminism) that have historically found 
themselves ostracised by the way negation has been thought only as the negation 
of class antagonism within, for example, Marxism: 
Difference is not the union of the two sexes, the overcoming of racial and 
other differences through the creation or production of a universal term by 
which they can be equalised or neutralised, but the generation of ever-more 
variation or differentiation. Difference generates further difference because 
difference inheres the force of duration (becoming/unbecoming) in all 
things, in all acts of differentiation and in all things and terms thus 
differentiated.29 
The Bergsonism I will uncover in Deleuze’s early writings is not opposed to his later, 
so-called political works, but is on the contrary their fulfilment in a philosophy of 
difference without a grounding concept of unity or identity such as race, nation, 
class or gender to which something differs. The real for Deleuze does not need to 
be negated in order to be thought (where stripping away layers of cultural, sexual 
or racial difference will reveal some prior common existence). Instead it is the self-
negating movement of becoming which is at the same time an unbecoming that 
philosophy must “think”, and political movements must become worthy of.30 This is 
the critical force of Deleuze’s Bergsonism, his postcolonial Bergsonism, and the 
power which animates Marechera’s passion for the real in his writings-flights-
becomings. As Grosz argues, following Deleuze, a passion for the real in science, 
philosophy or art always takes the form of a delirium or escape in the first instance, 
if it is to succeed in its critical task of unbecoming: 
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30 To paraphrase Deleuze: we must “become worthy of what happens to us”. See Gilles Deleuze, The 
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Deleuze seeks an understanding of the real that is based on two principles: 
the real is positive, full, has no lack or negation, except through its own 
positive capacity for self enfolding; and the real is dynamic, open-ended, 
ever-changing, giving the impression of stasis and fixity only through the 
artificial isolation of systems, entities or states. His abiding concern remains 
with the real, with defining and refining being or reality so that its difference 
from itself, its fundamental structure of becoming or self-divergence – 
which may also be understood as an unbecoming – is impossible to ignore. A 
real that lacks nothing, that is fully positive, that functions as a whole; and a 
real that changes, that generates the new, that continues becoming, even as 
it un-becomes earlier becomings. In short, Deleuze seeks a real that is 
intimately linked to the dynamism of temporality itself.31 
Thinking the dynamism of temporality itself is where Deleuze’s Bergsonism will take 
him in Difference and Repetition, and which I will utilise as a means to think the 
becoming of world literature outside of the historicist paradigms of nationalism and 
globalism respectively in my next chapter. But this dynamism, or the radical 
openness of the future understood as force which cuts through the line of time, 
first needs to be understood in the context of Deleuze’s Bergsonian philosophy of 
difference, which I argue is always and already a postcolonial political philosophy of 
unbecoming. 
In Bergsonism Deleuze lists the roles or functions through which two 
competing aspects of difference can be philosophically understood: 
One is represented by space […] it is a multiplicity of exteriority, of 
simultaneity, of juxtaposition, of order, of quantitative differentiation, of 
difference in degree; it is a numerical multiplicity, discontinuous and actual. 
The other type of multiplicity appears in pure duration: it is an internal 
multiplicity of succession, of fusion, of organization, of heterogeneity, of 
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qualitative discrimination, or of difference in kind; it is a virtual and 
continuous multiplicity that cannot be reduced to numbers.32 
Both of these variations on difference operate on the real but without there being a 
contradiction that would transform them into a unity of opposites. The former is a 
function of the actual, of how difference is spatialised as the diversity of given 
things or states of affairs. The latter refers to difference as pure relation – as virtual 
process of self-differentiation to which objects, persons, states-of-affairs are the 
resultant actualisation in space. Hence internal or virtual difference is a theory of 
ontological genesis according to which matter differs from itself, first, before it 
differs from other kinds of materials. Things or states of affairs are already 
composites of a self-differing process of actualisation: they are a multiplicity. 
Deleuze draws this argument from Bergson’s Time and Free Will where 
Bergson’s description of “two kinds of multiplicity, two possible senses of the word 
“distinguish”, two conceptions, the one qualitative and the quantitative, of the 
difference between same and other” closely mirrors the language of contemporary 
systems-theory in its understanding of intensive and extensive space.33 The former 
refers to spaces defined only in terms of intensive continua of differences (such as a 
weather-system) wherein the composition of the space changes qualitatively 
according to singular points (of heat, pressure) rather than quantitatively in terms 
of external limits or boundaries: 
When we explicitly count units by stringing them along a spatial line, is it not 
the case that, alongside this addition of identical terms standing out from a 
homogenous background, an organisation of these units is going on in the 
depths of the soul, a wholly dynamic process, not unlike the purely 
qualitative way in which an anvil, if it could feel, would realise a series of 
blows from a hammer?34 
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Intensive spaces become along affectual lines – where quantitative changes in one 
aspect of the system alter the composition of the whole. Extensive spaces, on the 
contrary, are defined by external limits, boundaries or frontiers whose shifting 
patterns have no effect on the elements they contain. Whereas in the second 
example, of extensive difference, it is a question of occupying space, for intensive 
multiplicities it is a question of becoming with the space. Thinking in terms of 
intensive difference is to think with the non-human and affectual zones that 
compose the world. In their relation to geography, we can map Bergson’s intensive 
and extensive multiplicities on to the difference between major and minor 
philosophy in A Thousand Plateaus. But crucial to the way in which Deleuze (with 
Guattari) reads this passage is via the concept of the state – such that the 
interpretation of extensive spatiality becomes indexed to state-space. This is why 
Bergson’s conception of multiplicity becomes the primary way of thinking spatial 
politics against the state in the later works: 
Unity always operates in an empty dimension supplementary to that of the 
system considered (overcoding). The point is that a rhizome or multiplicity 
never allows itself to be overcoded, never has available a supplementary 
dimension over and above its number of lines, that is, over and above the 
multiplicity of numbers attached to those lines.35 
Hence, intensive multiplicities – minor assemblages and non-metric zones—become 
dominated by state-space just as “geometry lies at the crossroads of a physics 
problem and an affair of the state”.36 Becoming minor, or the intensive 
morphogenesis of a previously striated physical system, is not a question of 
occupying space delimited by boundaries, but transforming qualitatively the limits 
of the space alongside the elements it supposedly contains – a territorialisation. 
Hence, for Deleuze and Guattari, nomads are not to be identified by their way of 
traversing space (in fact travel is to be abhorred) but rather for their ability to move 
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at infinite speed within an intensive geometry of lines, vectors of escape, rather 
than points.37 
 Moreover, the principle of overcoding—whereby intensive zones are 
translated and striated into the Euclidian geometry occupied by a subject—has 
nothing to do with an opposition or binary that would govern and determine this 
transformation: one is not negated by the other. Rather, discrete or Euclidian 
spaces are at the same time intensive and continuous – organised by singular points 
or attractors of affective intensity. 
Bergson’s reading of early theorists of multiplicity such as Reimann leads 
Deleuze to locate in him a philosophy of difference which both encompasses and 
surpasses the dialectical tradition whose reality was based on Euclidean geometry 
and Cartesian physics: “It was a decisive event when the mathematician Riemann 
uprooted the multiple from its predicate state and made it a noun, ‘multiplicity’. It 
marked the end of dialectics and the beginning of a typology and topology of 
multiplicities.”38  
The capacity for the self-organisation of physical systems takes place 
according to the shifting dynamics of intensive zones or attractors which regulate 
behaviour in a state of equilibrium. But in a state of far-from-equilibrium 
conditions, chemical, biological or linguistic systems are subject to a “high 
coefficient of deterritorialisation” in which intensive reductions and tranversal 
communication between terms reach a critical mass.39 This is the case with 
Bergson’s concept of “creative evolution” as non-determinate bio-enviromental 
morphogenesis or what Deleuze and Guattari call the rhizome.40 As the non-
dialectical becoming of multiplicities, the rhizome “in effect […] constitutes the 
surplus value of evolution, always coming into being without origin, and only 
conceivable when evolution is understood as functioning transversally, that is, as 
                                                          
37 “The nomad is on the contrary he who who does not move” ibid. p.420. 
38 Ibid. p.532-533 
39 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. Dana Polen, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1986; Paris: Les Editions de Minuit 1975), p.16. 
40 Henri Bergson, “Creative Evolution”, in Bergson: Key Writings, trans. and ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson 
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cutting across distinct lineages.”41 These “far-from-equilibrium conditions” (a 
phrase Deleuze and Guattari borrow from physical systems theory in chemistry) are 
the means by which structures open themselves to dynamic variation without the 
need for dialectical negation or contradiction, and in which a minor literature 
decomposes language’s communicational-representational function into a flow of 
pure affect.42 In minor literature, signifying structures which regulate the relation 
between the sign and the referent (the thing-meant) give way to an intensive 
reduction – sound is detached from sense, metaphor becomes metamorphosis. 
Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers have described how the observation of 
certain solutions at far-from equilibrium conditions led to the eventual discovery of 
chemical clocks: 
Suppose we have two kinds of molecules, "red" and "blue." Because of the 
chaotic motion of the molecules, we would expect that at a given moment 
we would have more red molecules, say, in the left part of a vessel. Then a 
bit later more blue molecules would appear, and so on. The vessel would 
appear to us as "violet," with occasional irregular flashes of red or blue. 
However, this is not what happens with a chemical clock; here the system is 
all blue, then it abruptly changes its colour to red, then again to blue. 
Because all these changes occur at regular time intervals, we have a 
coherent process.43 
Systems theory would regard this solution as both open and dynamic (rather than 
closed and stable). That is, an organisation of forces in the environment produces 
the conditions under which a system moves from a state of relative entropy into a 
state of predictable but dynamic oscillation. This phenomenon has subsequently 
been observed across multiple physical systems, where the material elements of a 
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system are prompted by far-from equilibrium conditions to enter into self-
organising relations of oscillation. This in spite of the material elements in a system 
being radically different. As Manuel DeLanda describes:  
At the onset of a process of self-organization (when a chemical clock begins 
to assemble, for example), the mechanisms involved become extremely 
sensitive to minor fluctuations in the environment. A small change in 
external conditions, one that in thermodynamic equilibrium would have had 
negligible consequences - caused perhaps by a relatively weak gravitational 
or magnetic field - is amplified and directs the kind of chemical clock that is 
assembled (the period of its oscillations, for example), thereby "naturally 
selecting" one self-assembly pattern over another.44 
In far-from-equilibrium conditions, according to Prigogine, matter is capable of 
“perceiving” extremely minor changes in its environment. Rather than the positive 
elements of any given system being of concern, in an open-dynamic system the 
relations between positive elements are primary, being the abstract power 
determining the response of a material systems to a critical imbalance of forces in 
the environment. Deleuze and Guattari term this abstract potential for 
spontaneous self-organisation the “machinic phylum” – a potential for different 
material systems to enter into machinic relations with one another but where the 
specific elements in question are irrelevant. 45 The machinic phylum is the reservoir 
of abstract solutions (which Bergson terms the virtual) corresponding to 
problematic relations of force which different flows of matter and energy actualise 
in various ways. The peripheries of any physical system are the zones where the 
potential for radical transformation is most potent. But these peripheries are not 
necessarily geographical so much as ontological. This is evident in the number of 
formally peripheral cities (in respect to capital accumulation) in the world which 
now contain both first and third world zones of production, circulation and 
accumulation in the same physical space. If “World Literature” is the aesthetic-
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semiotic system analogous to the combined and uneven development of capitalist 
globalisation, then postcolonial writers occupy a unique position at the point where 
the spatial categories (centre/periphery) which maintain the homeostatic 
organisation of this system are vulnerable to radical reterritorialisation. This is not a 
case of writing back to the centre in order to oppose and negate it, but writing in 
such a way that the moment of re-stratification on an identity (whether that be a 
peripheral identity – the subject who recognises themselves as other) can be 
endlessly deferred and put into continuous variation as an intensive reduction. 
Where theories of World Literature have so far encountered the philosophy of 
Deleuze, the key differences between intensive and extensive spaces have been 
blurred – hence Casanova’s conflation of Deleuze-Guattari’s concept of minor 
literature with the “literary texts [of] small countries” in such a way that ignores 
Deleuze’s anti-dialectical critique of spatial categories as precisely that logic 
belonging to the state.46 
Deleuze’s quarrel with Hegelian dialectics (and consequently that mode of 
dialectics inherited by postcolonial studies) centres on the immanence of intensive 
differential processes within actual, extensive reality. When this relationship is 
thought as two separate orders of reality – as a dualism between virtual and actual 
- virtual difference is folded back into a theory of the One or the “Univocity of 
Being” according to Badiou. 47 In the manner of Hallward, this reads Deleuze’s 
concept of the virtual as a quasi-spiritualist philosophy, contrary to its rigourously 
materialist foundations.  Consequentially the way material processes and historical 
movements are transformed by political action are devalued because they are 
secondary to the virtual or cosmic order of difference-in-itself which is always 
happening elsewhere. The political objection to Bergsonian ontology is summarised 
by Hallward in his full length study of Deleuze which followed Absolutely 
Postcolonial: 
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Deleuze writes a philosophy of (virtual) difference without (actual) others. 
He intuits a purely internal or self-differing difference, a difference that 
excludes any constitutive mediation between the differed. Such a 
philosophy precludes a distinctively relational conception of politics as a 
matter of course.48 
The apparent duality of virtual and actual, containing Deleuze’s initial distinction 
between positive (Bergsonian) difference and negative (dialectical) difference, leads 
to a situation in which it appears as if “the political” is at the same time projected 
onto a universal or cosmic plane of differentiating chaos and made entirely 
irrelevant to those colonised or subaltern communities for whom the actual state of 
things is wretched (they are the wretched of the Earth). In Hallward’s reading of 
Deleuze’s other wordly politics the ability of actual beings to transform the 
conditions of their existence is nullified. He is led to confirm Badiou’s original 
characterisation of Deleuze/Deleuze-Guattari’s commitment to affirmation being 
aligned with the utmost conservatism: “In places like Palestine, Haiti, Iraq, the 
agents of imperialism have more to learn from Deleuzian rhizomatics than do their 
opponents”.49 
Were it the case that virtual self-differentiation nullified the ontological power 
of the actual to transform itself, this conclusion would be inevitable. However, the 
virtual and actual, positive and negative difference, are never conceived by Deleuze 
as a dualism or as an opposition through which one negates the other. Rather, as 
Lorna Burns has argued effectively, the virtual subsists or endures in its spatial and 
temporal actualisation, acting as a reservoir of potentiality in the manner of 
Bergson’s concept of memory:  
Since each actualisation of the virtual designates the emergence of the new, 
both élan vital and different/ciation describe the creative evolution of the 
immanent totality: ‘evolution takes place from the virtual to actuals. Evolution is 
actualisation, actualisation is creation’. However, more than this, for Deleuze, 
                                                          





Bergson’s sense of the virtual as ‘gigantic memory’ ensures that this creative 
process is also a temporal evolution. The past for both Deleuze and Bergson is a 
virtual field available for different/ciation within the present as recollection.50 
An account of Deleuze’s positive conception of difference needs to recover his 
thought for indigenous and anti-colonial struggles today, but in a way which still 
affirms the immanence of the virtual to material reality. The radical indeterminacy 
of the virtual is politically troubling (because it commits itself to the importance of 
chance and spontaneity within organised anti-colonial struggle) but also avoids 
those struggles falling into an antagonism that reduces the possibilities of 
becoming-other – as the desire not to be an “African writer” as much as the desire 
not to be a “European” or “Caribbean” writer. This is the commitment to intensive 
difference, to becoming-imperceptible to the World-Literary system I will identify in 
the work of Dambudzo Marechera (although his texts are by no means the only 
possible example) and whose theoretical elaboration Simone Bignall gives shape to 
in her critique and reconstruction of postcolonial studies along Deleuzian lines. At 
the same time I will use the encounter between Deleuze and Marechera as 
justification for reading Deleuze’s texts on Bergson under a postcolonial lens. This 
analysis will depend, however, on why Deleuze’s critique of negation speaks to the 
impasse suffered by postcolonial studies when it accepts the terms of dialectical 
negation. This impasse, I argue, is already implicit in Fanon’s late-period anxiety 
over the extent to which the failures of African national liberation struggles towards 
the end of the 1960’s have their roots in the French dialectical tradition of Kojève 
and Sartre he himself helped to weaponise against imperialism. There exists in the 
Fanon of The Wretched of the Earth a hitherto undervalued anticipation of 
Deleuze’s non-dialectical philosophy which is at the same time a critique of the 
nation-state as the proper form of postcolonial consciousness. 
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3.2. The problem of agency: multiplicities against the dialectic 
 
In 1944, while still at high school, Deleuze was present at several gatherings in 
Paris which included amongst others Alexandre Kojève, Jean Hyppolite and Jean 
Paul Sartre.51 These figures constitute the axis through which the reception and 
appreciation of Hegel’s philosophy becomes a key subject of post-war French 
philosophy. Kojève’s reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit rests on a theory of 
praxis in which the agency of social transformation is conceived in terms of critical 
negativity. This in turn informs via Sartre and subsequently Frantz Fanon much of 
the postcolonial theory in the twentieth century I wish to distance from Deleuze’s 
thought – notably that of Gayatri Spivak and Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o—which grounds its 
approach on the negation of being by difference. Crucially for Kojève, negation 
never reaches a moment of final unity or cancellation of difference as the subject’s 
coming to self-consciousness as it does in Hegel, but instead is the driving force 
behind the subject’s recognition of her own desire as an ontological void: 
Desire is directed not toward a given being but toward a nonbeing […] to 
desire nonbeing is to liberate oneself from being, to realise one’s autonomy, 
one’s freedom. To be anthropogenetic, then, desire must be directed 
toward a nonbeing – that is, toward another desire, another greedy 
emptiness, another I. For desire is absence of being (to be hungry is to be 
deprived of food); it is a nothingness that nihilates in being, and not a being 
that is.52 
For Kojève, ontological void, lack and negativity are the conditions of human agency 
as such: 
The man who desires a thing humanly acts not so much to possess a thing as 
to make another recognise his right […] to that thing, to make another 
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recognise him as the owner of that thing.  […] it is only desire of such a 
recognition (Annerkennung), it is only action that flows from, such a desire, 
that creates, realises, and reveals a human, nonbiological […] one can 
already foresee, or understand (‘deduce’) what human existence will be.53 
In human beings desire-as-negativity is raised to the absolute; as the operator of 
differentiation which, in the first instance, is the differentiation between purely 
biological (i.e non-reflexive) negativity and human (self-reflexive) negativity. Hunger 
in humans is raised to the level of concepts: as the “idea” of hunger. But this 
primary negation is first and foremost an attribute of the actual qua the real: 
material history happens through the negation of that which exists. Agency is 
devalued as a movement which can only realise the possible forms of action 
constrained within the inevitable poverty of existence in itself – as ontological lack. 
This implies that reason as a property of humanity comes hand in hand with 
negation – one of Fanon’s eventual anxieties over Negritude as an aesthetics of 
unreason which only reaffirms in dialectical opposition the dominance of European 
rationality. Non-being is the condition upon which forms of all possible forms of 
agency can take place. 
From this follows Sartre’s emphasis, in a direct repetition of Kojève, on 
scarcity as a material fact of existence in the Critique of Dialectical Reason: “Scarcity 
is a fundamental determination of man […] Indeed, it is because of this 
fundamental scarcity that certain relations of production have arisen, defined on 
the basis of a mode of production, which institutionally exclude certain social 
groups from full consumption, reserving it for other groups, insufficient in number 
to consume everything”54. Difference is thus the result of a primary negation or 
void (nonbeing) which is the genesis of action. But the theory of praxis Sartre 
describes here is one which, conversely, folds human agency back into its biological 
determination by scarcity. In contrast to Hallward’s argument regarding Deleuze’s 
commitment to human emancipation, what we find in the dialectical tradition 
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inherited by Deleuze is a theory of praxis which brings ever diminishing returns: “It 
goes without saying that scarcity […] can be the occasion for the formation of new 
groups whose project is to combat it. Man, in fact, produces his life in the midst of 
other men who are also producing theirs, or at least causing others to produce it; 
he produces his life in the social field of scarcity.”55 Lack is the ontological field 
(givenness) which praxis is endlessly compelled to try and negate, but which the 
labour of political organisation, class solidarity and revolutionary action can never 
overcome in and of itself: “given a social field which is defined by scarcity, that is, 
given the historical human field, labour for man has to be defined as praxis aimed 
at satisfying need in the context of scarcity by a particular negation of it.”56 
Struggles against colonial domination are therefore reduced to a relationship 
between the actual and the merely possible, given the a priori field of scarcity 
which serves as the determining ground for the emergent structural relationships 
between forms. This is key to understanding the poverty Marechera identifies in 
the intellectual and political climate of post-independence Zimbabwe – which 
appears to screen out potentials for communities outside the state-form. 
Spontaneity and chance encounters are excluded as effective tools for political 
emancipation in Sartre’s political philosophy. As one commenter describes: “By 
restricting group identification to a purely reactive status […] Sartre omits both 
those concepts (such as love, friendship, kinship) through which we can reach an 
organicity of communal relations as well as vital, enriching experiences of inter-
subjectivity that arise from spontaneous gatherings”57. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
political philosophy can be seen as an attempt to incorporate such notions of 
spontaneous gatherings within an organisational strategy that can endure without 
cancelling such encounters out.58 
This is consequently where Deleuze’s emphasis on the radically 
indeterminate nature of the Bergsonian virtual becomes a political rallying cry in A 
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Thousand Plateaus - in a section titled “Memories of a Bergsonian”. Taking up 
Bergson’s emphasis on cross-species communication and genetic transfer, Deleuze 
and Guattari give an account of strategic alliances between organisms which 
dissolves the reductionist logic of categories (being) towards a becoming-other to 
those identities:  
Becoming is not an evolution, at least not an evolution by descent and 
filiation. Becoming produces nothing by filiation: all filiation is imaginary. 
Becoming is always of a divergent order than filiation. It concerns alliance. If 
evolution includes any veritable becomings, it is in the domain of symbioses 
that bring into play beings of totally diverent scales and kingdoms, with no 
possible filiation. There is a block of becoming that snaps up the wasp and 
the orchid, but from which no wasp-orchid can ever descend […] 
Accordingly, the term we would prefer for this form of evolution between 
heterogeneous terms is ‘involution,’ on the condition that involution is in no 
way confused with regression. Becoming is involutionary, involution is 
creation.59 
This passage translates the Bergsonian concept of involution to describe the activity 
of chance encounters or events within the determinate structure of biological 
evolution. This closely mirrors Deleuze’s description over two decades earlier of 
“two types of division which must not be confused” where his ontology of intensive 
actualisation is opposed to the Kojèvean/Sartrean dialectic of negation and 
subsumption: 
Now the process of realisation is subject to two rules, one of resemblance 
and another of limitation. For the real is supposed to be in the image of the 
possible which it realises. (It simply has existence or reality added to it, 
which is translated by saying that, from the point of view of the concept, 
there is no difference between the possible and the real.) […] The virtual, on 
the other hand, does not have to be realised, but rather actualised; and the 
rules of actualisation are not those of resemblance and limitation, but those 
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of difference or divergence and of creation […] While the real is in the image 
and likeness of the possible that it realises, the actual, on the other hand 
does not resemble the virtual that it embodies. 60 
The chaotic virtual milieu differs in kind from the actual which materialises it in time 
and space and which contains this virtuality within itself as the tendency or 
potential of all systems towards entropic de-stratification (“absolute 
deterritorialization”).61 For Sartre, the labour or praxis of creativity is part of the 
process of realisation of various possibilities within the general situation of scarcity 
(negation merely selects which of these possibilities to realise). On the other hand, 
the Deleuzian actual is never realised as self-identical but instead carries within 
itself the virtual problems which define its systemic becoming in time and space but 
which are always open to radical decomposition (or deterritorialisation) back 
towards the virtual. Systemic, because things in themselves are already composites 
– multiplicities of elements in temporal duration – but which are open rather than 
closed systems. 
This “carrying within itself” of the virtual within the actual is key to how 
Deleuze retains the role and function of critique in his positive concept of 
difference – as to how actual states of affairs are always threatened by radical 
decomposition—without recourse to negation as the primary motor of this 
critique.62 It therefore provides the point of rupture with Badiou, where Deleuze’s 
ontology is able to speak to universal givens and specific situations of social 
transformation at the same time. It offers us a line of flight out of the impasse 
suffered by postcolonial theory when it conceives of difference as both the negative 
cause of otherness and the very means by which said otherness is to be 
overcome.63 The negativity of difference which Fanon inherits from Sartre as the 
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void of non-being leads him to the same problem of agency, articulated in a new 
way, which Deleuze’s philosophy of immanence seeks to swerve. Dambudzo 
Marechera’s novels Black Sunlight and The Black Insider similarly respond to this 
problem through an aesthetic praxis that continually seeks to swerve its non-being 
or otherness in relation to the “being of the centre” of the World-Literary system. 
 
3.3. The neo-colonial subject: Deleuze and Fanon 
 
The dialectic of being – non-being, which positions creative transformation within 
critical negativity leads to a (both literal and theoretical) poverty in Sartre, where 
being or identity requires nothingness, void and scarcity in order to function. This is 
analogous to Fanon’s remarks in “On the Pitfalls of National Consciousness” where 
he castigates those bourgeois movements for national liberation in former colonies 
which only succeed in repeating the intellectual terms of the European 
enlightenment at the periphery: “In certain young states of Black Africa members of 
parliament, or even ministers, maintain without a trace of humour that the danger 
is not at all of a reoccupation of their country by colonialism but of an eventual 
invasion by ‘those vandals of Arabs coming from the North’”.64 The aims of pan-
African nationalism are for Fanon, writing at the beginning of the 1960’s, still 
subject to the racialising discourses which attend the national consciousness of the 
European bourgeoisie and which retroactively determine their identity via a 
supposed “ethnic centre” threatened by its geographic and ontological borders:  
Colonialism, which had been shaken to its very foundations by the birth of 
African unity, recovers its balance and tries now to break that will to unity 
by utilising all the movement’s weaknesses. Colonialism will set the African 
peoples moving by revealing to them the existence of ‘spiritual’ rivalries […] 
this religious tension may be responsible for revival of the commonest racial 
feeling. Africa is divided into Black and White, and the names that are 
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substituted – Africa south of the Sahara, Africa north of the Sahara – do not 
manage to hide this latent racism.65 
As well as being the negating force that destroys colonial rule, difference returns as 
that which threatens national unity conceived along racialised grounds. The subject 
of dialectical negation can only become conscious of itself via the recognition of 
what-it-is-not. So Fanon’s statement in Black Skin, White Masks that “The Negro is 
not. Any more than the white man”66 becomes prophetic for the way the dialectic 
of centre and periphery which characterised the emergence of bourgeois 
nationalism in various African states is compelled to seek out the non-being of 
difference as the very condition of its possibility. Despite this Fanon himself remains 
committed to a dialectics of negation derived from Sartre and, according to Neil 
Lazarus, “an alternative nationalist standpoint” tied to the existential humanism of 
the latter. 67 Or, as Simone Bignall observes: 
For Fanon, the crux of the problem concerns the colonial imposition of a 
misrepresentative universality with the colonial construction of ‘the Negro’ 
as its object; it follows that only by asserting local cultures which affirm the 
dynamic particularity of positive, culturally defined black identities, will 
people oppressed by racism and colonialism break free from the terms of 
universal misrepresentation that have become the legacy of colonial 
discourse.68 
There remains an uncomfortable question as to how much the neo-colonialism 
Fanon diagnoses in The Wretched of the Earth has its roots in the very structures of 
critical negativity he brings to bear on imperial violence in Black Skin, White Masks. 
Homi Bhabha maintains that: 
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Fanon is fearful of his most radical insights: that the space of the body and 
its identification is a representational reality; that the politics of race will not 
be entirely contained within the humanist myth of Man or economic 
necessity or historical progress, for its psychic effects question such forms of 
determinism; that social sovereignty and human subjectivity are only 
realisable in the order of Otherness.69 
Poststructuralist debates over the foundation of the subject in lack then become 
crucial for any articulation of a theory of decolonization which doesn’t end up 
fixated on its own outsides – its own peripheries. Hélène Cixous summarises the 
restrictions and conditions placed on the role of difference in dialectical philosophy 
conceived under the structures of negation: “I saw that the great, noble, ‘advanced’ 
countries established themselves by expelling what was ‘strange’; excluding it but 
not dismissing it; enslaving it. A commonplace gesture of history: there have to be 
two races – the masters and the slaves.”70 The enlightened, rational subject is 
conditional on the progressive recognition, cancellation and internalisation of its 
external limits under the dialectical model of centre and periphery through which 
globalised capitalism achieved (with the exception of the USSR and some other 
cases) hegemonic dominance in the 1960s and 70s. Bignall frames this dependency 
of the capitalist world-system on dialectical models of constitutive recognition and 
internalisation of non-being as a failure by Fanon to critique the very forms of 
human action available to the colonised; as a failure to think agency beyond 
negation: 
Fanon wants recognition as a desiring subject, as a subject who transforms 
and possesses the material world through the act of negation. Thus, he 
cleaves the dialectical goal of reciprocal recognition between ‘freedoms as 
confronted freedoms’, with a Marxist inflection similar to Kojève and 
Sartre’s, which holds that subjects might acknowledge each other in terms 
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of the negating agency each extends, upon each other and their world. […] 
However, Fanon, like Sartre, does not challenge the character of this human 
agency or the nature of action associated with the dialectical verbs of 
recognition and negation.71 
Whilst not directly engaged in this struggle, Deleuze’s theorization of a difference-
without-negation during this period has a direct bearing on the political and 
strategic crises suffered by decolonization movements in Africa in the mid-1960s. 
 For example, in his late essay on “Colonial War and Mental Disorders” Fanon 
moves away from the dialectical categories of coloniser-colonised and focuses on 
those displaced or indeterminate persons caught up in the Algerian war of 
independence as something more akin to an atmosphere or, in Foucualt’s language, 
a “thought from outside”.72 An Algerian civilian begins to hear “all sorts of insults 
coming from out of the night and resounding in his head: ‘traitor, traitor, coward… 
all your brothers who are dying, traitor’”73 and is led to deceive the French police 
into thinking he is a member of the FLN in spite of himself. Trauma in this instance 
is less to do with a causal event, nor as something Fanon’s patients are compelled 
to repeat in any Freudian sense, but as a wound which subsists and inheres in the 
experiential present as something which is always happening elsewhere or which is 
always about to happen. The event of colonisation is not something to be negated 
in order for the other to reach self-consciousness in their own right, but instead the 
anxiety of otherness comes from an always already being-spoken-for—as 
ressentiment. To this end, Lorna Burns has framed Albert Memmi’s critique of the 
dialectical politics of postcolonial ressentiment—of being defined in relation to 
what one is not—along Deleuzian lines as an apparatus of capture: 
The colonised self-assertion, born out of a protest, continues to define itself 
in relation to it. In the midst of revolt, the colonised continues to think, feel 
and live against and, therefore, in relation to the coloniser and colonization 
                                                          
71 Bignall, Postcolonial Agency, p.69. 
72 Michel Foucault and Maurice Blanchot, Michel Blanchot: The Thought From Outside, trans. Jeffrey 
Mehlman and Brian Massumi (New York: Zone Books 1987; Montpellier: Éditions Fata Morgana 
1986), p.7 
73 Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p.220. Emphasis added. 
136 
 
[…] In order to witness the colonised complete cure, his alienation must 
completely cease. We must await the complete disappearance of 
colonisation—including the period of revolt.74 
In focusing on those persons and bodies who exist in somewhat of a hybrid relation, 
an indeterminate position, to the traditional binary of coloniser-colonised, Fanon’s 
essay anticipates the one which follows—“On The Pitfalls of National 
Consciousness”—where the affect of ressentiment is shown to be disastrous to 
newly independent or post-colonial nations. Howard Caygill notes this tension in 
Fanon, where colonial violence represents a strategic danger to anti-colonial 
resistance movements hastened to escalate the very violence which conditions 
their ressentiment: 
The scenes of ressentiment and violence described by Fanon take place 
within and are aggravated by this scenario of escalating colonial enmity. 
Fanon, however, also emphasizes that this abstraction, this ‘alienation’ – to 
use the term in the psychiatric sense used in Black Skin, White Masks – is a 
product of specific historic processes. This is affirmed repeatedly throughout 
‘On Violence’, perhaps most graphically in the expression that ‘colonialism, 
as we have seen, is the organisation of a Manichean world, of a 
compartmentalised world’. The Manichean world, created by a mad God 
and policed by demonic forces, is the theatre of struggle between light and 
dark […] Yet for Fanon, it is a world of alienation (in all senses of the word) 
created by colonial violence, an abstract violence that provokes responses 
which initiate a mutually destructive escalation.75 
Here the danger of ressentiment comes as it overdetermines national 
consciousness to become instead only a nationalism conceived in opposition to 
other (European) nationalisms.76 Hatred of the coloniser is co-opted by those 
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bourgeois nationalisms intent on the restoration of capitalist modes of production. 
Writing six years after Fanon’s essay on national consciousness and its limitations, 
Deleuze similarly writes of those schizoid-subjects or “mortally wounded” able to 
grasp “all violence in a single act of violence, and every mortal event in a single 
event which no longer makes room for the accident, and which denounces and 
removes the power of ressentiment in the individual as well as the power of 
oppression within society”. 77 Aside from the fact that both Deleuze and Fanon 
were experimenting with serial forms of composition at around the same time, at 
the end of his life Fanon also anticipates the wider questions Deleuze and Guattari’s 
political philosophy asks: how does one becomes revolutionary beyond the politics 
of negation and ressentiment?78  
I make this claim in spite of the obvious point that the exact opposite case 
has been made by, above all, Gayatri Spivak. In “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Spivak 
mirrors those criticisms put forth by Badiou in “The Facism of the Potato” – namely 
– that Deleuze and Guattari’s theorization of a subject without dialectical negation 
or lack falls back on a Eurocentric, univocal conception of being: 
When the connection between desire and the subject is taken as irrelevant 
or merely reversed, the subject-effect that surreptitiously emerges is much 
like the generalised ideological subject of the theorist. This may be the legal 
subject of socialised capital, neither labour nor management, holding a 
‘strong’ passport, using a ‘strong’ or ‘hard’ currency, with supposedly 
unquestioned access to due process. It is certainly not the desiring subject 
as Other.79 
But this is only the case if one separates Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of subject 
formation in Anti-Oedipus from their broader conception of difference as 
ontologically primary. For Spivak, given that difference is understood as the motor 
of dialectical becoming according to the tradition of Hegel, Kojève and Sartre, 
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rejecting negation can only result in affirmation of the One. But “subject-effects” in 
Anti Oedipus are not so much dissolved in favour of chaotic or anarchic 
connections, so much as disaggregated amongst a range of pre-individual and 
relational concepts of identity-in-process. The question is not “how can we free 
difference from identity?” but “given that difference is given, how can we think 
consistency and individuation without falling prey to the identity of the subject?” 
This question follows logically even from Deleuze’s earliest work on David Hume - 
“we are habits, nothing but habits – the habit of saying I”80. The effects of processes 
of individuation are never fully closed. The legal subject becomes by incorporating 
those bodies (such as female, black, homosexual bodies) that were previously 
invisible. This is a majoritarian structure. Becoming-minor entails a qualitative 
change in the makeup of any given assemblage. As Andrew Robinson and Simon 
Tormey point out, this is the “third” category of subjectivity which Spivak neglects 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s work:  
In Deleuzian theory there is an ‘other’ of the neurotic ‘barred subject’. This 
other is the schizophrenic (or nomad, molecular becoming and so on). Yet 
the schizophrenic is also ‘divided’, cross-cut with flows, schizzes and 
multiple positions. In other words, Deleuze posits against the lacking divided 
self, not an undivided self, but a non-lacking divided-self.81 
 Spivak’s commitment to the constitutive lack at the core of subjectivity leads 
inevitably to problems of enunciation and representation – where the ability of the 
colonised class (i.e the negating class) cannot be assumed to be able to speak for 
themselves. As with Fanon, the subaltern is not. 
 The problem of difference for a postcolonial politics of negation after Spivak 
subsequently finds itself bound up in problems of authentic speech. This can be 
seen in, for example, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o’s turn away from writing novels in English – 
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the effects of which he describes as “a cultural bomb” that “makes [the post-
colonised] see their past as one wasteland of non-achievement and [that] makes 
them want to distance themselves from that homeland”. 82 In former European 
colonies such as Kenya, Thiong’o argues: 
Possibilities of triumph or victory are seen as remote, ridiculous dreams. The 
intended results are despair, despondency and a collective death-wish. 
Amidst this wasteland which it has created, imperialism presents itself as 
the cure and demands that the dependent sing hymns of praise with the 
constant refrain: ‘theft is holy’. Indeed, this refrain sums up the new creed 
of the neo-colonial bourgeoisie in many ‘independent’ African states.83 
Here Thiong’o’s antagonists are the same as those identified by Fanon in The 
Wretched of The Earth and against which he posits a cultural nationalism from 
below – as an antidote to the acquiescence of the former colony towards neo-
imperialism and capitalist globalisation. Only through negation can postcolonial 
literature become the self-conscious expression of “a people”- rather than a 
subaltern class caught in the void of otherness. But the choice between writing in 
English or Gikuyu should, according to Deleuze, be seen as a false one—just as the 
choice between being and non-being, identity and difference, is undermined in 
Bergsonism as an inferior version of a more profound virtual difference. Post-
independence African writers working in English like Dambduzo Marechera are, 
from Thiang’o’s perspective, slaves to the cultural paternalism implied by their 
tertiary use of a dominant language. On the contrary, I will make the case directly 
for Marechera as a writer whose aesthetic praxis can be read productively 
alongside a non-dialectical philosophy of postcolonial difference derived from 
Deleuze and Bergson. Rather than recovering a lost or forgotten identity through 
linguistic identity and national allegory, Marechera is a “language terrorist” whose 
work traces a line of flight out of both African and European national literatures. 
The novels Black Sunlight and The Black Insider have no national community of 
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language users to speak of, and are therefore forced to carve out a space for 
creative experimentation with competing ideas of cultural belonging in language. 
The audience for Black Sunlight and The Black Insider are always “to come” in the 
manner Deleuze describes in minoritarian art practices. 84  The minor always works 
in the le futur anterior—that which will have become. Marechera’s texts are a 
difference engine which subtracts linguistic and metaphorical variations from 
Zimbabwean national consciousness, forcing them to take flight in a way that 
makes them imperceptible to the global signifying regime world literary theory. 
Marechera writes not “from” the periphery but of an intensive space of multiplicity 
– an intensive virtuality that continually escapes recognition and incorporation by 
the centre through the Bergsonian process of counter-actualisation. 
 
3.4. Bergsonism in Harere: Dambudzo Marechera 
 
Against Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o’s description of colonialism as a bomb – which 
transforms being into nothingness – Antonio Benítez Rojo speaks of a “bricolage” or 
“Caribbean machine” capable of repeating the catastrophe of Empire across several 
human and non-human strata in a global assemblage of expropriation, exchange 
and domination: 
The flow of nature in [the Caribbean] was interrupted by the suction of an 
iron mouth, taken thence through a transatlantic tube to be deposited and 
redistributed in Spain. When I speak of nature in I do so in integral terms: 
Indians and their handicrafts, nuggets of gold and samples of other minerals, 
native species of plants and animals, and also some words like tabaco, 
canoa, hamaca etc […] A machine of the same model […] was installed in 
Puerto Rico, in Jamaica, in Cuba […] a machine made up of a naval machine, 
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a military machine, a bureaucratic machine, a political machine, a legal 
machine, a religious machine…85 
In contrast to earlier (dialectical) theorisations in the 1960’s, Benitez-Rojo’s 
description of a colonialism which reproduces itself in space and time as a machinic 
connection or modulation of elements across different series—bringing them 
together but also bifurcating them into new territories and strata—seems to have 
more in common with a globalised capitalism that contains multiple centres and 
peripheries. Benitez-Rojo is not attempting to reduce the significance of the human 
misery caused by colonisation, but to show how the catastrophe traverses 
linguistic, physical, psychological, economic and environmental systems as an 
assemblage of elements whose relations are structurally abstract but actualised in 
concrete, specific ways. Language makes smooth communication between local 
zones of accumulation and the economic centres of Europe and the US possible, but 
is not simply a mode of linguistic domination imposed on colonial subjects from 
without as it is for Thiong’o. As Benitez-Rojo makes clear, language as a repeating 
assemblage or strata of phonetic matter and written inscription belongs neither to 
the periphery or the centre, but is forever “in between” as a system in relative 
equilibrium but always open to transformation at any given point. This openness of 
language to internal transformation marks a distinction between earlier 
postcolonial writers such as Thiong’o, and writers such as Marechera who emerged 
after the movements for national liberation in Africa and elsewhere acquiesced to 
the soft power of global capitalist hegemony (rather than direct imperial conquest). 
Deleuze and Guattari’s remark that “a minor literature doesn’t come from a minor 
language” but something which happens to a major language, is especially 
instructive for understanding this shift.86 If the abstract machine of colonisation 
(read: “combined and uneven development”) is only conceived as a system of 
oppositions (centre and periphery) which sustains itself via the ceaseless 
identification of its others, it will always appear as if the other is lacking the fullness 
of being that belongs to a linguistic subject (an I). But as a Bergsonian multiplicity or 
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rhizome, language exceeds the dialectic of recognition and identity, instead 
becoming a plane or plateau through which the postcolonial writer can potentially 
escape the ceaseless demand to say “I”. 
 World-literary scholars have already attended to some of the 
epistemological failures of the dialectic of centre and periphery—Nirvana Tanouki 
calls for “a disciplinary critique of the concept of scale, which by necessity moves us 
away from metaphorical deployments of “space” toward concrete discussions 
about the materiality of literary landscapes”.87 Tanouki argues that comparativist 
approaches tend to turn the objects of their attention into discursive problems with 
similar themes. Read novelistically, a contemporary African sculpture Man with a 
Bicycle “is turned into a sign of novelty by a way of reading, which not only pulls 
together identity and landscape […] such that they become inextricable—but, more 
impressively, they mystify the [protagonist’s] journey, turning garb and transport 
into hurdles along his way”.88 It is assumed by the comparativist that speaking in a 
language that is not one’s own, wearing American clothes and riding a machine 
born of capitalist modernity represent a series of identity crises the peripheral 
subject must overcome if they are truly to become a subject. Thus all narratives of 
the periphery begin to look similar in the way they are organised around the 
problem of periphery in relation to the centre, and the journey is made irrelevant so 
long as the figure coming over the horizon is a reflection of ourselves. Tanouki 
betrays her most radical insights, however, by neglecting the role of dialectics in 
this system. It is the tendency to reduce the singularity of postcolonial narratives to 
a structure of oppositions and antagonisms that introduces a false universalism to 
theories of World Literature—and which sacrifices the singular difference between 
peripheries themselves in the effort towards systemisation. 
Metaphor has a specific role in this arrangement, as the stylistic device by 
which the postcolonial novel appears to communicate its form of “creativity under 
duress”.89 Deleuze and Guattari are suspicious of metaphor for its Platonic 
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associations, and this is borne out in the neoliberal appropriation of the term 
“World Literature” to mean an ideal sphere of discursive communication and 
identity politics in which all subjects are required to communicate.90 Yet even 
though Deleuze and Guattari’s anxiety over metaphor has become synonymous 
with Kafka’s austere deterritorialisation of German (where extraneous 
metaphorical elements are subtracted as far as possible), we do find in Kafka: 
Towards a Minor Literature allusion to a different direction of deterritorialisation 
based on the multiplication rather than subtraction of metaphorical elements. Set 
against the willed-poverty of Kafka, this literary maximalism would utilise “all the 
resources of symbolism, of oneorism, of esoteric sense, of the hidden signifier”.91 
This is a style which Deleuze and Guattari will ultimately come to identify with 
James Joyce: “Joyce's words, accurately described as having 'multiple roots', shatter 
the linear unity of the word, even of language, only to posit a cyclic unity of the 
text, sentence, or knowledge”.92 Through the repetition or multiplication of 
metaphor and image, the work loses its representational quality in a contrary but 
complimentary movement to Kafka. Instead of the singular world to be 
represented, in a novel like Ulysses we find only the multiplicity of images and 
perspectives without a subject position to unify or totalise them – the work 
becomes its own world.  
It is through this maximalist mode of deterritorialisation I wish to read the 
novels of Dambudzo Marechera, where a transverse line connects the peripheries 
of Marechera’s 1980s Harare and Joyce’s 1920s Dublin that has been mistakenly 
and reductively described as a perverse “European” aspect of Marechera’s own 
style that prevents him developing a more fully “African” sensibility. In contrast to 
the subtractive method of deterritorialisation Deleuze and Guattari diagnose in 
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Kafka, Marechera’s fictions aim to destroy metaphor from the inside. They conduct 
an immanent critique of the metaphorical image in parallel to that (I propose) 
undertaken by Deleuze and Guattari against psychoanalysis, in order to bring those 
concepts “to the point of auto-critique”.93 The novels Black Sunlight and The Black 
Insider are written (contra Kafka) almost entirely in metaphor. Rather than 
subjecting those metaphors to the dialectical play of antagonisms, however, the 
novels assemble metaphors in repeating series only to dissolve them, removing 
them from their context and thus resisting their systemisation into a postcolonial 
subject of enunciation. They are best read, therefore, by following a line of 
contagion between metaphorical series, through which they escape the supposed 
oppositional binary of the World-Literary centre and its peripheral other. These 
processes of contagion are, I argue, identical to Bergson’s concept of creative 
involution – which Deleuze describes as “counter-actualisation” and which we have 
already encountered as the process of unbecoming. 94 Critique here has nothing to 
do with the negative, but instead requires that: “One has only to replace the actual 
terms in the movement that produces them to bring them back to the virtuality 
actualised in them, in order to see that differentiation is never a negation but a 
creation, and that difference is never negative but positive and creative”.95 This 
mode of critique has nothing to do with representing reality more accurately, but in 
resisting the spatial coordinates of the present state of things: 
All our problems derive from the fact that we do not know how to go 
beyond experience [the actual] towards the conditions of experience [the 
virtual], towards the articulations of the real and rediscover the differences 
in kind in the composites that are given to us and on which we live.96 
As previously discussed, counter-actualisation is not required to go as far as 
dialectical opposition or antagonism (which would only trap such forms of critique 
in a structure of dependency) but remains open to the creative potential of chance 
and indeterminacy within the political. This movement from dialectical opposition 
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to creative counter-actualisation is implicit, I will argue, in Marechera’s theorisation 
that realism in African literature is the literary parallel to the Fanonian recognition 
of self-as-object associated with the colonised experience. The realism of, say, 
Chinua Achebe, becomes for Marechera an attempt to overcome this position of 
otherness by simply expanding the European category of subjectivity to include 
non-Europeans. Instead, Marechera is moved to ask— “how can Africa write as if 
that black Frenchman, Frantz Fanon, never existed[?]”.97 Fanon’s dialectical model 
of the development of African literature in The Wretched of the Earth ultimately 
remains for Marechera wedded to a European (or Hegelian) mode of subjectivity. 
As David Pattison summarises, Fanon’s dialectic of colonialism proceeds via: 
 The period of 'unqualified assimilation' in which the writer demonstrated a 
complete absorption of the culture of the occupying power; a second period 
in which those acquired values are questioned, a time nominated by Fanon 
as 'just-before-the-battle' (for independence, that is), before entering a 
third and, according to Fanon, final feature, the 'fighting phase' when the 
writer acts as 'awakener of the people' producing a revolutionary 
literature.98 
Pattison adds a fourth phase to this dialectic he terms “after the battle”99 but this is 
to mis-register the attack on Fanonian dialectics conducted by novels such as The 
Black Insider and Black Sunlight. The processes of counter-actualisation at work in 
these texts cannot be understood via the hermeneutic terms given to them by the 
dialectic of centre and periphery that world literary theory retains and extends 
from earlier postcolonial critiques. 
 The role of the postcolonial text in narrating the nation against its 
overdetermination by a European bourgeois tradition, is upheld in world-literary 
studies by Casanova, who writes of Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart that it was: 
“at once a realist, didactic, demonstrative and national novel [the aim of which] was 
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to provide Nigeria with a national history and to teach this history to the people.”100 
The people here are understood in the manner of Kojève’s dialectic, whose coming-
to-consciousness rests on the recognition of themselves as other—as the agents of 
dialectical history. But for Deleuze the true revolutionary path is the endless 
deferment of this identitarian moment, where no mediation or synthesis is possible 
or required. Whereas the dialectic merely reveals that the other was a subject all 
along, becoming is always in service of a schizoid or minor “people yet to come” 
that never settles on a subject position.101 This important difference, between the 
extensive spaces of national literatures and the emergent processes through which 
a landscape, or a body, becomes territorialised in the production of space, is erased 
by Casanova.102 This results in a conflation in her work between the national politics 
of peripheral countries and narrative as the ersatz form of expression for this 
politics. As Lorna Burns argues: 
[Casanova] traces a trajectory that begins with a direct relation between 
politics and literature. In this first moment, the close connection between 
literature and politics is expressed through texts that are distant from 
literary modernity: they use conservative narrative forms like realism and 
are thus vulnerable to political and nationalist appropriation […] the 
literature of the centre, on the other hand, is one that is expressly 
depoliticised and in it we will find “the almost complete disappearance of 
popular national themes, the appearance of ‘pure’ writing—texts that, freed 
from the obligation to help to develop a particular national identity, have no 
social or political ‘function” [...] The sleight of hand here is one that 
conflates politics with nationalism. Experimental or otherwise innovative 
literatures, by the same token, [are apolitical according to Casanova] 
because as redefinitions of what constitutes modernity they belong to the 
autonomous literary space.103 
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In this arrangement, the novels of a writer such as Dambudzo Marechera become 
imperceptible due to the combination of their peripheral status in respect to the 
European modernist centre, their highly experimental or anti-realist narrative form 
and their antagonism towards national allegory. Moreover, this becoming-
imperceptible is not metaphorical but literal. 
 Marechera’s sporadic publishing history is documented by his biographer, 
Flora Veit-Wild, who recounts that Heinemann’s reader in Nairobi found Black 
Sunlight “Too nihilistic, his avant-garde style of writing not ‘African’, and thus 
probably not suitable for [Heinemann’s African Writer’s Series].”104 Moreover, the 
version of The Black Insider eventually published in 1990 is reconstructed by 
Heinemann from Marechera’s posthumous manuscripts and incunabula, whilst 
eliminating the many instances of recurrence and duplication in these texts “in 
order to avoid repetition”.105 This is not to say that Marechera’s personality or ego 
were underserved by his various publishers, but to suggest that Marechera’s praxis 
is better understood as writing-machine in which the politics of (postcolonial) 
identity are simultaneously what Deleuze refers to as an “extra-textual effect” (i.e. 
a practical question of the novel and its readers) and a problem of textual 
pragmatics—of how the politics of language subsists beneath and between the 
subjects we “are”. 106 Seeing the texts as an assemblage in this way skewers the 
problematic emphasis on hermeneutics left behind by discourse analysists in 
postcolonial studies, where despite a Derridean attention to the impossibility of 
meaning and identity, the world is still positionally that of a discursive object 
awaiting recognition. As Benita Parry writes: 
Those who have been or are still engaged in colonial struggles against 
contemporary forms of neo-colonialism could well read the theorizing of 
discourse analysts with considerable disbelief [at their] incuriosity about the 
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enabling socio-economic and political institutions and other forms of social 
praxis.107 
Black Sunlight was at the same time caught within a state apparatus hostile to 
critiques of Zimbabwean nationalism and an institutional publishing machine 
aiming to promote “African literature” as a more or less homogenous antidote to 
the European canon. The idea that there might exist a greater degree of difference, 
for instance, between Marechera and Chinua Achebe than between Marerchera 
and Joyce was therefore uncomfortable to almost all concerned. Against the literary 
politics of narration or allegory, which always need a complimentary movement in 
society to “complete” them, Marechera’s writing-machine, whose stylistics and 
experimental prose form draws passages of escape out of the condition of 
postcolonial ressentiment, must fundamentally be understood as, in and of itself, a 
social praxis. 
 Where World-Systems theory has thus far only interpreted the extensive 
spatial properties of textual representation (with concurrent emphasis on the novel 
form and its historical relationship to the emergence of the legal subject), Deleuze’s 
non-dialectical philosophy opens up a textual pragmatics (latterly schizoanalysis) 
the aim of which is to map the intensive material ground of collective enunciation. 
The book-as-assemblage replaces the dialectical and phenomenological book-as-
image-of-the-world: 
There is no difference between what a book talks about and how it is made. 
Therefore a book also has no object. As an assemblage, a book has only 
itself, in connection with other assemblages and in relation to other bodies 
without organs. We will never ask what a book means, as a signified or 
signifier; we will not look for anything to understand it. We will ask what it 
functions with, in connection with what other things it does or does not 
transmit intensities, in what other multiplicities its own are inserted and 
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metamorphosed, and with what other bodies without organs it makes its 
own converge. A book exists only through the outside and on the outside.108 
The book-as-assemblage acts directly on semiotic flows as material flows without 
the need for a subject position which organises them into a totality. Black Sunlight 
is an imaging machine whose metaphors detach from their referent, such that a 
zone of indetermination passes between the object and the subject without falling 
back on a world or totality that would organise them into a binary opposition. The 
perceiving body or self in Marechera’s work is reduced to the trace or stain left by 
an encounter between affective forces: “the amount of blood that shrieked out left 
a large stain on the asphalt”; “A stain of horror inside me, an inky blackness, 
stretched tightly across the sky”; “as she sipped her tea I imagined for one ghastly 
moment that I could actually see (as she swallowed it) the tea going down into her 
like one ever-growing brown stain so pale and pink was her beaux-arts frock”.109 
The narrator-function as a recording surface or trace-effect allows Marechera to 
repeatedly transgress the representational boundaries of text/world, 
subject/object, inside/outside such that affectual connections between images 
precede the desiring subject, and perceptual phenomena are projected onto the 
external world—as percepts. This is evidenced in the way the photojournalist 
protagonist is gradually replaced by his camera, both metaphorically and 
syntactically: 
Everywhere, the battle for an instant paused. Then, rage, yells, a series of 
shots, unbelieving screams. Through the camera lens the whole thing 
writhed like a jackal biting through its own trapped leg. I had the camera on 
my right shoulder. I felt absolutely nothing. I had actually become the 
camera itself, shooting the human spectacle before me.110 
Whilst this becoming is superficially self-conscious (it is represented to us via the 
first person) by the end of the novel the disjunctive serialisation of images no 
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longer happens from the perspective of a subject who experiences them, nor from 
an objective whole able to totalise them into a world – the becoming is groundless: 
Utterly outside himself. The ice and the snow. The heat and the sands. 
Utterly outside. Himself. Shriekily held down by Susan. To remember. 
Perhaps snatch a victory. But the armed lorries of language. Their articulate 
cartridges. With axes to confirm them. Reason and knowledge the bodies in 
the mass graves. Meaning killed by utterance.111 
The values of the European Enlightenment are not to be mourned or recovered in 
some dialectical victory, but instead registered as at the same time the very 
condition of colonial violence—a subjective void which cannibalises its own 
frontiers. This puts Black Sunlight at odds with the prevailing tendency in African 
publishing at the time of Zimbabwe’s independence, aimed at establishing Africa as 
a valid representational space for the human sciences—shown in the primacy given 
to Achebe’s Things Fall Apart in Heinemann’s African Writers Series.112 James 
Currey, the series editor who brought The Black Insider manuscripts to 
Heinemann’s attention, comments that Achebe “seamlessly uses Igbo phrases in his 
apparently English English”.113 If this linguistic hybridity is seamless, it is because it 
narrates a previously peripheral culture from a perspective of centrality — it 
transforms the other into a subject capable of enunciation. Hybridity is tied to the 
encounters between cultures at the periphery, but what returns from that 
encounter is essentially the same discursive basis for culture itself. Bhabha refers to 
this kind of hybridity as “the process of the enunciation of culture as knowledgable, 
authoritative, adequate to the construction of systems of cultural identification” 
and contrasts it to “cultural diversity [as] an epistemological concept—culture as an 
object of empirical knowledge […and] the recognition of pre-given cultural contents 
and customs; held in the timeframe of relativism it gives rise to liberal notions of 
multiculturalism, cultural exchange of the exchange of humanity”. 114 Nevertheless, 
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Bhabha’s concept of hybridity—of the differential genesis of culture—still shares 
some characteristics with cultural diversity as an extensive multiplicity (as the 
difference “between” two things) in its thinking about space: 
The problem of cultural interaction emerges only at the significatory 
boundaries of cultures, where meanings and values are (mis)read or signs 
are misappropriated. Culture only emerges as a problem, or a problematic, 
at the point at which there is a loss of meaning in the contestation and 
articulation of everyday life, between classes, genders, races, nations.115 
The intensive redistribution of sense (or cultural regimes of signification) remains 
subject to the extensive and dialectical categories of centre and periphery. The 
revolutionary potential of postcolonial writing (of “limit-texts”) therefore exists for 
Bhabha in “the moment of enunciation” in which they operate and which is 
exemplified by Things Fall Apart.116 But Bhabha’s focus on discursive enunciation, 
on culture’s role in communicating something about the body which speaks, also 
has the effect of transforming an intensive mulitiplicity (which divides only by 
changing in kind) into a minority (in the sense Deleuze and Guattari distance 
themselves from) which exists as a special category of subjectivity. Once otherness 
is recognised qua the Other, it becomes something about which we can speak—as 
something which “is not”. The dialectic compels the other to speak, or at least 
demands that enunciation is the problem of periphery, whence all that the 
subaltern lacks is authentic communication. As discussed earlier in relation to the 
Hegelian legacy in postcolonial studies, the idealism inherent in this formulation 
needs to be contrasted with Deleuze’s materialist understanding of the pre-cultural 
and non-enunciate politics of assemblages: 
An assemblage, in its multiplicity, necessarily acts on semiotic flows, 
material flows, and social flows simultaneously […] There is no longer a 
tripartite division between a field of reality (the world) and a field of 
representation (the book) and a field of subjectivity (the author). Rather, an 
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assemblage establishes connections between certain multiplicities drawn 
from each of these orders, so that a book has no sequel nor the world as its 
object nor one or several authors as its subject. In short, we think that one 
cannot write sufficiently in the name of an outside. The outside has no 
image, no signification, no subjectivity. The book as assemblage with the 
outside, against the book as image of the world.117 
Deleuze borrows this concept of the outside from Blanchot, as the fundamentally 
non-discursive and non-human basis of language (“In the work man speaks, but the 
work gives voice in man to what does not speak: to the unnameable, the inhuman, 
to what is devoid of truth, bereft of justice, without rights”) but a parallel exists 
with the Bergsonian virtual as inorganic life.118 An assemblage is composed of both 
extensive and intensive forces, but creative potential is never drawn solely from the 
encounter between extensive peripheries. Spatial concepts of hybridity, periphery 
and extensity rely on a dogmatic image of the world or the subject which pre-exist 
them and in which they find their logical answer. Cultural difference for Bhabha 
always returns to the subject as the problem to be solved, just as Achebe’s hybrid 
signifiers always come to rest on the figure of the human or person who 
experiences the world as if it was made for them. Hence the book-as-assemblage is 
oriented against the concept of totality which theories of World Literature posit as 
their transcendent concept, and which consequently undermines the question of 
how to systematise the relation between specific and universal. In their refusal of 
the world (or the world made of subjects) Marecehera’s texts are composed of 
fragmented images and metaphors that detach from their referent, forming an 
assemblage that is not reducible to interpretation or enunciation. As gestured 
towards in my first chapter, perhaps the idea of the work-as-machinic assemblage 
continues to discomfort literary studies for the way in which it makes interpretation 
(but not reading) redundant as a critical exercise. 
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 What emerges from Black Sunlight and The Black Insider is in fact an entire 
logic of metaphor that is non-representational, fulfilling Deleuze and Guattari’s 
injunction against metaphor by taking metaphor itself to its limit. In the opening 
chapter of Black Sunlight, the narrator’s escape from a racist caricature of an 
African chief takes the form of a Conradian journey: 
I willed my heart of darkness to stop wheezing horror – horror […] the yell 
seemed to explode from all directions. I was the pieces of its shrapnel flying 
lethally everywhere at once. My head was one huge madness showering 
rubble in their faces shouting hoarsely, tigerishly: ‘we are all brothers! WE 
ARE ALL BROTHERS!119 
But the identification with the European subject (Conrad’s Marlow) is then 
displaced onto the shrapnel, as that force-from-outside which both lacerates the 
narrator’s body and somehow constitutes him. Christian is drawn to the outside, to 
the complicity of his own body in inorganic matter, as a mode of de-subjectification. 
By substituting the vehicle of the metaphor for its tenor, the text resists 
interpretation in favour of something closer to what Jean-Jacques Lecercle calls “a 
melting pot of unordered elements”.120 This indeterminate distribution of sense 
affects the novel at the level of style, where metaphor becomes a kind of 
difference-engine: 
One! Two! Three! Four! … Eleven! Twelve! Go back to your seat! I was hot 
with resentment and pain. So this was school. From all sides my head was 
being jammed with facts […] A truckload of soldiers roared past. All their 
intensions were left hanging in the air like dust long after they were gone. 
They were there in the classroom with us, marshalling facts, categorising, 
reciting, and absorbing the knowledge handed down through the ages. All 
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these meanings that had a hard and unyielding face! How did one 
escape?”121 
The passage resembles a dream not simply via vague expressionism, but in pairing 
together heterogeneous elements (numbers, schools, soldiers, intentions, faces) 
where each image has its own relationship to the others and is not subject to any 
pre-existing psychological reality. But this dream has nothing to do with Freudian 
psychology (which reduces the metaphor to symptom) but is instead pure surface. 
The text becomes depthless at the same time as the heterogenous series of images 
form their own internal logic in which the state becomes indistinguishable from the 
school, and meanings become indeterminable. Signifying slippage and 
representational decomposition are two of the primary ways in which both Black 
Sunlight and The Black Insider corrode the distinction between subject and world, 
inside and outside, replacing those binaries with a dream-logic of simulacra:  
Dreams belong to a region of pure similitude. Everything in a dream is an 
appearance, every element is another element, is similar to it, and to yet 
another […] you may look for the origin, for the model; you would like to be 
referred to a starting point, an initial revelation, but there is no such thing: 
dream is merely similitude that endlessly refers to similitude.122 
As Lecercle notes, the logic of dreams and nonsense shares an affinity with the 
concept of assemblage, as a groundless becoming that is non-representational and 
has no need for the totality of a world. Marechera’s image-machines are endlessly 
frustrating to the comparativist reader that seeks in them the symptoms of 
periphery and the discursive crises of colonisation. The guerrilla linguistics 
employed in Black Sunlight, via the tactics of nonsense such as paranomasia and 
portmanteau, destabilises the spatial categories of centre and periphery and 
collapses the gap between text and world: “The essence of radical nonsense lies 
there: in the destabilisation of our idealised represented reality by the shocking 
incoherence and brutal actuality of assemblages.”123 Marechera’s fictions are in this 
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sense anti-novels for the way in which they utilise dream-logic against the world-as-
representation and, being pure surface, have no need for interpretation to re-
introduce a totalising perspective outside of them. They are indifferent to 
interpretation, obscuring as much as they illuminate: a black sunlight. This dream-
work has no latent European subject or consciousness waiting in the wings to be 
ushered in (as in dialectics) but is instead a schizophrenic movement, signifying 
nothing but itself. As an assemblage it has no other, but instead shows the other to 
be an effect of the colonising gaze of the subject. From the point of view of the 
dialectical legacy in postcolonial studies, this indifference to otherness and the 
labour of the peripheral author to overcome that crisis was uncomfortable (as 
Marechera’s publishers both in Africa and Europe discovered). 
Here we can draw the parallel directly between Deleuze’s non-dialectical 
philosophy of difference and Marechera’s relationship to Chinua Achebe as the 
African novelist whose work is addressed to the dialectical problem of African 
modernity. Where Achebe’s realism is a negation of the being of European 
modernism opposed to the non-being of the colonised body, Marechera’s anti-
realism escapes interpretation as national allegory. An affinity with Fanon’s late 
work emerges here between Deleuze and Marechera, where all three are sceptical 
of the dialectical politics of national liberation. The difficulty Heinemann had in 
establishing Marechera as the voice of Zimbabwean independence (in the manner 
Achebe became for Nigeria) was, I would argue, a result of the stylistic politics of 
Black Sunlight as much as his reputation as an enfant terrible. The effects of the 
novel’s serial or machinic style on the reading body (to which Hienemann’s 
reviewers attested) were at the same time “plugged into” the bureaucratic and 
institutional machinery of Zimbabwe’s transition to post-colonisation.124 André 
Astow comments that: 
The leadership of the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe was never able to 
fight consistently against imperialism. The leadership always attempted to 
constrain the struggle of the African people. As the anti-imperialist 
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movement developed, the leadership understood that its interests could be 
defended only through compromise with imperialism. This was not merely 
the result of the narrow class interests of the petit-bourgeois leadership. 
The political program of the nationalist movement was a clear expression of 
the petit-bourgeous politics dominating the movement as a whole.125 
Marechera shares with Fanon an anxiety over the dispersive quality of this failure – 
the fact that compromise or integration with neo-colonial forms of geopolitical 
structures such as the World Bank immediately following or in some cases 
preceding Zimbabwe’s official independence, did not appear to come from 
hierarchical structures of power in the movement itself nor from “the people” as a 
mass political subject either. Thus the crisis in movements for national liberation 
required a radical rethinking of the manner in which difference was conceived as 
the groundwork for postcolonial negation. This was the philosophical and political 
problem which Fanon intuited in 1961 and which, four years later, Deleuze 
diagnosed as the minor line connecting Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson (but also 
Kafka, Melville and Carmelo Bene).126 
Against the emphasis placed on the problem of enunciation and the 
apparent impossibility of authentic subaltern speech by postcolonial thinkers such 
as Bhabha and Spivak, Black Sunlight’s imaging-machine works in series, 
establishing connections between heterogeneous assemblages of semiotic and 
material components:  
I closed my mouth tightly like a man who has much to say. The grape was 
bitter on the tongue. The whole nation was a desert parked solid in a ripe 
grape that was bursting with decadent but sweet liquid […] There was 
nothing left but the polished desert of the floor. On which I walked towards 
Devil’s End. The spots of blood were turning into poems that blinded anyone 
who looked at them without a smoked glass. […] A republic of deadly 
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bacillus was lurking at the cemetery gate. Synonyms came out of the barn 
with a mass of snakes at their heels. The world was like an invisible bandage 
around their language”.127 
These fragments establish a zone or relay between human and non-human 
signifiers that overwhelms consciosuness—the narration becomes an imaging-
machine. The images undergo an intensive reduction that collapses the 
representational gap between the text and the world. Instead, the text becomes its 
own space of potentiality. Deleuze and Guattari identify this compositional strategy 
as one of the markers of minor literature—an a-signifying rupture ignored by their 
readers in world literary theory: 
There is no longer a designation of something by means of a proper name, 
nor an assignation of metaphors by means of a figurative sense. But images, 
the thing no longer forms anything but a sequence of intensive states, a 
ladder or a circuit for intensities that one can make race around in one 
sense or another, from high to low, or from low to high. The image is this 
very race itself; it has become becoming.128 
In place of the cogito, the camera lens becomes a surrogate recording surface for 
the inscription and organisation of images according to intensive multiplicity. This is 
made explicit in the narrator’s encounter with his predecessor and doppelganger at 
Devil’s Peak: a photojournalist who, angering the group’s Colonel Kurtz or Andreas 
Baader-like leader, has his camera lenses welded onto his own eyes. A perverse 
literalisation of the character’s own machinic-becoming, the doppelganger is a 
malign deterritorialisation, which ends in the black hole of anti-production (he is 
fixed to the wall of the cave). This is the fascistic pole of absolute 
deterritorialisation Marechera sketches when the Black Sunlight Organisation turns 
to terrorism to achieve their ends, when those movements or struggles for 
decolonization turn to militarism after being betrayed by post-independence 
Zimbabwe’s secession to the colonial state-form. Already in 1964, Guattari warns 
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this is the inevitable result when a minoritarian or group-subject learns they are in 
fact not the revolutionary subject of history—presciently (yet unknowingly) 
describing the psychology of the Italian Red Brigades whose campaigns in the 1970s 
led to the wrongful arrest of his close friend, Antonio Negri.129  
 The imaging-machines at work in Black Sunlight and in The Black Insider 
construct an assemblage or bricolage of elements that must be seen as materials in 
themselves, and whose a-signifying movement rejects the category of otherness as 
their organising principle.130 Non-being is no longer a void as it was for Fanon, but 
instead a reservoir of fragments and partial images closer to the concept of the 
abstract machine and its predecessor in Artaud, the body without organs:  
Subtract a man from himself and all you’ve got is just a shadow’ he said 
looking pointedly at me. ‘Chip away at the marble, down to the substance 
that holds the core together. There, we are mere abstractions. Ephemeral 
Macbeth travelled in that region. Caligula too. […] In this room, each one has 
his own way of doing it. It’s not so much that every man is not an island as 
what intercourse can two heaps of putrid clay and crumbling bones hold 
together? The organs of sense are destroyed, the eyes eaten out, the heart 
black and without emotion, the intellect perished. It is in the corpse at our 
feet that we see the evidence of our destiny.131 
Black Sunlight and The Black Insider frequently draw upon images of decay, 
decomposition and the entanglement of the body in its own objectivity that were a 
source of anxiety for Fanon—a sign of colonial violence—but which are 
transformed in Marechera as affirmation of the complicity of bodies with the 
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outside, the non-human or matter-in-itself independently of the presence of the 
subject. Contrary to the “seamless” World-English of Achebe and others, 
Marechera’s texts are nothing but seems: intensive ruptures and differential series 
without centres. In linking together metaphors in series that lose sight of 
their referent, of the “world” or “truth”, resonances occur between them which 
cohere in that they produce sense, but only to themselves and of themselves. They 
become a world at the same time as they take flight from the actual world in a 
disjunctive synthesis; a line of flight. Referring to Walt Whitman, Deleuze likens the 
disjunctive synthesis to a dry-stone wall (“The world as a collection of heterogenous 
parts: an infinite patchwork, or a limitless wall of dried stones”) in which each 
fragment is irreducible to a totality that would exist outside of itself.132 Like 
Bergon's line that divides only by changing in kind, whose movements follow an 
aberrant logic, Marechera's novels destabilise not only the dialectic of centre and 
periphery, but the relations between multiple peripheries as well. Becoming instead 
an intensive cartography that carves a schizoid line across the Earth, cutting across 
territories in a way that has nothing to do with narrating “a people”, but draws lines 
of filiation between divergent postcolonial realities. Instead of “coming home” to 
the subject of enunciation, Black Sunlight and The Black Insider put the question of 
subjectivity into an endless variation, a line of flight, or traveling that is not a 
relation between geographic points or frontiers but always “in the middle”.133 In 
Black Sunlight, Christian glimpses this line of flight as a kind of running or 
movement without a geography, or as an indeterminate process that dissolves the 
geographies of colonial violence: 
The escapee. The scapegoat. The fiery bundle of fur streaking through ripe 
fields of wheat. There is always somebody on the run. From weird judges, 
fucking pigs, filthy neighbours, from the shit inland revenue, the brutal 
Special Branch, from the Man in the camouflage uniform, from the Man 
behind the riot shield, from the scandalised husband, the embittered 
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mistress, from the ugly face of tradition, the back of a bus face of slogans. It 
flashed right through me, the history of the Runner.134 
Instead of the movement from centre to periphery and back, Deleuze’s nomad or 
Marechera’s runner is precisely one who does not move, but by a ceaseless 
becoming-other empties geography of its content. “To flee” or take flight, argues 
Deleuze, is “not exactly to travel, or even to move, because flights can happen on 
the spot, in motionless travel”.135 Everywhere Black Sunlight encounters an 
architecture of totality or transcendence (such as the Cathedrals) it disseminates it 
into rubble; a collection of stones organised only by their differentiation and to 
which Devil’s End is the primary example—a rocky outcrop of stone portals, a 
system of caves which appears to grow in all directions. If there is in fact a 
relationship between Marechera and Kafka, it is the desire to create a burrow in the 
middle of the cathedral.  
Marechera’s texts open a passage or burrow out of the trap of subjectivity, a 
line of flight based on his anti-representational style and the non-discursivity of 
rubble, ranged against the politics of postcolonial world building and which Julia 
Kristeva has called “the power of horror” or abjection: 
The abject is not an ob-ject facing me, which I name or imagine. Nor is it an 
ob-jest, an otherness ceaselessly fleeing in a systematic quest of desire. 
What is abject is not my correlative, which, providing me with someone or 
someone else as support, would allow me to become more or less detached 
and autonomous. The abject has only one quality of the object – that of 
being opposed to ‘I’. If the object, however, through its opposition, settles 
me within the fragile texture of a desire for meaning […] what is abject, on 
the contrary, the jettisoned object, is radically excluded and draws me 
towards the place where meaning collapses.136 
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Kristeva’s critique is launched from within the standpoint of a postcolonial ethics, 
where the wound or abjection is a refusal of worldliness – the refusal of identity, of 
subjectivity, of enunciation and exchange. The images of abjection in Black Sunlight 
occupy a similar structural position to what Deleuze describes as “the diagram” in 
Francis Bacon’s paintings: “It is as if, in the midst of the figurative and probabilistic 
givens, a catastrophe overcame the canvas [like] the emergence of another 
world”.137 As a mode of composition, the diagram or abjection-image is an a-
signifying wound which collapses the extensive or representational capacity of the 
work into pure affect. In Marechera’s texts this occurs when the prose collapses the 
apparent gap between signifier and signified, becoming instead pure noise—an 
intensity. This has nothing to do with dialectical negation, but instead is a 
potentiality which subsists across the surface of the text or canvas—a 
deterritorialisation can happen at the centre as much as at the periphery. For this 
reason, what Kristeva calls the abjection-image, Deleuze the disjunctive synthesis, 
or Francis Bacon the “wound”—is extra-territorial in the same way that a wound is 
both “of” the surface of a body (it “holds” two surfaces or pieces of skin together) 
and an intensive rupture to that surface (it opens a gap to the corporeal depths 
below).  The wound is not a body or space so much as an intensive difference that 
makes the idea of a body possible—by holding the gap between bare flesh, meat 
and organs and the surface or skin we think of as a person together. In the same 
way the border, periphery or frontier is not simply the edge of a territory so much 
as an intensive line that makes the concept of a territory, state or nation possible. 
As Thomas Nail argues: 
The “in-betweenness” of the border is not a lack or absence. The border is 
an absolutely positive and continuous process of multiplication by division—
the more it divides social space the more it multiplies it. It is thus important 
to distinguish between two kinds of division: extensive and intensive. The 
first kind of division (extensive) introduces an absolute break—producing 
two quantitatively separate and discontinuous entities. The second kind of 
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division (intensive) adds a new path to the existing one like a fork or 
bifurcation producing a qualitative change in the whole continuous system 
[…] Although borders are typically understood according to the extensive 
definition, this is only a relative effect of the intensive kind of division.138 
When theories of World Literature remain tied to a Cartesian conception of spatial 
politics (where space is only a “container” of elements rather than an effect which 
has to be produced) this belies an extensive geometry which is the precisely the 
spatial logic of the state.  As in Casanova, the whole is posited before the particular 
to which it is only an after effect. In Marechera, writing intensively (a becoming) 
entails the destruction of the logic of centre and periphery at the same time as a 
new world is constructed from the fragments that is less the dialectical narration of 
a national consciousness than the expression of “a people yet to come”.139  
Where the discipline of World Literature in its increasingly liberal guise 
concerns itself with “our” world or “this” Earth, Marechera's writing-machine 
confronts us with differential worlds or assemblages beyond the human. If as 
Nirvana Tanouki argues the problem of the postcolonial novel is to locate being, 
subjectivity or enunciation at the frontier, Marechera’s fictions recompose the 
question as one that concerns the centre as much as the periphery: “how do we 
become postcolonial in a way which does not return us to the (white, European) 
subject of modernity?” The thought of abjection, of the non-human, is therefore 
not the same as the thought of the other at all, but an affect which empties our 
ideas of subjectivity, humanity, identity of their positive content. To (un)become 
postcolonial is at the same time then an un-worlding that makes Marechera a 
fellow conspirator with the Deleuze that once dared to suggest “a world without 
others”.140 Following Benitez Rojo’s concept of the colonising machine, it must be 
said that colonialism is less a historical structure that effects our experience of the 
world than a fully ontological structure or principle of organisation which creates 
qualitatively different worlds. For Marechera, the colonising machine is a fissure 
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rather than a quantitative shift: an atemporal wound which disperses the violence 
of colonisation across the globe as a transcendental principle of organisation. The 
colonising machine determines the entire spatial coordinates of worlds which are 
not merely experienced as different by human beings, but are materially different in 
their structures of visibility, their architectures of control, their institutional 
inequalities, and their economies of violence.  In what follows, I would like to 
position Marechera as a dark precursor to a post-planetary turn in contemporary 
world literature that aims to “become with the world” rather than represent it: a 
geoliterature that thinks through the politics of abjection and postcoloniality as a 
line of flight; escaping the desire for recognition and taking up Deleuze and 
Guattari’s call for “a new Earth and a people that do not yet exist”.141
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4. A Cut in the World 
 
4.1. “Pure life” and the time of the postcolonial 
 
In Charles Dickens’ Our Mutual Friend, Riderhood, a former waterman who 
makes his living by stealing from corpses floating in the Thames, almost drowns 
before he is revived by the onlookers who carry his limp body up to Miss Abbey’s 
pub. On the verge of death, something like an empathy of feeling emerges between 
Riderhood and the observers: 
See! A token of life! An indubitable token of life! The spark may smoulder 
and go out, or it may glow and expand, but see! The four rough fellows 
seeing, shed tears. Neither Riderhood in this world, nor Riderhood in the 
other, could draw tears from them; but a striking human soul between the 
two can do it easily. He is struggling to come back. Now he is almost here, 
now he is far away again. Now he is struggling harder to get back. And yet — 
like us all, when we swoon — like us all, every day of our life, when we wake 
- he is instinctively unwilling to be restored to the consciousness of this 
existence, and would be left dormant, if he could.1 
Their sympathy is not for Riderhood's own life—his personality and relationships 
and actions—but rather for life itself. Between death and life, an impersonal, pre-
subjective life emerges if only for a second. Deleuze returns to this passage in his 
final published work, writing just before his own death, as the literary expression of 
the life of immanence. A vital materiality which Dickens' characters can sense or 
apprehend before Riderhood returns to his own, individuated being, it is this 
impersonal and a-subjective life which literature captures or subtracts from the 
habits of our everyday perception: 
                                                          




Between [Riderhood’s] life and his death, there is a moment that is only that 
of a life playing with death. The life of the individual gives way to an 
impersonal and yet singular life that releases a pure event freed from the 
accidents of internal and external life, that is, from the subjectivity and 
objectivity of what happens: a ‘Homo tantum’ with whom everyone 
empathises and who attains a sort of beatitude. It is […] a life of pure 
immanence, neutral, beyond good and evil, for it was only the subject that 
incarnated it in the midsts of things that made it good or bad. The life of 
such individuality fades away in favour of the singular life immanent to a 
man who no longer has a name, though he can be mistaken for no other.2 
Subsisting between the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens, between the 
perspectival fixity of the human eye and the brute facticity of things, a life of pure 
immanence emerges. This life is not immanent “to” anything, but is in fact 
immanence itself—unfolding and refolding as a univocal plane or becoming. 
What would an ethics of pure life consist of? It would not consist in a 
recognition of an other-which-stands-before-me, and it would not consist in a 
representation of the world according to the perceptions of a pre-existing subject 
who acts according to moral predicates. The life which emerges between 
Riderhood’s body dissolved of its subjectivity and the affections of the bodies of the 
observers is beyond good and evil; a becoming whose movement is essentially 
transgressive, always overspilling and disrupting those forms which try to contain it. 
This emphasis on the ethical in-humanity of becoming, which Deleuze elsewhere 
calls “a world without others”, has lead some to conclude that Deleuze’s philosophy 
is blind to the ethics which a properly postcolonial politics needs—reconciliation, 
historicism, recognition.3 In short, all those ideas which speak to relations between 
actual humans living in particular historical situations. Julie Wuthnow has 
summarised this blindness by contrasting the nomadic or rhizomatic ethics of 
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Deleuze’s vitalism with the politics of location and historicism with which 
indigenous and postcolonial thinkers have sought to resist the spatial and temporal 
effects of colonisation: 
By failing to historicise the concept of mobility and its links to concrete 
practices of colonization, models of subjectivity that embrace nomad 
thought as a defining feature necessarily bring very problematic political 
baggage along for the ride. As mobile and disembodied, the nomadic subject 
is not locatable; as unlocatable, the nomadic subject cannot be held 
accountable for its social location, whether it be one of privilege or 
marginalization.4 
Yet we might go further still: by being strictly non-linear and a-historical, does the 
vitalist time of becoming or “Aion” not instruct the colonised to embrace those 
forms of fragmented experience, temporal disruption, and rootless relations to land 
which colonial violence forced upon them?5 
 In the previous chapter, I argued that the concept of intensive multiplicity 
Deleuze finds in Bergson (where something can only be divided by changing in kind) 
forms the basis of the spatial politics one finds in Deleuze’s work with Guattari—
where the minor is that which cannot be subordinated to a standard or norm. This 
in turn leads to a way of thinking the politics of world literature against the 
dialectical current of its inception, in favour of a process of continual differentiation 
or the aberrant movements one finds in the work of Dambudzo Marechera.6 
Marechera’s work seeks to escape from the spatial politics of both national and 
world literatures. For the Hegelian dialectic at work in Kojève, Hyppolite and the 
postcolonial theorists they influenced it was the role of the peripheral author to 
represent their peripheral situation back to the centre, thus overcoming the 
dialectic of otherness in which they are trapped. This results, however, not in a 
more ethical relation to the other, but a concept of difference in which what 
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returns from the encounter with the other can only be a new kind of subject. 
Dialectical philosophies of difference only reveal or disclose that which was in fact 
there all along, waiting to be uncovered. In contrast, Marechera’s fictions engage in 
practices of experimentation with the real I have named geoliterature and which 
break down the system of core and peripheral literatures towards the radical 
unknown or a people yet to come. This is a better way of understanding Deleuze’s 
call for “a world without others” he diagnoses in Michel Tournier’s repetition of the 
Crusoe-myth; as a world without standards.7 For the same reason, the logic of 
racism appears in A Thousand Plateaus as, counter-intuitively, a logic of inclusion 
rather than exclusion: 
Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to 
the White-Man face, which endeavours to integrate nonconforming traits 
into increasingly eccentric and backward waves, sometimes tolerating them 
at given places under given conditions, in a given ghetto, sometimes erasing 
them from the wall, which never abides alterity (it's a Jew, it's an Arab, it's a 
Negro, it's a lunatic . . .). From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, 
there are no people on the outside. There are only people who should be 
like us and whose crime it is not to be. The dividing line is not between 
inside and outside but rather is internal to simultaneous signifying chains 
and successive subjective choices. Racism never detects the particles of the 
other; it propagates waves of sameness until those who resist identification 
have been wiped out (or those who only allow themselves to be identified 
at a given degree of divergence).8 
The cartography of literary forms I have called geoliterature, which proceeds via 
experimentation and speculation with the real (rather than representation or 
recognition) forces a path to the outside—to that which escapes the logic of 
identity. Following the logic of the line of flight (the aberrant movements which 
conjoin and redistribute signifying chains in Marechera, or which produce the 
irrational geography of Kafka’s The Trial), geoliterature displaces the world so as an 
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Earth can emerge. An Earth is what emerges once the habits of perception which 
organise experience into a world have been deterritorialised. The politics of the 
Earth are not just a question of how to occupy a territory, but how to compose with 
the real so as a reterritorialisation can happen: new relations to land, to animals, to 
the molecular and the non-human. The people to come are not subjects, they are 
perhaps not even human. 
 The question then becomes, how does newness enter the world? If not 
through dialectical mediation, how does literature compose or cut out a people to 
come from the present world? The logic of the line of flight therefore needs a 
temporal or historical dimension as well as a spatial one. If the politics of otherness 
works, according to Deleuze and Guattari, via progressive inclusion to a standard or 
molar identity, the same can be said of time itself. Colonisation imposed on non-
Western societies not only a standard form of territory (the state-form) but also a 
standard form of time. As Pheng Cheah has argued: 
The subordination of all regions of the globe to Greenwich Mean Time as 
the point zero for the synchronization of clocks is a synecdoche for 
European colonial domination of the rest of the world because it enables a 
mapping that places Europe at the world’s centre. This tethering to the 
uniform march of European standard time is a form of imprisonment that 
smothers lived local temporalities.9 
The speculative cartography which emerges when one reads world-literary texts as 
a series of lines of flight, fractures the image of the world-as-globe. Colonisation 
was the end of a world, at least for the victims, and paying attention to the lived 
reality of this fact belies the need to think history not as a progressive line of time 
but according to the multiple durations which global or state-time of capitalism 
smooths over. This is not to make a political goal of hybridity or cultural difference 
in itself, as has sometimes been the case with discourse analysis of the kind we find 
in, for example, the work of Homi K. Bhabha.10 On the contrary, Capitalism has no 
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problem with hybridity or diversity. For that reason, “World Literature” as 
discipline, if it is truly to go beyond the commitment to diversity and recognition of 
the other in comparative analysis, must draw upon the speculative resources of 
philosophy if it is to really think the spatial and temporal reality of the other Earths 
that global capital subordinates to state-time. This is not an idealist position, as 
lines of flight can occur in the most everyday utterances. For example, when Toni 
Morrison argues that “modern life begins with slavery” this is not (or not only) an 
argument about history. 11 It is to assert the existence of a lived duration and reality 
that takes flight from universal history. What happens to modernism (in its 
historical existence as an archive or texts, as well as its repetition as a living 
tradition by authors today) if we say, following Morrison: 
From a woman's point of view, in terms of confronting the problems of 
where the world is now, black women had to deal with "post-modern" 
problems in the nineteenth century and earlier. These things had to be 
addressed by black people a long time ago. Certain kinds of dissolution, the 
loss of and the need to reconstruct certain kinds of stability. Certain kinds of 
madness, deliberately going mad in order, as one of the characters says in 
the book, "in order not to lose your mind". These strategies for survival 
made the truly modern person.12 
By being a truly modernist theory of time and history in which the subject is 
dissolved or fragmented, Deleuze’s philosophy is already postcolonial—it already 
thinks with those colonised and enslaved persons that were the first moderns. This 
is the sense in which Deleuze speaks of his work as “science fiction” and 
“apocalyptic” and its intervention in thought as “untimely”: “that is to say, acting 
counter to our time and therefore on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a 
time to come”. 13 In the same paragraph, Deleuze cites Samuel Butler’s Erewhon 
(1872) as instructive for the same reason: 
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signifying at once the originary ‘nowhere’ and the displaced, modified and 
always recreated ‘here-and-now’. Neither empirical particularities nor 
abstract universals: a Cogito for a dissolved self. […] What this book should 
have therefore made apparent is the advent of a coherence that is no more 
our own, that of mankind, than that of God or the world.14 
Thinking both the nowhere and the here and now of literature’s aberrant 
movements and untimely interventions in history, I wish to read works of world 
literature against the category of world. That is to say, as a line of flight which 
always escapes or evades the particularities of time and space, without substituting 
a totality or universal time of “man” or “language” or “capitalism” or “culture” that 
would striate and constrain their way of resisting the present and opening up 
radically discontinuous futures.15 
In the following chapter, I will argue that Deleuze’s philosophy of time, 
detailed in the three passive syntheses of chapter two of Difference and Repetition, 
builds upon a Bergsonian understanding of duration which enables us to think a 
non-standard politics of time, in the same manner that the concept of intensive 
multiplicity discloses the spatial politics of minor literature in the study of Kafka. By 
rewriting the discussion of time in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Deleuze abandons 
Kant’s insistence on a universal subject for whom time is given as linear and 
historical, in favour of a “dissolved” or “larval subject” for whom the future is not a 
series of given possibilities, but a cut or caesura in time itself.16 Reading three 
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contemporary works of world literature, J.M. Coetzee’s Age of Iron (1990), Amitav 
Ghosh’s The Calcutta Chromosome (1995) and Alexis Wright’s The Swan Book 
(2015), I will argue that Deleuze’s philosophy, precisely by thinking those lived 
tempoaralities and durations outside of standard European time, not only 
anticipates those temporal critiques of colonisation by non-Western literatures, but 
in fact makes them both necessary and inevitable. In doing so, the geoliterature 
which emerged in chapter two now reaches its full potential as a textual and 
temporal politics of “a new Earth”—a speculative cartography through which we 
might compose with a people yet to come.17 
 
4.2. First synthesis of time: J.M Coetzee’s Age of Iron 
 
In Caribbean Discourse, Edouard Glissant distinguishes between two ways of 
measuring time. On the one hand, he argues, there is the time of filiation by which 
European thought has traditionally tended to think the history of the world: 
For the Western mind, it is a matter of learning the natural Genesis, the 
primordial slime, the Eternal Garden, and embarking […] on a journey to an 
ordering-knowledge. History and Literature agree (With the rare episodes of a 
blending of the two that quickly came to an end, as with the pre-Socratic 
philosophers) to separate man from the world, to subject nature to culture. The 
linear nature of narrative and the linear form of chronology take shape in this 
context. Man, the chosen one, knows himself and knows the world, not because 
he is part of it, but because he establishes a sequence and measures it 
according to his own time scale, which is determined by his affiliation.18 
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Glissant observes that Western or European mythologies and narratives often tend 
towards a search for origins, for unity of the self with some external nature. But in 
so doing, Western thought at least since Aristotle has subjected nature to a way of 
measuring time that takes “man” as its starting point, and subordinates the time of 
nature or the world to this sequence: “History is written with a capital H. It is a 
totality that excludes other histories that do not fit into that of the West”.19 
Different histories, times, and places are only different in so far as they are different 
from some transcendental perspective (whether that be “man”, “the subject”, 
“universal spirit”, “nation”, or “capitalism”) which supersedes their differences and 
orders them according to degrees of distance from the standard. This is the 
majoritarian image of thought which runs throughout Deleuze’s philosophy as a 
critical counterpoint to the affirmative philosophy of difference articulated firstly in 
Bergsonism and then fully formed in Difference and Repetition. In the previous 
chapter we restated the problem of postcolonial difference not as one of hybridity 
(the being-in-between two identities that characterises the novel of national 
allegory) but of an intensive process of self-differentiation that Dambudzo 
Marechera’s fictions carry out in a minor mode. The question then is, if it’s possible 
to conceive of minoritarian spaces via the Bergsonian concept of intensive 
multiplicity, is it also possible to conceive of minoritarian times particular to the 
postcolonial as a worldly literature; that is, a literature that responds to the ethical 
imperative to fashion new worlds from the existing one? 
Just as intensive space becomes subject to extensive space in the 
majoritarian image of thought (where multiplicity is measured by an external 
standard or rule), in such a way does time come to be spatialised in the same 
manner that philosophies of identity come to spatialise difference as difference 
“between” thing-a and thing-b.20 Against this linear and segmentary History is 
ranged the time of creolisation, which Glissant conceives as a ceaseless process of 
differentiation without ground and which has both a spatial and temporal 
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dimension: “History is fissured by histories; they relentlessly toss aside those who 
have not had the time to see themselves through a tangle of lianas”.21 In the same 
manner that the vines of the liana find a path, a line of flight, through and between 
the branches of the trees whose arborescence it both subverts and sporadically 
incorporates, so does creolisation place History into variation; scanning the past for 
new combinations and new lines of alliance which cut through the narrative time of 
linear determination and chronological sequence. 
 If in the previous chapter I thought the space of world literature not via 
those arborescent and evolutionary models which subordinate difference to 
identity, and found in Marechera a rhizomatic movement, a writing machine, that 
makes the system of core and periphery take off on a line of flight, I now aim to add 
to this thought a temporal and historical dimension. What if the time of world 
literature were thought not only as a line of time, branching off here and there, but 
also and at the same time a rhizome making irrational cuts and forced movements 
between local historical and temporal circumstances? Such a time would not point 
towards a future which is merely the continuation of the present (a universal time 
of development towards which those on the outside of globalisation must restlessly 
yearn) but a futurity which is aberrant, unknown, and which makes a cut in history 
itself—setting off on an entirely different line of time. This is why Deleuze’s 
philosophy of time is inherently revolutionary, and speaks to postcolonial writing 
immediately and complicitly, not as part of a division of labour or dialectical play 
between European philosophy and its others. As Deleuze argues, following 
Rimbaud, “I is an other”.22 The first movement in this complicity between Deleuze’s 
philosophy of time in Difference and Repetition and postcolonial critiques of the 
“time of man” concerns the first synthesis of time—the living present.23 The way 
Deleuze revolutionises Kant’s formula of the passive synthesis of the present has 
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immediate ramifications when placed alongside a novel such as J.M. Coetzee’s Age 
of Iron. Here the notion of the “dissolved” or “larval” subject speaks to an ethical 
commitment that isn’t grounded in a universal “time of man” nor its dialectical 
opposite in a unifying otherness. The lived experience of colonialism (in which I 
include the neo-colonial period in South Africa post-independence) is not an appeal 
to some fixed identity or subject position, but speaks instead to the way in which 
colonisation engages processes of subjectification and desubjectification as a 
combined and uneven temporality. Apartheid law works combined and unevenly in 
Coetzee’s fictions by requiring the subaltern be subject at certain points and in 
certain institutional times and spaces, and at other times reduced to an inhuman 
other. These dissolved and fragmentary processes of (de-)subjectification, as the 
only way to describe postcolonial experience, are my primary justification for 
reading Deleuze’s philosophy of time as, in retrospect, already a postcolonial one. 
 Reading Coetzee’s work in terms of a postcolonial ethic, however, one is 
immediately confronted with Coetzee’s own status as settler, and this problem is 
doubled when one considers Coetzee’s postcolonial ethics through the philosophy 
of Deleuze which has its own accusations of Eurocentrism. On the one hand, as 
David Atwell has registered, one cannot escape the fact that in Coetzee’s work “the 
African subject or African humanity is under-represented and under-valued, and to 
this extent Coetzee’s work exhibits the mentalité of the settler colonial” and, on the 
other, that “Coetzee deconstructs the discourses of power from within”.24 These 
discourses of power manifest themselves in Coetzee’s work via the question of 
representation and its ethical pitfalls, which makes a comparative reading alongside 
Deleuze’s philosophical critique of representation all the more pertinent, at the 
same time as it opens itself up to ridicule on the grounds that one cannot reject 
representation on behalf of those who themselves are unrepresented. Yet the 
tension between these two positions, their unresolved dialectic, precisely ensures 
its timeliness; whenever one appears to have solved the question of representation, 
to have answered the ethical call of the other, this can only be a failure to think the 
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other as other, absolutely, as that which cannot by definition be represented. 
Atwell understands this tension in Coetzee’s work as a will to represent the South 
African situation in narrative, but in such a way that the singular perspective of the 
narrator, being partial, must always be disavowed: “In this view Coetzee is also said 
to acknowledge the African presence, but he withdraws from directly representing 
it for what is an ethically defensible reason, which is that he avoids the 
epistemological capture that would only confirm the position of privilege”.25 The 
question which drives Deleuze’s and Coetzee’s ethical visions, then, is how to think 
and write in such a way that the other can be thought independently of an ethical 
subject to whom difference and alterity must be represented, captured, 
sublimated. This is the basis of Grant Hamilton’s recent study of Deleuze and 
Coetzee (though only the novels Dusklands, Waiting for the Barbarians and Foe): 
Thus, possession determines the final act of representation as one of 
internalization—to bring the exterior into the interior. However, it is clear 
that such a movement can only occur by means of a certain relativity that 
ensures that the self-same is maintained as the subject of all investigation.26 
 
Likewise, Samantha Vice links this desire for an impersonal or impartial ethics that 
would not attempt to capture difference and subject it to identity, to the politics of 
style in Age of Iron: “It is plausible to think that the spare style and distinctive form 
of J.M. Coetzee’s writing has some close connection to the content and quality of 
his moral vision”.27 However, I would argue that Coetzee’s austere style (at least in 
Age of Iron) is better linked to a politics of time which is at the same time a critique 
of the ontological foundations by which a Western, European conception of ethics 
begins.28 
                                                          
25 Ibid. 
26 Grant Hamilton, On Representation: Deleuze and Coetzee on the Colonised Subject, (Amsetrdam: 
Rodopi 2011), p.152. 
27 Samantha Vice, “Truth and Love Together at Last: Style, Form, and Moral Vision in Age of Iron”, in 
Coetzee and Ethics: Philosophical Perspectives on Literature, ed. Anton Leist and Peter Singer, (New 
York: Columbia University Press 2010), p.293. 
28 In this way I would want to understand Coetzee’s own stated allegiance to the European tradition 
in the manner in which Adorno speaks of having “tradition in oneself, to hate it properly”, See 
Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections From Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott, 
(London: Verso 2005 [Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag 1951]), p.52.  
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The phenomenological tradition in Western philosophy has tended to follow 
Kantian thinking in presupposing a subject of experience that must organise the 
sensual data we receive into meaningful units or components of self. In the Critique 
of Pure Reason this takes the form of a passive synthesis which, argues Deleuze, “is 
not carried out by the mind but occurs in the mind”.29 Passive synthesis might also 
be called a sensory-motor schema for the way it organises perception without us 
having to consciously, that is, actively, do so.30 Everyday habits such as walking or 
eating are (at least for most people) passive syntheses in that they are contractions 
of biological processes into repetitive movements or actions, without us having to 
consciously think about them. “I” is a habit, as well as an other. 
Significantly, when Kant came to rewrite the critique, the passive syntheses 
of “sense, imagination and apperception” were refolded under the faculty of 
understanding and were no longer passive or pre-subjective in the specific way 
Deleuze needs them to be.31 Deleuze follows Husserl in recovering from Kant’s A 
Critique the concept of passive synthesis, and thus an account of selfhood which is 
both empirical and transcendental (i.e. concerned with lived experience but 
without installing a ready-made subject of that experience). For Deleuze, the 
subject does not emerge fully formed, as present in time, but rather the present 
consists in a contraction by way of passive synthesis of a dissolved, latent, or larval 
subject. Sensibility (which will later become the body-without-organs) here is a 
plane of matter-energy, or immanence. But before that plane of discontinuous 
matter, sensibility or immanence can be represented as a subject-object relation, 
“contemplative souls must be installed here and there; passive selves, sub-
representative syntheses and habituses capable of contracting the cases or the 
elements into one another […]”.32 Contraction describes a physio-biological process 
which selects from the flux of experience elements of synthesis. The present is no 
longer a point on a line which stretches backwards and forwards in time, but a 
                                                          
29 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p.91. 
30 For example, when we have a sensation of taste this is not a conscious activity carried out by the 
mind, but is nonetheless a sensory response which occurs in the mind. 
31 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason trans. Norman Kemp Smith, (London: Palgrave Macmillan 
2007 [1781]), p.127 (A.94/B.127). 
32 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p.357. 
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multiplicity of durations both human and non-human: a plant is a contraction of 
light, minerals, carbon-dioxide and other elements with their own durations. 
Durations, to use Bergson’s term, are non-compossible differences or intensities 
Deleuze here refers to as a “a living present”.33 
Deleuze’s desire to avoid the ego-centrism and anthropocentrism of much 
post-Kantian philosophy echoes Glissant’s call for an alternative to totalising 
theories of history which posit a universal time of man. It is this alternative time of 
the postcolonial in which durations outside the history of the Kantian subject take 
precedence, which emerges when reading Deleuze’s first passive synthesis (the 
synthesis of the living present) through J.M. Coetzee’s Age of Iron, and which 
informs my theorisation of world literature according to aberrant movements and 
lines of flight rather than totalising systems and structures. The novel is a first-
person account of the final days of Mrs Curren following her diagnosis of bone 
cancer, taking the form of a letter to her emigrant daughter. On the day she is 
diagnosed, she takes in a homeless drifter and alcoholic named Vercueil, whom she 
tasks with posting the letter after her death. Mrs Curren’s imminent death, as well 
as those of her maid Florence’s son Bheki and his friend at the hands of the police, 
are the trigger for something of an (albeit qualified) ethical awakening on the part 
of Mrs Curren. But this ethical awakening or conversion does not take clearly or 
easily the form of a national allegory in which the white Mrs Curren recognises and 
acknowledges the shared humanity of the black persons who constitute the 
background to her everyday lifeworld. In fact, in response to the politically engaged 
and militant sensibility of Bheki’s friend, she feels only unrecognition or disjunction:   
I did not like him. I do not like him. I look into my heart and nowhere do I 
find a trace of feeling for him. As there are people to whom one 
spontaneously warms, so there are people to whom, from the first, we are 
cold. That is all. He is not like Bheki. He has no charm. There is something 
stupid about him, something deliberately stupid, obstructive, intractable.34 
                                                          
33 Ibid. p.99 
34 J.M. Coetzee, Age of Iron, (London: Seeker and Warburg 1990; repr. London: Penguin 2010), p.78. 
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This is one of numerous occasions where the novel foregrounds the irreconcilable 
differences between Mrs Curren and the black characters in her vicinity, as well as 
between Florence, her son and his friend, and the vagabond Vercueil. Both Mrs 
Curren and Florence associate him or directly refer to him as waste, emptiness or 
rubbish: “I heard him at the far end of the landing, trying the two locked doors. 
Only rubbish, I wanted to whisper to him – rubbish and dead memories; but the fog 
in my head closed in again”; “He lives here,' said Florence, 'but he is rubbish. He is 
good for nothing”; “Florence gave me a malicious look. 'Rubbish person,' she said, 
and stamped off”.35 Subjectivity or selfhood exists on a spectrum or continuum in 
the novel, between the white, bourgeois Mrs Curren and the black characters who 
enter in and out of her house, with Vercueil a fleeting sometimes imperceptible 
figure who exists at the boundary between the house and the outside world. It is 
Mrs Curren’s journey towards death, the evacuation of her subjectivity as a 
dissolving away of the self that triggers her ethical becoming and enables the 
perception of durations other than her own, but this is not the ethical perception of 
an Other by a subject one finds in, for example, Levinas.36 In the complex interplay 
of repetition and difference which underplays the novel’s first-person narration, it 
is possible to detect the obsolescence of the Kantian subject rather than its 
representation. This obsolescence does not take the form of allegory, but a 
linguistic variation which opens up the possibility of a becoming without identity, 
that is to say, a dissolved subjectivity that might form the basis of an alternative 
ethics. 
Mrs Curren’s daily life, her continuing existence in time, is made up of 
repetition. In this sense the novel’s prose style is presented as a matter of habit as 
much as Mrs Curren’s own habits. Her repetitive actions and passions, make up the 
linguistic matter of Coetzee’s style rather than simply a thematic or allegorical 
content. Habitual description makes up a large part of the novel: 
                                                          
35 Ibid. p.14, p.47, p.59.  
36 See Immanuel Levinas, Humanism of the Other, trans. Nidra Poller, (Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press 2005; Montpellier: Éditions Fata Morgana 1972). 
179 
 
I dozed (it is still yesterday I am writing about), read, dozed again. I made 
tea, put on a record. Bar by bar the Goldberg Variations erected themselves 
in the air. I crossed to the window. It was nearly dark. Against the garage 
wall the man was squatting, smoking, the point of his cigarette glowing. 
Perhaps he saw me, perhaps not. Together we listened.37 
It is in these moments of everyday or pedestrian description that form and content 
become almost indistinguishable, the words presented as flatly as possible the 
character’s own as if the novel were only written passively or unconsciously. 
Subjectivity here is nothing more than the contractions of a passive synthesis: “our 
rhythms, our reserves, our reaction times, the thousand intertwinnings, the 
presents and fatigues of which we are composed, are defined on the basis of our 
contemplations”.38 The steady and metered phrasing of the sentences recalls the 
bar by bar rhythm of the Goldberg Variations, such that the everyday habits of Mrs 
Curren’s life erect themselves in our mind as a kind of verbal architecture. Habits 
are the building blocks of consciousness in that they are the contractions of the 
mechanical and biological perceptions the body undergoes in passivity. As 
narrative, habitual representation in grammatically uniform sentences passively 
synthesises for the reader the sense of the novel’s space-time as extensity. The 
present of the novel is what passes in prosaic contemplation as “the foundation 
from which all other psychic phenomena derive”.39 
Yet this is where Deleuze’s first synthesis of time, the contraction of 
durations which allows the imagination to “hold” passing instants in contemplation 
constituting a line of time, allows us to think subjectivity from the point of view of a 
transcendental empiricism (that is, from the perspective of pre-personal and pre-
subjective experience) rather than idealism. The unravelling of Mrs Curren’s 
subjectivity, the culmination of her duration (but not the durations of the physical 
and biological matter she consists of) opens the possibility for her of other 
durations both human and animal: 
                                                          
37 Ibid. p.30. 
38 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p.98. 
39 Ibid. p.99. 
180 
 
I try to sleep. I empty my mind; calm, begins to steal over me. I am falling, I 
think, I am falling: welcome, sweet sleep. Then at the very edge of oblivion 
something looms up and pulls me back, something whose name can only be 
dread.  I shake myself free. I am awake in my room in my bed, all is well. A 
fly settles on my cheek. It cleans itself. It begins to explore. It walks across 
my eye, my open eye. I want to blink, I want to wave it away, but I cannot. 
Through an eye that is and is not mine I stare at it. It licks itself, if that is the 
word. There is nothing in those bulging organs that I can recognise as a face. 
But it is upon me, it is here: it struts across me, a creature from another 
world.40 
The grounding of her present in a passive synthesis, “the foundation of time”, is 
subject to a radical ungrounding, as the unity of the ego is opened up to the 
possibility of multiple durations—including the duration of the cancerous cells 
which mean oblivion.41 The living present is therefore “one” and “many”, where 
contraction implies “a present which may be exhausted and which passes, a 
present of a certain duration which varies according to the species, the individuals, 
the organisms and the parts of organisms under consideration”.42 Beyond the 
emotional fatigue of her illness, there is the visceral fatigue of a body which can no 
longer bear what it contemplates:  
The duration of an organism’s present, or its various presents, will vary 
according to the natural contractile range of its contemplative souls. In 
other words, fatigue is a real component of contemplation […] Fatigue 
marks the point at which the soul can no longer contract what it 
contemplates, the moment at which contraction and contemplation come 
apart.43 
The novel’s first-person narration which contracts the repetitive habits of Mrs 
Curren’s present(s) enters into fatigue when it contemplates that which it cannot 
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hope to contract: the obsolescence of the bourgeois colonial lifeworld which 
underpins her subjectivity. The deaths of Bheki and his friend are less events which 
occur in the novel’s present, than as temporal wounds which press in upon Mrs 
Curren’s “presentness” from all sides: 
But the respite is never long. Clouds come over, thoughts begin to bunch, to 
take on the dense, angry life of a swarm of flies. I shake my head, trying; to 
clear them away. This is my hand, I say, opening my eyes wide, staring at the 
veins on the back of my hand; this is the bedspread. Then as quick as 
lightning something strikes. In an instant I am gone and in another instant I 
am back, still staring at my hand. Between these instants an hour may have 
passed or the blink of an eye, during which I have been absent, gone, 
struggling with something thick and rubbery that invades the mouth and 
grips the tongue at its root, something that comes from the depths of the 
sea. I surface, shaking my head like a swimmer. In my throat is a taste of 
bile, of sulphur. Madness! I say to myself: this is what it tastes like to be 
mad!44 
Here again the unity of the ego is confronted with the multiplicity of other 
durations; of flies and other animals which metabolise organic waste. The deaths of 
Bheki and his friend at the hands of the police are scars which disrupt and 
undermine Mrs Curren’s attempts at reconciliation or recognition of the duration of 
the other. Her death is implied in theirs, as the end of a duration which can no 
longer contract that which it contemplates into a meaningful line of time based on 
the succession of instants. The wound or scar is, for Deleuze, not in this sense the 
sign of a past injury, but “the present fact of having been wounded”.45 The present 
fact of having been wounded is what describes the temporal asymmetry between 
the durations of the (post-)colonised and the presentness of the Kantian subject of 
modernity as described by Glissant. 
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But in its multiplicity, its ungrounding of time on the identity of a subject, 
Deleuze’s “phenomenology […] of the present” avoids the ego- and anthropo-
centrism of phenomenology itself.46 Here a second elaboration of Deleuze’s claim 
“we are all made of lines” with which I began my introduction becomes apparent: 
we are all made of time-lines.47 Thinking about the present via the concept of 
multiplicity avoids the two paradoxes of common sense notions of presentness. 
Firstly, that if there is such a thing as the present, it must pass and therefore cease 
to be present or, on the hand, if it doesn’t pass, there is only one eternal present 
and no such thing as time at all. Deleuze responds to these paradoxes by insisting 
on the multiplicity of durations in the present, and the transcendental or pure past 
as that into which the present passes as a virtual whole or structure of possibility 
for our experience of presentness. It is to the concept of the pure past as a way of 
thinking an “other time” of world literature I shall now turn.48 If an ethics suitable 
to a world literature is not to be founded on the recognition or representation of a 
single duration, but on a multiplicity of durations which open up the possibility of 
other worlds, Deleuze’s philosophy of time is already “post” colonial in its 
commitment to removing the ground from under the feet of the Kantian subject. 
Coetzee’s novel perhaps gives us no answers as to how one should respond to the 
wounds which apartheid continues to unfold in the present, but in what follows I 
shall attempt to think through the consequences of this dilemma when it comes to 
reading Deleuze’s second synthesis of time (that of the pure past) through Amitav 
Ghosh’s The Calcutta Chromosome. 
 
4.3. Second synthesis of time: Amitav Ghosh’s The Calcutta Chromosome 
 
                                                          
46 Jay Lampert, Deleuze and Guattari’s Philosophy of History, (London: Continuum 2006), p.51. 
47 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, “Politics” in On the Line, (California: Semiotext(e) 1983). 
48 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p.103. 
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Amitav Ghosh’s 1995 novel The Calcutta Chromosome gives us an image of what 
a globally computerised society might have looked like from the perspective of the 
beginnings of the widespread use of the internet: 
If the system hadn’t stalled Antar would never have guessed that the scrap of 
paper on his screen was the remnant of an ID card. […] The card turned up in 
one of those routine inventories that went flashing around the globe with 
metronomic regularity, for no reason that Antar could understand, except that 
it was what the system did best. Once it got started it would keep them coming, 
hour after hour, an endless succession of documents and objects, stopping only 
when it stumbled on something it couldn’t file: the most trivial things usually.49 
The description of AVA, the global information-database program the novel’s 
protagonist Antar works at from his terminal in a dilapidated Manhattan 
apartment, bears some resemblance to Gayatri Spivak’s more recent description of 
globalisation in Death of a Discipline as a computer-enabled abstraction rather than 
a differentiated political space:  
Globalization is the imposition of the same system of exchange everywhere. 
In the gridwork of electronic capital, we achieve that abstract ball covered in 
latitudes and longitudes, cut by virtual lines, once the equator and the 
tropics and so on, now drawn by the requirements of Geographical 
Information Systems.50 
In contrast to the globe, Spivak proposes the notion of the planetary as a 
theoretical repose to the totalizing tendency of World-Systems analysis. For Spivak, 
what world-systems analysis reveals is, in fact, “US nationalism masquerading as 
globalism” and that, whether close or distant, the praxis of reading literature should 
attend to the incommensurability of different worlds and what is untranslatable or 
negated in encounters between cultures.51 Globalisation is not so much a space for 
                                                          
49 Amitav Ghosh, The Calcutta Chromosome, (London: Picador 1995; repr. London: John Murray 
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50 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Death of a Discipline, (New York: Columbia University Press 2003), 
p.72. 
51 Ibid. p.108. 
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Spivak, but a kind of affect produced by financial capitalism. Planetarity – as a 
differentiated political space which contains multiple worlds, replaces the globe as 
something which “exists on our computers [but] no one lives there”. 52 
Nevertheless, the effects of globalisation are real and that the lived friction 
between the local rubbing up against the global (or the planetary against the global) 
is what theories of World Literature attempt to study (the world-system is in that 
sense a real abstraction). Spivak’s use of the word virtual (in the sense of “virtual 
reality” or a simulacrum) should in actual fact be closer to Deleuze’s notion of 
virtuality as that which is real without being actual: the globe as an abstraction 
effected by the spread of finance capital and communications technology but is 
nonetheless actualised when it comes to defining our sense of a lifeworld. The 
medium is the message, to repurpose the adage of Marshall McLuhan.53 Here 
Spivak’s comparison between the global and the planetary is curiously a-temporal—
if there are multiple worlds which globalisation attempts to smooth over, do they 
exist in the same time as global capital (defined by universal exchange and 
maximum efficiency)? Or by a slowness specific to local conditions? Or by a 
different temporality all together? What is the relation of this other time of the 
planetary to history? Ghosh’s novel is an early example of what Sharae Deckard has 
called a “cartographic” imaginary which articulates the lived friction between the 
universal and the local, the singular and the specific, beyond the times and spaces 
of both national literatures and global fictions.54 This is where the notion of 
cartography as a practice of mapping that proceeds from experience rather than 
beginning with a universal or totality, intersects with Deleuze’s interest in the 
politics of literature. In Dambudzo Marechera this takes the form of disjunctive 
metaphorical series rendered as the minor zones of postcolonial experimentation 
                                                          
52 Ibid. 
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beyond national allegory. Is it possible to translate the notion of writing-as-
cartography to a temporal politics then? What would a postcolonial cartography of 
the past look like? Here I turn to Deleuze’s second synthesis of time (the pure past) 
as a way to conceive of an intervention into the colonial archive in the form of a 
cartography or mapping. Building on my analysis of Coetzee’s Age of Iron as the 
writing of a dissolved or larval postcolonial subject of modernity, Ghosh’s The 
Calcutta Chromosome conceives of the colonial archive as an active synthesis or 
subjectivising machine which overcodes other times and histories via capture. The 
novel’s layered temporality which, to paraphrase to Deleuze, we might call its 
“sheets of the past”, as well as the protagonists’ various attempts to “journey” 
through these sheets in the manner of a line of flight which cuts through different 
strata, should therefore be read as an attempt to evade capture by the subject of 
modernity and its constitutive others.55 
 In this I draw upon several critical approaches to Ghosh’s work which 
highlight its intimate relationship with disciplines outside literature (history, 
anthropology, medicine) but to which literature is uniquely capable of traversing 
and reconfiguring according to its own logic. The concern that postcolonial theory is 
overly discursive, philosophical as opposed to practical and historical is, in Ghosh’s 
fiction, subverted such that the disciplinary means by which colonialism enacted 
forms of epistemic violence against its outsides are to be thought of doubly, 
theoretically and practically, from whence the power of Ghosh’s writing emerges in 
both its particularity and its relevance to postcolonial acts of solidarity and 
resistance which are, already, global and international. Robert Dixon, for instance, 
argues that “Ghosh’s writing reflects the recent concern of anthropologists with the 
porosity of cultural boundaries”, and that his fiction operates precisely in the 
transversal spaces between disciplinary, national, epistemic, historical and cultural 
regimes: “the characters in Ghosh’s novels do not occupy discrete cultures, but 
“dwell in travel”, in cultural spaces that flow across borders—the “shadow lines” 
                                                          
55 Deleuze describes Alain Resnais’ Last Year in Marienbad as composed from “sheets of past”. See 
Gilles Deleuze, Cinema II: The Time Image trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galetta, (London: 
Continuum 2005; Paris: Les Editions de Minuit 1985), p.101. 
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drawn around modern nation states”.56 Like Deleuze’s philosophy, which similarly 
dwells in travel, in concepts which are always on the line of constellations, Ghosh 
seeks the traces of a subaltern history which might be recovered or actualised from 
within the closed system of global history itself. Like Assia Djebar, this takes the 
form of an intervention in the archive and against the archive, which is immanent 
to a politics of style. John Thieme comes close to this Deleuzian configuration of the 
archive as doubly virtual and actual when her argues that The Calcutta 
Chromosome: 
interweaves a network of traces—from the history of late nineteenth-
century malaria research, theological movements generally deemed to be 
heretical in the West and slightly futuristic technology inter alia—to provide 
the possibility of an alternative subaltern history, which exists in parallel 
with colonial history as an equally (or possibly more) potent epistemological 
system, albeit one which has traditionally operated through silence rather 
than articulation.57 
My contention is that Ghosh’s investment in a subaltern or postcolonial praxis of 
historicism requires an altogether alternative conception of history, memory and 
the archive than those European or Western epistemologies. This alternative 
conceptualisation works itself out via a literary style which disrupts what Anshuman 
A. Mondal has described a “the metaphysics of modernity” and which finds its 
parallel in Ghosh’s work in the form of universalist claims regarding time, narrative 
and history constitutive of the bourgeois or realist novel.58 The Calcutta 
Chromosome works on the metaphysics of modernity via a literary stylistics in the 
same manner Deleuze’s philosophy works on the ontology of modernity via a 
philosophical stylistics. The subordination of a metaphysics of presence, identity 
and universalism by a conceptual style which dwells in travel and constructs lines of 
                                                          
56 Robert Nixon, “The Writing of Amitav Ghosh” in Amitav Ghosh: A Critical Companion, ed. Tabish 
Khair, (Delhi: Permanent Black 2010), [pp.9-35], p.10 
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flight as a way out of the archive of history ties Ghosh and Deleuze together in the 
form of a specifically postcolonial intellectual endeavour. 
Ghosh’s novel stages an intervention into the colonial archive (in this case 
the 1902 discovery by British colonial officer Ronald Ross of the means by which 
malaria is transmitted via mosquitos) which forms one of the lived abstractions via 
which the global striates and stratifies local conditions. As Bonnie Roos and Alex 
Hunt point out, when the real Ross came to publicise his discovery in his diaries, its 
implication in colonial power structures was written out:  
These writings reinforce a heroic paradigm that disenfranchised those 
Indian subjects who, in making his research possible, played a role in this 
discovery. Ross ignored the ideological work—so often assumed absent in 
scientific discovery—operating within his experiments. Malaria’s 
disproportionate effect on Westerners travelling to tropical and subtropical 
regions necessarily linked scientific progress to a colonial agenda—facts 
outside the scope of his diaries.59 
In Ross’ diaries, the living present of his subjects is simply the background noise or 
mosquito hum out of which the colonial archive arises as a universal “time of man”. 
Ghosh’s novel doesn’t recognise this other time of the subaltern by giving it a voice, 
but reconstructs these two incompossible times in abstract: out of the colonial 
archive which obliterates all other presents, arises a pure past of a dissolved 
subjectivity suitable for postcolonial reality. This reading is necessarily 
transformative of both Deleuze’s philosophy of time (which now takes on a 
postcolonial perspective) as well as Ghosh’s novel (which becomes a literary-
philosophical machine for the dissolving of Kantian modes of subjectivity and 
personhood). The novel is undoubtedly global in reach and institutional affiliation, 
receiving positive reviews and acknowledgement from American and European 
literary magazines, but this is not to say it is representative of Spivak’s “bad” 
globalisation. 
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Rather, the novel works by way of what I have termed a geoliterature, which 
utilises its institutional existence as a global novel with audiences in South Asia, 
Europe and America as an opportunity for sabotage, redistributing those flows of 
knowledge and intellectual capital which reinforce the scientific claims made by the 
colonial archive. 
 The novel’s narrative is constructed via a series of interlocking “presents” 
via which it transports the reader from the near future of Antar’s Manhattan 
apartment, back to Calcutta in the mid 1990s, and the events surrounding Ross’ 
discovery of the Malaria parasite in the same city at the turn of the century. Whilst 
sitting at his workstation Antar comes across an identity card belonging to his 
former colleague, Dr. Murugan, displayed on AVA’s digital projection screen. What 
follows is a detective story (similar in style to Proust’s involuntary memory) in which 
Antar discovers that Murugan was on the trail of a secret Indian society (unnamed 
but referred to at times as “the secret”) guiding Ross’ research and attempting to 
transfer their consciousnesses between bodies, via a hitherto unknown genetic 
mutation Murugan calls “the Calcutta chromosome”.60 The novel’s plot is at times 
complex and confusing, in the manner of a delirium, where the reader only 
belatedly learns that certain characters are reincarnated versions of those occurring 
at different levels of the novel’s time line. 
In “The Philosophy of Crime Novels” Deleuze distinguishes between the 
detective fiction of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, characterised 
by inductive reason in the Anglo-Saxon mould (Sherlock Holmes) and deductive 
reasoning in its Gallic form (Tabaret and Lecoq) and what he calls “the new literary 
use and exploitation of cops and criminals”.61 In the old conception, according to 
Deleuze, “we would be shown a genius detective devoting the whole power of his 
mind to the search and discovery of the truth”.62 But in the new detective novel, 
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“police activity has nothing to do with a metaphysical or scientific search for the 
truth”:  
Police work no more resembles scientific inquiry than a telephone call from 
an informant, inter-police relations, or mechanisms of torture resemble 
metaphysics. As a general rule, there are two distinct cases: 1) the 
professional murder, where the police know immediately more or less who 
is responsible; and 2) the sexual murder, where the guilty party could be 
anyone. But in either case the problem is not framed in terms of truth. It is 
rather an astonishing compensation of error. The suspect, known to the 
cops but never charged, is either nabbed in some other domain than his 
usual sphere of criminal activity (whence the American schema of the 
untouchable gangster, who is arrested and deported for tax fraud); or he is 
provoked, forced to show himself, as they lie in wait for him.63 
Instead of a metaphysical search for truth in which the genius detective faces his 
mirror and opposite in the criminal mastermind, the new detective novel engenders 
a deep complicity between cops and criminals in which the crime is only incidental 
and replaced by a vision of society defined by “the power of falsehood”.64 Clearly 
inspired by Foucault’s analysis of the production of delinquency, Deleuze’s 
description of the new detective novel which, by the power of falsehood, shows 
that “a society indeed reflects itself to itself in its police and its criminals, even 
while it protects itself from them by means of a fundamental deep complicity 
between them” returns us to the real in the form of a parody: delinquency and 
criminality are the fictions by which the social body is produced.65 Ghosh’s novel is 
a detective novel which takes the colonial archive as its power of falsehood. 
Murugan’s search for the truth of Ronald Ross’ discovery is only incidental to the 
way in which we learn that the past (our historical reality) is the effect of a 
fabricating power (the colonial archive) to subsume other temporalities and 
histories within its present. AVA, Antar’s digital manager-cum-AI-companion, is the 
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colonial archive given sentience, as she endlessly categorises and organises the 
objects and documents which enter her “timeline” via the acquisitions of the 
International Water Council—Antar’s corporate employer.66 In Deleuze’s terms, 
AVA’s labour is an active synthesis performed by a digital brain, which produces a 
past, present and future as a line of time out of which nothing escapes or is left 
uncategorised. But in the course of the novel’s Matryoska-doll narrative, an entirely 
other conception of the past begins to emerge: that of the “pure past” given to 
passive synthesis by a “dissolved” or “larval” subject which, as will become clear, is 
at the same time a properly postcolonial one. 
 If the first synthesis of the present mirrors the “connective” synthesis from 
Anti Oedipus, which enjoins elements on the body-without-organs together and, in 
its temporal form, allows for expectancy in the organism (the projection from past 
to future through the present), the second synthesis is conjunctive; it allows for a 
present duration that passes and falls away into memory.67 In Difference and 
Repetition, that which the present passes into (as an archive of present moments) is 
not actual in the sense of the living present, but nevertheless can come back in the 
form of memory. The madeleine here is Murugan’s burnt identity card, which opens 
up into a Proustian episode in which we witness Antar’s first meeting with Murugan 
more than a decade previously. Unlike the active synthesis of AVA’s digital timeline, 
Antar’s memory is an open whole in which any moment might be recalled: the past 
is “present” to itself at every point, open to reminiscence as a conjunctive 
synthesis. There is no need to scroll back through one’s memory to find a past 
moment. This is the first instance in which the sense of memory as an archive 
differs from the active synthesis of the colonial archive, which orders and striates 
the past as a closed system. Yet Deleuze also claims that there is a pure past that is 
transcendental and a priori rather than psychological: “To the degree to which the 
past in general is the element in which each former present preserves itself and 
may be focused upon, the former present finds itself ‘represented’ in the present 
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one.”68 Here Deleuze draws on Bergson to evoke the sense of the past (not just 
memory) as an a-temporal bloc which serves as the condition into which any 
present moment finds itself as, at the same time, a passing moment. Each present 
moment in time must also be its history; its becoming-history as the condition of its 
presentness: 
Each past is contemporaneous with the present it was, the whole past 
coexists with the present in relation to which it is past, but the pure element 
of the past in general pre-exists the passing present. There is thus a 
substantial temporal element (the Past which was never present) playing 
the role of ground.69 
In structuralist terms the pure past is the virtual whole which is actualised in 
specific ways, as the structure of language is an open system which is actualised in 
specific speech acts. Unlike the active synthesis of the colonial archive, which 
represents the past by reducing difference to the same (species: mosquito; genus: 
anopheles…) the synthesis of the pure past contracts the different series or “sheets 
of [the] past” which are enfolded in the life of any present “thing”.70 Like Dickens’ 
Riderhood, a life can consist of any number of incompossible differences (son, 
friend, waterman, thief, scoundrel) that nonetheless are enfolded as a life. For 
Deleuze, the pure or a priori past gives coherence to the heterogenous series of 
presents without which there would be no possibility of a lifeworld. This is the 
sense in which Deleuze speaks of being as really the actualised becoming of a 
virtual past or whole contracted in the present; that is, as destiny:  
Destiny never consists in step-by-step deterministic relations between 
presents which succeed one another according to the order of a 
represented time. Rather, it implies between successive presents non-
localisable connections, actions at a distance, systems of replay, resonance 
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and echoes, objective chances, signs, signals and roles which transcend 
spatial locations and temporal successions.71 
Rather than the representable succession of presents in a single narrative, Ghosh’s 
novel finds coherence in the resonances between layers of the past which signal a 
time other than the historical determination of the archive. The signs of the pure 
past occur in the novel as aberrant objects; traces which escape AVA’s archive and 
whose erratic movement create resonances for the reader between the narrative’s 
historical layers—Murugan’s identity card, a sheet of newspaper from 1892 
preserved as fish wrapping in the mid-1990s, Antar’s archaic answering machine 
which preserves Murugan’s disembodied voice, the mysterious servant 
Lachman/Lutchman/Laakhan who serves as the temporal Doctor Moriarty to 
Murugan’s Holmes. These resonances prompt characters to abandon their everyday 
and habitual movements across Calcutta and Manhattan, as they are seized by a 
line of flight which selects elements of the pure past, making them resonate 
together, changing their relation to the novel’s (or simply Antar’s) present: 
Suddenly Urmilla found herself shaking with indignation. She knew she was 
on the verge of one of those periodic seizures of outrage which sometimes 
gripped her when she was working on her investigative articles. She was so 
angry now that she stopped caring about the time—about the press 
conference at the great Eastern, the news editor, even the minister of 
communications from Delhi. She stuffed the pieces of fish back into the 
plastic bag and marched to the door. On her way out she snatched up the 
sheets of Xerox paper, crumpling them into a ball, in her fist.72 
The relation between characters’ living presents and the passive synthesis of 
memory, or of the pure past, is one of contraction and dilation (such as the wide 
and pointed ends of a cone) as these aberrant signs force resonances to move 
between series. Deleuze names these aberrant signs “lacking a place” the 
“object=x” or “dark precursor” which belong to no individual series or chronological 
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time (they are other than any historical moment) but whose movement brings 
together the connective synthesis of the present and the conjunctive synthesis of 
the past in the form of a disjunctive synthesis: 
Given two heterogenous series, two series of differences, the precursor 
plays the part of the differentiator of these differences. In this manner, by 
virtue of its own power, it puts them into immediate relation to one another 
[…] Because the path it traces is invisible and becomes visible only in 
reverse, to the extent that it is travelled over and covered over by the 
phenomena it induces within the system, it has no place other than that 
from which it is ‘missing’, no identity other than that which it lacks […] We 
call this dark precursor, this difference in itself or difference in the second 
degree which relates heterogeneous systems and even completely disparate 
things, the disparate.73  
This disparate power returns us to the figure of the aberrant movement, the 
irrational cut which gives our path through Deleuze’s thought its coherence if only 
in the form of a constitutive difference-in-itself or a vector of transformation we call 
the line of flight. The line of flight, I have argued, is what opens world literature to 
its pedagogical and ethical function: the possibility of a new world from within the 
world. In The Calcutta Chromosome, Murugan’s schizophrenic movement across 
the novel’s spatial and temporal series can only be read retrospectively as 
belonging to the operation of a dark precursor: the non-archivable element which 
makes the novel’s “presents” resonate together and gives the appearance of an 
historical timeline only retroactively. The novel’s investigation into the ways in 
which colonial science relies upon and is conditioned by the colonial archive belies 
the ethical awareness that it could always have been different. The dark precursor 
or object=x par excellence being the “Silence”, the occult society which the novel 
posits as the irrational ground upon which the colonial archive is situated and which 
it can never successfully subdue or capture. 74 The science-fiction elements of the 
plot wherein characters repeat themselves across Ghosh’s narrative in the manner 
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in which the malaria virus copies and pastes its DNA using the mosquito as a vector, 
are not simply allegorical or metaphorical but in themselves express the potential 
for postcolonial difference, an aberrant movement, to resonate in the midst of the 
colonial archive. A delirium or archival fever signals the existence of other presents, 
other histories. In the manner of a “cone of memory” which is wide or narrow 
depending on the perspective of each passing moment to all the others, the novel 
recovers the pasts whose difference colonisation cancels out by way of an 
occupation of the living present(s) by chronological time. 
 But the most enigmatic sign of the pure past in the novel, the creature 
which creates resonances and forced movements between the passive syntheses of 
memory is undoubtedly the mosquito itself. Its erratic movement across bodies 
affects a delirium in the colonial officers and scientists who find themselves in 
Calcutta. Delirium becomes for the novel an ontological as well as medical 
phenomenon, as the viral movement of malaria—repeats itself by “cut-and-
past[ing]” its DNA across bodies—in one of the novel’s many translations between 
medical and digital parlance. The viral movement of Malaria which forces aberrant 
movements to occur across time and space undoes the identity of characters’ 
presents.75 The colonial archive is grounded upon, is conditioned by, a delirium in 
which the identity of the same gives way to a difference it cannot contract and a 
past it cannot represent: 
He flattened himself against the mattress and tried to lie still. Spread-eagling 
his arms and legs he waited—waited to discover whether they really were 
inside the net; whether his inflamed skin would allow him to discern the feel 
of their bites. It was strangely intimate to lie there like that, against damp 
cloth, spread out in that elementally open posture of invitation, of embrace, 
of longing. […] Displaying himself in those minute detailed ways that only 
they were small enough to see, to understand, because only they had eyes 
that were designed to see not the whole but the parts, each in its 
uniqueness. Involuntarily he flexed his shoulders, arching his back, offering 
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himself up, waiting to discover where they would touch him first, where he 
would first detect the tingling prick of their bites”.76 
Like the detective complicit in the crime he seeks to understand, Murugan’s 
passage through the novel’s enfolded histories is enabled by what Derrida called 
“archive fever” and which the novel posits as the other time of a past which is not 
exhausted by history.77 Murugan’s search for the Calcutta Chromosome, in the 
hope that it will offer a more permanent cure for the neurosyphilis he has 
temporally halted by way of the malaria virus, turns him into a desiring-machine 
composed of parts—a dissolved subject seeking reverberations in the past which 
the colonial archive of world literary theory (in its globalising mode) can only 
witness as a delirium.78  
This brings us to the question of how the other past of Deleuze’s second 
synthesis of time, where the relation between present and past is one of 
contraction and dilation rather than succession and determination, allows for a 
properly postcolonial philosophy of time? That is, how does Deleuze’s philosophy 
inculcate a postcolonial critique of futurity based upon the passive rather than 
active synthesis of a dissolved subjectivity? In Anti-Oedipus, desire is presented as a 
force which scans the past from the perspective of the present in search of future 
actualisations, and Ghosh’s novel likewise scans the history of the archive and 
colonial medicine in search of a delirium that cannot be exhausted by those 
determinations and which might open up new relations between our postcolonial 
present and the histories of violence which nonetheless striate it. In Difference and 
Repetition the pure past is in that sense “the future of the archive” in that it serves 
as the virtual condition for a future which is not simply the continuation of the 
present along a line of time:  
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In other words, the sign of the present is already a passage to the limit, a 
maximal contraction which comes to sanction the choice of a particular level 
as such, which is in itself contracted or relaxed among an infinity of possible 
levels.79  
The power which scans the past and selects from an infinity of possible layers 
irrational cuts, aberrant movements between series, is the force of futurity thought 
now as a disjunctive synthesis; the third synthesis of time. 
 
4.4. Third synthesis of time: Alexis Wright’s The Swan Book 
 
Whether in Deleuze’s claim that “Lawrence, Miller, Kerouac, Burroughs, Artaud 
and Beckett know more about schizophrenia than do psychologists and 
psychoanalysts” or the self-description of The Logic of Sense as a psychoanalytical 
novel or the desire in Difference and Repetition to turn philosophy into a form of 
apocalyptical science fiction, Deleuze’s thought is always formed in proximity to 
literature and literary authors.80 But this is never done in the form of a philosophy 
of literature, a representation of what literature does, so much as a literary-
philosophy that operates through an encounter with literature’s powers of 
affection and perception, such that philosophy must generate new concepts for 
what literature does to thought.81 It is in the sense of a future which escapes its full 
determination by the past, an unknown or aberrant cut in time, that Deleuze and 
Guattari always speak of art in terms of the invention of a people.82 Deleuze’s 
deduction of third synthesis of time as a future which is radically open, aberrant, 
different must be thought in terms intimately involved in literature’s powers of 
affection and perception. In fact, Deleuze indexes the third synthesis of time (the 
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future) to Hamlet: “what does this mean: the empty form of time or third 
synthesis? The Northern Prince says: ‘time is out of joint”.83 But if Deleuze can be 
accused of a fatal Eurocentrism it is surely here, because the question of a future 
which is not simply the continuation of the past through the present, but is itself an 
interregnum where historical injustice (in Hamlet’s case, the murder of his father by 
his uncle) returns transformed; as a differential power or futurity that changes our 
relation to actual history, is properly speaking a postcolonial problematic. This is 
how I will justify thinking Deleuze’s deduction of the third synthesis of time via the 
postcolonial politics of Alexis Wright’s The Swan Book (2013), as a textual encounter 
that Deleuze’s philosophy precurses darkly. 
Approaches to Wright’s fiction have tended to situated her work in the 
Australian context of Aboriginal sovereignty and the politics of concern and care 
which structures the relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal attempts 
at solidarity. For Jennifer Mills, The Swan Book “is not the Great Australian Novel, it 
is the great novel of the Federal Intervention”.84 In this respect her work is often 
indexed to a spatial politics which resists the forms of sovereignty belonging to 
settler colonial nation states. As Nicholas Birns relates: 
The Swan Book does not make an absolute, legitimist claim to land on the part 
of indigenous people, as if trying to mimic a European nation-state. Instead, it 
depicts indigenous people tending and shepherding a commonwealth in which 
non-indigenous people who share their values can also gather.85 
Like Ghosh, Wright’s approach to narratology offers the possibility for thinking 
solidarity and relationality outside the logics of integration and capture which 
structure dialectical philosophies of difference. My concern here, however, is with 
the temporal politics of Wright’s novel which has to do with articulating a sense of 
futurity which has in common with Deleuze’s philosophy of time an emphasis on 
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discontinuity, the break, or the caesura in time itself. In this way my reading 
acknowledges those critical receptions of The Swan Book which stress the 
particularity of its intervention into postcolonial Australian history, but without 
essentialising the novel as only indexed to those specific political dynamics.  
Set in an unspecified point in Australia’s near future, Wright’s novel follows the 
life of Oblivia, an Aboriginal girl who is found mute hiding in the roots of a 
eucalyptus tree following a sexual assault. Taken in by a white European emigré 
named Bella Donna, living in the hull of an abandoned navy boat marooned on the 
shores of a lake-turned-swamp by dust storms, Oblivia learns about the world 
beyond their government-mandated compound for displaced Aboriginals, including 
the time “before the drought” which transforms Australia’s coastline into a 
desert.86 The government enclosure which surrounds the lake’s inhabitants alludes 
to the continuing Australian policy of intervention into Aboriginal communities, and 
the inherent exclusion of indigenous voices from that policy. But in all other ways 
the novel’s narrative and linguistic transgression from representation disclose a 
world in which time is, like Hamlet’s, out of joint. Oblivia, as the novel’s perspectival 
protagonist, we’re told has “a cut snake virus” living in her brain which “is as stuffed 
as some old broken-down Commodore you see left dumped in the bush”.87 This 
dissolved or displaced narrative perspective makes possible the incursion of other 
styles, languages and historical realities into the text. French, Latin and Waanyi 
words occasionally interject into the fractured storytelling as several linguistic series 
running adjacent to one another, and disclose a multiplicity of presents which 
envelop the novel’s characters and landscape. Here chronological time resonates 
with a force from outside, a mythological time that is not antecedent to human 
history but stands alongside it as “Dreaming”.88 Dreaming exists somewhere 
between a noun and a verb and attaches itself to people, places or things. The time 
of “dreaming” runs parallel to history but is not subject to its linear determination. 
As a non-chronological temporality, it connects indigenous Australians with their 
spiritual ancestors, as well as with animals and landscape. But more precisely 
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dreaming evokes the sense of country apart from landscape. Landscape painting in 
the European tradition usually implies the separation of subject from object (the 
figure who perceives the landscape as a landscape and not herself). By dissolving or 
fragmenting Oblivia’s subjectivity in favour of a lattice-work style in which 
omniscient narration and first-person perspective are at various points interrupted 
by a collective dreaming voice presented in italics, the novel does away with the 
Kantian impression of landscape so that an Earth can emerge. This is not a spatial 
politics of hybridity, but a temporal politics that disrupts the spatial geographies via 
which world literary theory thinks the world as an object for the understanding in 
the Kantian sense. Now it’s the country as a spatial category existing in time which 
is forced out of joint, where the entanglement of the human and non-human, 
language and animal chatter allows for something like an Earth to emerge from 
world: 
The swamp’s natural sounds of protest were often mixed with lamenting 
ceremonies. Haunting chants rose and fell on the water like a beating drum, and 
sounds of clap sticks oriented thoughts, while the droning didgeridoos blended 
all sounds into the surreal experience of a background listening, which had 
become normal listening. Listen! That’s what music sounds like! The woman 
once explained to the girl that the music of epic stories normally sounded like 
this. This is the world itself, disassembling its thoughts.89 
Country is the “nowhere” and the displaced, disguised, modified and always 
recreated “here-and-now” in the manner Deleuze describes Samuel Butler’s 
Erewhon.90 Barbara Glowczewski relates how, in the context of Walpiri desert 
painting, the language of dreaming works via a temporal indeterminacy that 
subjects the conventions of landscape to an abstract cartography of lines and 
becomings out of which the Walpiri compose their sense of time and history: 
Kuruwarri, a word with multiple meanings, literally image, designates any 
painting made by men or women, but also the mythical narratives and 
                                                          
89 Ibid. p.54. 
90 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p.xix. 
200 
 
everything that gives its name to a Dreaming. Kuruwarri are also the marks 
left by the heroes in the landscape: cave paintings whose origin was 
attributed to them; depressions in the ground they would have made when 
sitting; beds of sand dug out under their steps; springs that sprung from 
their urine, sperm or milk; ochre deposits brought to light from their 
coagulated blood. Most of the landscape features are thus imprints of the 
passage of the Dreaming heroes or the metamorphosis of their bodies. A 
swamp or a cave mark their disappearance into the earth. Rocks testify to 
their petrified organs. Trees reveal their underground forces.91 
In contrast to the way in which the majority of apocalyptical narratives operate on 
the disconnection between the “before” and “after” the cataclysm, Oblivia’s world 
is in an uneasy continuity with the time before Australia’s catastrophic climate 
change, where Aboriginal communities “already knew what it was like to lose 
country”.92 Instead it is dreaming which splits time into a before and after in the 
manner of Deleuze’s third synthesis of the future: a disjunctive synthesis which acts 
as a caesura or cut in time and stops the novel from falling into the conservatism of 
dystopic nihilism. Dreaming drives the narrative towards a collective, or at least 
non-subjective, future which is open in respect to the archival past which it does 
not resemble: 
[Oblivia] walks around the old dry swamp pretty regularly they say, and 
having seen her where there is a light moving over the marshes in the 
middle of the night, like a will-o’-the-wisp, they thought that they had heard 
her screaming, kayi, kayi kala-wurru nganyi, your country is calling out for 
you, which they described was just like listening to a sigh of a moth 
extending out over the landscape, or a whisper from the scrub ancestor 
catching a little stick falling from a dead tree, although nothing that can truly 
be heard—just a sensation of straining to hear something, which 
understandably, was how anyone should whisper on this spirit-broken place, 
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from seeing their old homes scattered to kingdom come, of being where the 
Army owned everything, every centimetre of their traditional land, every 
line of buried song, stories, feelings, the sound of their voices, and every 
word spoken loudly on this place now.93 
The novel’s epilogue gathers together the linguistic series established in the 
previous pages, suggesting a collective enunciation that is both more than the sum 
of Aboriginal persons to have lost their country, and less than any given population 
of displaced persons. Known as “foolish fire” (ignis fatuus) in Latin and in European 
folklore as the ghost light seen over marshland made by the decaying plants, Oblivia 
is at the same time a will-o’-the-wisp, a ghost light, and an Aboriginal voice 
extending over the country attempting to recover what was lost. The call to country 
inscribes all of Aborignal history, but as ghost light: what returns is not the actual 
events of colonisation, dispossession, dislocation in the form of redemption, but 
their difference. As a dark precursor, or ghost-lighted figure, Oblivia’s narrative 
frames Australian history and the history of colonisation in Europe and elsewhere 
as a series of catastrophes which ramify in the present. But the evocation of 
dreaming, linguistically recreated as a collective voice which interrupts the 
narrative, opens up an other time in the form of a cut or caesura which “draws off” 
difference from those histories, opening them up not only to “a” future, but a 
multiplicity of futures that were disavowed in the actual events of colonisation as 
they occurred.94 The cut, then, is “a pure order of time” in which the archival past is 
disconnected from a future that is open and undetermined with respect to 
chronology.95 
 The third synthesis of time, as caesura, cuts into chronological time as 
psychological reality. The organic representation (me, myself and I) rendered by the 
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first two syntheses as psychological succession—the remembrance of past 
moments and the pre-emption of future moments in a connective synthesis—is 
now dissolved or fragmented as an “aborted cogito”.96 A collective enunciation 
overcomes the narrative in the form of a cut in chronological time:  
This might be the same story about some important person carrying a swan 
centuries ago, and it might be the same story in centuries to come when 
someone will carry a swan back to this ground where its story once lived.97 
Through the cut which separates the archival past from the future as a “pure and 
empty form time”, the novel assembles history as in a series through which “pure 
differences” may pass.98 The aborted cogito of Aboriginal consciousness, the 
“fracture in the I”, gives way to a dreaming in which Oblivia is the passive and 
dissolved subject of a dreaming which overtakes her own ego.99 After the prelude, 
the novel’s first-person narration is overtaken and subsumed by a third-person 
voice which resonates across the novel’s historical series. As Linda Daley has 
argued: 
At many points, the reader wonders who is speaking and what level of 
reality is this passage describing? The transparency of language frequently 
turns opaque and dense, asserting its material and performative dimensions 
over ideational content, and explicitly challenging the limits of chronology. 
This becomes possible once the first-person narration of the prelude ends. 
From that point on, an anonymous, third-person narrator takes over, and 
multiple dimensions of speech and thought become possible. Oblivia 
threads the story from beginning to end, but at times, it is not clear if she is 
functioning as a character or as a figure of relationship itself: to the land, or 
to the animal and spirit beings.100 
                                                          
96 Ibid. p.135. 
97 Wright, The Swan Book, p.334. 
98 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p.346; p.64. 
99 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p.111. 




Feasting on “a plague of outsideness”, Oblivia enables the novel’s collective 
narration to scan the past, organising and selecting those differences which are 
worthy of the caesura, are worthy of the future.101 As an aborted or dissolved 
subject, Oblivia follows the movements of the black swans mysteriously drawn to 
her. In their passage over Country she discovers the work of the dark precursor, the 
pure differences which reverberate across historical time, undoing them, and taking 
them up as a means of futuring her people, fabricating them into history: 
Somehow, the books became good company. Pages were flicked over, and 
lines recited, and reflected upon: The wild swan’s death-hymn took the soul 
of that waste place with joy. Was this wasteland the swamp? She left the 
books on the table, and touched them frequently as though they were her 
friends. She sang over and over, a chant, her lonely incantation to the swans 
flying over Country, All the black swans sail together. She moves on, finds 
another thought—He who becomes a swan, instructs the world! This swan 
could spread his wings and fly where his spirit takes him, and Oblivia 
imagines the past disappearing in this flight to a frightening anticipated 
unknown future.102 
What returns in the third synthesis of time is not history, but difference. As eternal 
return, the third synthesis cuts off the past from the truly new. Actual events and 
identities are lost, but that force which makes them differ from one another in their 
specificity (this wound, this massacre, this dispossession) can return as difference in 
repetition. This is the sense in which Oblivia’s transformation into a fable, an 
aborted cogito for the creation of fictions, envelops all Aboriginal uprisings, all 
indigenous political heroes, all challenges to settler colonialism, but in the form of 
difference. The actual lives and events of those figures fall away into linear time and 
chronology, but the force of their difference, their futuring as a cut and a caesura in 
history, returns. The third synthesis of time in Difference and Repetition is in the 
                                                          
101 Wright, The Swan Book, p.15. 
102 Ibid. p.240. 
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same sense Nietzsche’s eternal return, understood as the return of difference-in-
itself: 
We produce something new only on condition that we repeat - once in the 
mode which constitutes the past, and once more in the present of 
metamorphosis. Moreover, what is produced, the absolutely new itself, is in 
turn nothing but repetition: the third repetition, this time by excess, the 
repetition of the future as eternal return […] Eternal return affects only the 
new, what is produced under the condition of default and by the 
intermediary of metamorphosis.103 
Eternal return is that force by which the work makes a cut in the world and draws a 
caesura across history. The third synthesis of time already assumes a modernist 
aesthetics capable of fulfilling it, and is in that sense a postcolonial philosophy of 
time in the way Toni Morrison speaks of modernity as belonging to the slave, to the 
dispossessed and to the conquered. For Coetzee, Ghosh and Wright it serves as a 
corollary to and a realisation of the aborted cogito—that dissolved subject of 
modernity which populates the postcolony without ever belonging to a people. In 
its fabrication of a yet to come to which we may still not be worthy, it is nothing 
less than “a belief in the future”.104
                                                          




Coda: For a Speculative Cartography 
 
Debates in world-literary studies have seen a renewed emphasis on the 
category of world, world-building or worlding. In Death of a Discipline (2005) 
Gayatri Spivak argues for a planetary ethics against the too-quick embrace of 
globalisation.1 More recently, Pheng Cheah has made the case for a worldly politics 
of postcolonial literature based on the tenets of a neo-cosmopolitanism.2 Yet this 
renewed commitment to worldliness in literary studies comes at a time when the 
category of world has less and less purchase on the real forces of subjectification, 
semio-capitalism, technological warfare and ecological catastrophe at work in the 
world today. That is to say, it appears difficult for scholars of the humanities to 
accept that the world is no longer for us. This has been the overriding concern of 
my reading of world-literary texts alongside Deleuze’s philosophy: to think the 
becoming of the world through its lines of flight, aberrant movements and 
immanent metamorphoses. 
 Despite this, many have used the uneasy proximity of Deleuze’s 
vocabulary to the slogans of contemporary capitalism (“connect!” “network!” 
“share!” “be creative!”) as an excuse to reject Deleuze’s philosophy in total.3 Yet 
this would be to ignore the aspects of Deleuze’s work which attain to the negative 
in the midst of affirmation: the “cruelty” of affects in his reading of Sacher-Masoch, 
the intolerability of the world in the presentation of his cine-philosophy, and his call 
to resist the present in his final collaboration with Guattari in What is Philosophy?4 
It is the encounter with the work which has no prior schema, no formal 
                                                          
1 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Death of a Discipline, (New York: Columbia University Press 2005), 
pp.71-102. 
2 Pheng Cheah, What is a World? On Postcolonial Literature as World Literature, (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press 2016). 
3 Slavoj Žižek, Organs Without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences, (London: Routledge 2004); 
Alexander R Galloway, Forget Deleuze! (2015) 
<http://cultureandcommunication.org/galloway/forget-deleuze> [Accessed 20 January 2018]. 
4 Gilles Deleuze, Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty, (New York: Zone Books 1989; Paris: Éditions de 
Minuit 1967): Cinema II: The Time Image, Trans, Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (London: 
Continuum 2005; Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit 1985), p.164: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What 
is Philosophy? Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchill, (London: Verso 1994; Paris: Les Éditions 
de Minuit 1991), p.110. 
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prescription, and whose resistance to the present calls for the creation of a new 
people via the unworlding of the existant, where philosophy takes place: 
The artist or the philosopher is quite incapable of creating a people, each 
can only summon it with all his strength. A people can only be created in 
abominable sufferings, and it cannot be concerned any more with art or 
philosophy. But books of philosophy and works of art also contain their sum 
of unimaginable sufferings that forewarn of the advent of a people. They 
have resistance in common—their resistance to death, to servitude, to the 
intolerable, to shame, and to the present.5 
What Deleuze and Guattari call “minor” literature are those singular works whose 
encounters with an audience are aberrant, destructive and deterritorialising in 
respect to language and identity and which are thus immediately political as 
opposed to simply being about politics.6 By reading Deleuze’s philosophy and 
world-literary texts together via an ethics of the encounter, the image of thought 
which is produced is necessarily involuntarist: “something in the world forces us to 
think”.7 Thought, for Deleuze, follows a logic which can only be transgressive, which 
happens in the aberrant movements forced by an encounter with what is not 
philosophy, what is not common sense, what is not “what everybody knows” and 
which must of necessity go beyond opinion and cliché.8 As David Lapoujade has 
argued, the aberrant movement is not a full concept in Deleuze’s philosophy in the 
sense that “the minor”, “deterritorialisation”, and “becoming” are, but is 
nonetheless a para-concept; a refrain or flourish that is the hallmark of his having 
                                                          
5 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p.110. 
6 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press 1986; Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit 1975). 
7 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (London: Continuum 2004; Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France 1967), p.176. 
8 Here Deleuze’s allusion to Talking Heads’ 1980 single “Cross-eyed and Painless” in The Logic of 
Sensation is less random when thought in conjunction with David Byrne’s call to ‘Stop Making 
Sense!’:  “As the song says, ‘I feel like a knife, I feel like an accident” Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of 




“done” philosophy.9 For instance, one can detect it in Deleuze’s “Letter to a Harsh 
Critic”, where he describes two methods or two logics of reading: 
There are, you see, two ways of reading a book: you either see it as a box 
with something inside and start looking for what it signifies, and then if 
you’re even more perverse or depraved you set off after signifiers. And you 
treat the next book like a box contained in the box or containing it. And you 
annotate and interpret and question and write a book about the book, and 
so on and on. Or there’s the other way: you see the book as a little non- 
signifying machine, and the only question is ‘Does it work, and how does it 
work?’ How does it work for you? If it doesn’t work, if nothing comes 
through, you try another book. This second way of reading’s intensive: 
something comes through or it doesn’t. There is nothing to explain, nothing 
to understand, nothing to interpret. It’s like plugging in to an electric 
circuit.10 
The first way of reading is extensive, it follows the dictum of representation in 
knowing already what a book can do. The second is intensive, experimental, and 
aberrant: it knows only the logic of the encounter, the line, and the passage of 
escape. As Deleuze and Guattari point out, “capitalism is profoundly illiterate”, 
preferring the instant data-transfer and semiotic cleanliness of financial coding over 
the messy and complex interactions of language.11 The beginnings of financial 
globalisation they observed are now the condition for any defence of a politics of 
literary aesthetics undertaken today. The question is not “how is globalisation 
represented in literature?” but “what is it that globalisation does to representation 
such that interpretation of texts is politically enfeebled?” This is the question 
                                                          
9 David Lapoujade, Aberrant Movements: The Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, trans. Joshua David 
Jordan, (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e) 2017; Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit 2014).  
10 Gilles Deleuze, “Letter to a Harsh Critic”, in Negotiations: 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin, (New 
York: Columbia University Press 1995; Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit 1990), pp.7-8.  
11 “Writing has never been capitalism's thing. Capitalism is profoundly illiterate. The death of writing 
is like the death of God or the death of the father: the thing was settled a long time ago, although 
the news of the event is slow to reach us, and there survives in us the memory of extinct signs with 
which we still write”. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, (London: Continuum 2004; 
Paris: Les Editions de Minuit 1972), p.260. 
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underlying my theorisation in Chapter 2 of geoliterature as a materialist semiotics 
that doesn’t rely on a subject or world to be represented in the text. 
Against the singular hermeneutics of world literature (in which what returns 
from the labour of interpretation is always the capitalist world-system one started 
with in the first place), Gayatri Spivak has insisted that, whether close or distant, 
the praxis of reading literature should attend to the incommensurability of different 
worlds and what is untranslatable or negated in encounters between cultures. 
Globalisation is not so much a space for Spivak, but a kind of affect produced by 
financial capitalism. The notion of planet – as a differentiated political space which 
contains multiple worlds, replaces the globe as something which “exists on our 
computers [but] no one lives there”.12 As “real abstraction”, globalisation is felt in 
such worldly effects as climate change, even if as a social relation it cannot be 
represented in a single object, institution or person. The catastrophes caused by 
climate change (which is itself the manifestation of the capitalist mode of 
production) might in that sense be understood as the global crashing into the 
planetary—as that force which erases the very possibility for different cultural and 
political worlds by making larger swathes of the planet uninhabitable for human 
life. 
If globalisation cannot be represented adequately in literature except in 
narratives which are simply about globalisation, how does World Literature as a 
discipline conceive of planetarity as a cultural formation that can register the 
friction between globalisation’s universalising thrust and the singular differences of 
those cultural sites or zones resistant to it? This is the same problem of the One 
against the multiple which Deleuze’s philosophy of difference attempts to move 
beyond and which, in Chapter 3, I reframed via the Bergsonian concept of 
multiplicity. In this way, the work of Dambudzo Marechera is instructive for how 
theories of world literature might think beyond the identities of national literatures, 
but also beyond the difference “in between” trans-national cultural formations. So 
rather than ask how does Zimbabwean literature differ from South African 
literature in respect to the dialectic of centre and periphery? We might ask: how 
                                                          
12 Spivak, Death of a Discipline p.72. 
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does Zimbabwean literature differ from itself? Reading Marechera’s writing 
machine as a difference engine, we can think the difference of Zimbabwean 
literature in terms of a pure multiplicity, as movement, rather than a difference 
which is secondary to the prior unity or totality of the “world” of world-systems 
analysis. The world does not pre-exist the fictions we make about it. This is not to 
say that the world is chaotic (there is a world system at work) but that it is at all 
times an open system that has to be created anew with each new inscription we 
make on a surface. The identity of centre and periphery arises from within 
multiplicity. Reading world literature with Deleuze then becomes a task of 
distinguishing between different types of multiplicities, of mapping movements and 
not points on a map, of following a line of flight: 
[The concept of multiplicity] was created precisely in order to escape the 
abstract opposition between the multiple and the one, to escape dialectics, 
to succeed in conceiving the multiple in the pure state, to cease treating it 
as a numerical fragment of a lost Unity or Totality or as the organic element 
of a Unity or Totality yet to come, and instead distinguish between different 
types of multiplicity.13 
Thinking in terms of multiplicity is essential if we are to truly think the worldliness 
of world literature and not the world as it is “for us”; if we are to replace points on 
a map with a cartography of lines.14 
My argument for reading world literature via cartography of lines, for an 
ethics of the encounter which follows its own logic, is in contrast to the dominant 
ethical thrust in world-literary studies today. The emphasis on the cosmopolitan 
made by Pheng Cheah and others is part of a wider turn in world-literary studies 
towards an emphasis on human rights; where world literature acts as a 
                                                          
13 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi, (London: Continuum 2004; Paris: Les Editions De Minuit 1980), p.36. 
14 For the same reason the ‘entropy’ thesis of world literature espoused by, for example, David 
Damrosch (in which world literature is the ‘leaking’ of national literatures) is insufficient: it only 
confirms there was an identity called national literature in the first place. The antithesis to the 
world-literary argument is set up as the very condition of its possibility. See David Damrosch, What is 
World Literature? (New Jersey: Princeton University Press 2003). 
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subjectivising beacon upon those at the sharp end of capitalist modernity.15 When 
cultural difference is thought about dialectically in terms of the “the same” and 
“the Other”, what returns from the encounter with alterity can only be the identity 
of the same. ‘Cosmopolitanism’ as way of describing the worldliness of postcolonial 
literatures is for this reason a weak theorisation of cultural difference, because it 
slides too easily into its colloquial or governmental associations: the recognition of 
difference in terms of the identity of the same. This is why, for Deleuze, there can 
be no becoming-European, becoming-human or becoming-man because the minor, 
as intensive multiplicity, can never be subject to a standard or identity. Multiplicity, 
as the becoming of difference, is what precedes identity and not the opposite. Alain 
Badiou describes succinctly the weakness of cosmopolitanism when it comes to 
recognising difference in terms of the same: 
The problem is that the ‘respect for differences’ and the ethics of human 
rights do seem to define an identity! And that, as a result, the respect for 
differences applies only to those differences which are reasonably 
consistent with this identity (which, after all, is the identity of a wealthy—
albeit visibly declining—West). Even immigrants in this country [France], as 
seen by the partisans of ethics, are acceptably different only when they are 
‘integrated’, only if they seek integration (which seems to mean, if you think 
about it, only if they want to suppress their difference). It might well be that 
ethical ideology […] is simply the final imperative of a conquering 
civilisation: ‘Become like me and I will respect your difference’.16 
Badiou’s solution to the problem (which insists on an ethics of truths indifferent to 
the actual multiplicity of differences in the world) is completely different to 
Deleuze’s Spinozist ethics, but their diagnosis of difference conceived only in terms 
of a difference from identity is the same: integration is an apparatus of capture. 
                                                          
15 See Elizabeth Anker, Fictions of Dignity: Embodying Human Rights in World Literature, (New York: 
Cornell University Press 2017). 
16 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil trans. Peter Hallward, (London: Verso 
2012; Paris: Editions Hatier 1993), pp.24-25. 
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This is why, in my fourth chapter, I attempted to elude the apparatus of capture 
by which the becoming of world literature is integrated into a cosmopolitan identity 
of the same. There, Deleuze’s modernist philosophy of time already presumes a 
dissolved or larval subject that is, I contend, a postcolonial ethics of alterity which 
cannot be reduced to the identity of the same. In place of the politics of the 
republic of letters which reduces difference to the same, and temporal unevenness 
to the chronological rule of Empire, the fictions of Coetzee, Ghosh, Wright and 
others allows us to think a speculative cartography and literary philosophy that is 
not simply “US nationalism masquerading as globalism” (as Spivak wryly observed) 
but which is multiple, differential, nomadic and thinks “with” rather than “for” 
those for whom the universal time of globalisation is to be rejected in favour of the 
innumerable lines of flight and durations which continually escape it, unravel it and 
deterritorialise it towards futures and peoples unknown and imperceptible.17 The 
third synthesis of time, the disjunctive or “both/neither”, provides a logic for 
thinking the future in terms of radical alterity, a break or caesura in time, rather 
than a progressive integration of those durations outside of European modernity 
into its orbit. My reading of the novels of Coetzee, Ghosh, and Wright is speculative 
in this respect, because it aims to think the philosophical consequences of the 
aesthetic encounter in terms of Deleuze, rather than applying a philosophy of 
literature that would be given in advance.  
Cultural difference and the multiplicity of perspectives alive in the world today, 
need to be thought together with an ethics of world literature that does not merely 
repeat the forms of European, bourgeois subjectivity at its peripheries but which 
can think the politics of alterity in terms of a singular vocation: a new Earth and a 
people yet to come. The people yet to come are not persons or individuals 
fundamentally like us but merely lacking human rights or parliamentary democracy; 
they must be called for via the practice of what Deleuze calls, after Henri Bergson, 
“fabulation”.18 
                                                          
17 Spivak, Death of a Discipline, p.108. 
18 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema II: The Time Image trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (London: 
Athlone 1989; Paris: Les Editions de Minuit 1985), p.150. Translation modified. Note Tomlinson and 
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In Cinema 2 Deleuze defines fabulation in terms of a process of “fictioning the 
real” (l’affabulation réalisante), using the films of the Canadian documentary maker 
Pierre Perrault as an example.19 Perrault was a documentary maker, but a strange 
one in that he actively sought to create situations in which he became entangled 
with his subjects. In his 1963 film, Pour la Suite du Monde, Perrault works with a 
group of Québequois islanders to resume a long-abandoned collective fishing 
method of erecting weir barriers in the St Lawrence river in order to catch white 
dolphins, and the camera follows the islanders’ enthusiastic attempts to revive 
these forgotten or discarded aspects of their cultural history. Perrault’s cinema is 
not opposed to truth, or the real, but operates by way of a pure simulacrum or 
fictioning which Deleuze terms “the powers of the false”.20 Fabulation’s falsifying 
power happens as something in-between Perrault’s camera and the islanders, who 
need one another as intercessors or operators for their becoming. Perrault is no 
less the author of the fiction than the islanders are its subject: 
When Perrault is addressing his real characters of Quebec, it is not simply to 
eliminate fiction but to free it from the model of truth which penetrates it, and 
on the contrary to rediscover the pure and simple story-telling function which is 
opposed to this model. What is opposed to fiction is not the real; it is not the 
truth which is always that of the masters or colonisers; it is the story-telling 
function of the poor, in so far as it gives the false the power which makes it into 
a memory, a legend, a monster.21 
The people which emerge out of Perrault’s film are not so much a subaltern-
coming-to-language, but far more than a previously ignored minority gaining 
recognition—it’s a community that wasn’t there before and couldn’t be predicted 
by empirical research alone. Their fictioning makes the white dolphin into a legend, 
a monstering that enables their becoming-animal as a mode of narration that is 
unfixed from subjective and objective predicates. It’s not a Utopia either, an ideal 
                                                          
Galeta translate ‘l’affabulation’ as ‘story-telling’, which, in my view, mistakenly removes its 
conceptual specificity in Bergson. 
19 The English translators also term this process “story-telling becoming reality”. Deleuze, Cinema II, 
pp.324-245, n.37. 
20 Ibid. p.126. 
21 Ibid. p.150. 
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or transcendent world separate from our own, but a process of becoming-other 
than the possibilities offered by the present state of affairs. For Deleuze, the task of 
the modern work is to abandon Utopia and instead “take up Bergson’s notion of 
fabulation and give it a political meaning”.22  
Perrault’s film, like the geoliterature of Yacine, Farès and Djebar, or the 
writing machines of Marechera, or the aberrant durations of Coetzee, Ghosh and 
Wright, functions in the manner of a probe which scans the past, searching for lines 
of flight and modes of becoming outside of the categories of “the colonised”, “the 
Other” or “those-who-are-not-us”. In the manner of a “cartography of the virtual” 
the fictions of fabulation contribute to the invention of a people to come in a real 
(which is to say, false) way other than utopianism. In this sense, as Ronald Bogue 
has argued, writing is its own becoming: 
For Deleuze, then, to write is not to propose models of an ideal world but to 
hint at possibilities, to open a way forward through an experimentation on 
the real, an unsettling of the powers that be—their institutions, practices, 
categories and concepts—a process of becoming-other that engages in the 
generative forces of metamorphosis immanent within the world.23 
A geoliterature is always a plugging into the lines of flight which criss-cross the real, 
opening up paths of escape and resistances to the present state of things. Whether 
in Captain Ahab’s becoming-whale, or Gregor’s becoming-insect, world literatures 
express their ethical and political function when they take on the power of the 
false: as fables which become their own becoming; a fictioning. The mode of 
speculative cartography or fictioning the real which world literature sometimes 
undergoes, and which I have variously mapped in the course of my analysis, 
consists in texts for which the world is not a metaphor of integration and 
recognition, but an infernal collection of lines through which one might flee: a 
cartography of escape. This is not prediction, much less a Utopia, but a method of 
                                                          
22 Gilles Deleuze and Antonio Negri, “Control and Becoming”, in Gilles, Deleuze, Negotiations 1972-
1990 trans. Martin Joughin, (New York: Columbia University Press 1995; Paris: Les Editions de Minuit 
1990), p.174. 
23 Ronald Bogue, Deleuzian Fabulation and the Scars of History, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press 2010), p.223. 
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fictioning the real which collaborates with the reader in resisting the present and 
summoning a new people and a new Earth. The world will always be more than the 
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